University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

8-2014

Trust in News Media in post-Communist Eastern Europe: The
Case of Serbia
Ivanka Pjesivac
University of Tennessee - Knoxville, iradovi1@utk.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss
Part of the International and Intercultural Communication Commons, Journalism Studies Commons,
and the Mass Communication Commons

Recommended Citation
Pjesivac, Ivanka, "Trust in News Media in post-Communist Eastern Europe: The Case of Serbia. " PhD
diss., University of Tennessee, 2014.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2846

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Ivanka Pjesivac entitled "Trust in News Media
in post-Communist Eastern Europe: The Case of Serbia." I have examined the final electronic
copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in
Communication and Information.
Catherine A. Luther, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Peter Gross, Nicholas Geidner, Brandon Prins
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Trust in News Media in post-Communist Eastern Europe: The Case of Serbia

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Ivanka Pjesivac
August 2014

ii

Copyright©2014 by Ivanka Pjesivac
All rights reserved.

iii

DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to the loving memory of my parents, my mother Slavica
Radović and my father, Maksim Radović. They taught me to work hard, to live an honest live,
and to be fair and just. They extremely valued good education and rooted in me the love for
reading and the passion for problem solving. They spent days in teaching me how to approach
math problems and evenings in reading and explaining literature classics. They encouraged me to
learn foreign languages, explore novel places, and discover something new every day. They
taught me to deeply respect the place I come from, but let me choose where I would like to go.
They wanted me to always do what I love and never be afraid of pursuing my dreams. Because
of them, I was able to find knowledge and new experiences in each place I went.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my deep gratitude to the four professors who served on my
dissertation committee.
To Dr. Catherine Luther, my committee chair: Your mentorship and your knowledge of
international journalism helped me tremendously in envisaging and finishing this dissertation
study. Thank you for your constructive criticism, for your careful editorial eye, and for your
willingness to share your vast knowledge. Thank you also for the enormous support that you
have been giving to me throughout the graduate school. Without it, I wouldn’t have been able to
make it to the finish line. I am deeply indebted to you for all your advice, support, help, and
encouragement.
To Dr. Peter Gross: Your immense knowledge and deep understanding of media systems and
journalism in Eastern Europe helped me focus the theoretical perspective of this dissertation
study and define some of the main problems in news media performance in the region. Thank
you for your support and your valuable comments in the process of writing this dissertation, as
well as for all your support during my graduate work at the University of Tennessee.
To Dr. Nicholas Geidner: Your knowledge of quantitative methodology helped me find my way
not only through this dissertation study, but also through many other reseach projects. Thank you
for unselfishly sharing your methodological and data analytical knowledge with me. Thank you
for teaching me, for always being there to answer my questions, and for challenging me to think
more clearly about research studies. Because of it, I am a better researcher.
To Dr. Brandon Prins: Thank you for your patience, understanding and support during this
process. Your knowledge of international politics helped me understand better its relationship

v

with media systems around the world. Thank you for teaching me how to think theoretically
about international politics, as well as for being constructive and practical in your advice.
I would also like to thank Dr. Jörg Matthes, from the University of Vienna, for dedicating
his time to advise me on the trust in news media measurement issues, and for his helpful
suggestions on the use of vignettes in measuring performance aspects. I am also thankful to the
citizens of Serbia who participated in this study. Your kindness and willingness to devote time to
me are appreciated. Without your participation this study would not be possible. I would like to
thank Mr. Predrag Kurčubić, the research director of media CT and public affairs at IPSOS,
Strategic Marketing Agency from Belgrade, Serbia. Thank you for your utmost respect of
professional norms when collecting survey data for this dissertation. I appreciate your
punctuality, your knowledge of public opinion surveying, and your impeccable implementation
of this project. I am enormously grateful to the McClure family, whose W.K. McClure
Scholarship Program for the Study of World Affairs paid for the collection of field data for this
dissertation. Without your generosity and investment in young scholars, this dissertation would
not be possible. Finally, I would like to thank my beautiful family - my husband, Raško Pješivac,
and my 2-year-old daughter, Mila for their love, support and patience that made possible the
successful completion of this project. I am eternally grateful to you two!

vi

ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this dissertation research was to examine the influences of cultural
and performance factors on trust in news media in Serbia. This was done by conducting a survey
on a stratified random sample of the Serbian population (N=544). Before testing cultural and
performance theories, this dissertation explored the meanings of trust in news media and trust in
other people in Serbia, in order to properly operationalize these concepts and establish their
conceptual equivalence needed for their adequate measurement. This was done by 20 in-depth
interviews with representatives of the Serbian population. The results of this dissertation study
showed that both cultural and performance factors play a role in determining trust in news media
in Serbia. However, the performance explanation, measured as assessments of news media
corruption, was found to be slightly more powerful than the cultural explanation, measured as
generalized trust, or trust in people that we don’t know personally. In addition, the results of this
dissertation study showed that more than 20 years after the fall of Communism and 13 years after
the fall of Slobodan Milošević’s authoritative regime, the pervasiveness of distrust remains
present in Serbia. Serbians who participated in this study expressed skepticism about their news
media and distrust of people they don’t know personally. Conceptualizing trust in news media as
well as trust in other people in the same way as their Western counterparts, Serbians thought that
Western standards, necessary for trust in news media and other people to occur, such as fair
selectivity of news, objectivity, neutrality, accuracy in reporting or sincerity in helping other
people, were not met or applicable in their country.
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CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
Trust has been considered a foundation of social order and cohesion that often determines
nation’s well-being and its ability to organize and compete (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993;
2000). Frequently equated with the notions of reliance, dependence or faith (Barber, 1983), trust
enables social relations to function on the basis of promise. Thus it becomes essential for stable
relationships, maintenance of cooperation, and for even the most routine of everyday interactions
(Misztal, 1988). Presupposing an essential confidence that people place in each other, trust
reduces uncertainty about the future and the need to continually make provisions for the
possibility of devious behavior among actors. The presence of trust increases the desire of people
to take risks for productive social exchange and facilitates everyday life as it fosters acts of
tolerance and acceptance of otherness. In this atmosphere, daily living becomes easier, happier,
and more confident (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002).
A common threshold for classifying countries as democracies is that the governments do
not rely on coercion but depend on voluntary acceptance of citizens to obey the law and accept
the decisions of authorities. In this regard, citizens place confidence, under condition of risk, in
democratic institutions and trust that the government will not misuse its power (Luhiste, 2006).
New democracies, such as the countries of post-Communist Eastern Europe, have faced a
difficult task of building this type of relationship. In traditional democracies, common
knowledge and social representations of political phenomena are formed on the basis of past
experience (Markova, 2004). In post-Communist societies, where the historical knowledge
relates to the oppression by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, distrust, uncertainty, and
skepticism towards all institutions have been widespread and pervasive (Macek & Markova,
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2004). Studying trust in institutions in post-Communist countries scholars have found that
citizens’ perceptions of all political institutions stay largely negative (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007;
Mishler & Rose, 1997; Mishler & Rose, 2001).
News media are one of the important institutions in any democratic setting. They are
expected to survey the world, report and interpret the ongoing events. Especially significant is
the surveillance of decision makers; the public, who sees journalists as its eyes and ears, expect
them to scrutinize government performance and report about it (Graber, 2010). Although a
certain level of distrust towards institutions is a healthy characteristic of a democratic system, a
very low level of trust could endanger news media’s ability to inform citizens and monitor the
work of the government (Gaziano, 1988; Muller, 2010). As Bok (1979) stated, “society whose
members are unable to distinguish truthful messages from deceptive ones, would collapse” (p.
18).
In recent decades scholars have noted decreasing levels of trust in news media in Western
societies. A 2011 Pew Research Center report shows that confidence in the news media in the
United States has been steadily declining since 1985 and reached its all-time low in 2011, when
66% of Americans thought that news stories produced by traditional media outlets were
inaccurate (Pew Research Center, 2011). In a more recent survey, credibility ratings for nine of
13 news organizations tested, including national newspapers, cable news outlets, broadcast TV
networks, and National Public Radio, have fallen significantly (Pew Research Center, 2012). A
world-wide survey conducted in 2006 showed that, in the United Kingdom, 64% of viewers did
not consider that broadcast news media report all sides of the story (BBC, Reuters & Media
Center Poll, 2006).
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In Eastern Europe, news media have undergone tremendous changes since the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989. They have been confronted not only with the breakdown of the old
institutional methods of control, but also with the challenge of having to evolve from one stable
state of the media system to another (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013), from one in which they served
the government to another in which they ought to control its power. With the process of their
transformation still not over, news media in Eastern Europe are today facing the challenge of
regaining public trust, devastated by their role of serving the state under real-socialism
(Sztompka, 2000). Studies conducted during the 1990s and in the first decade of 2000 show that
this process might be slow as the skepticism towards news media prevails among the countries in
the region (e.g., Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Stompka, 2000).
Serbia is one of the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe, where, during more
than five decades of Communism (1943-1989) and a decade of authoritarian regime of Slobodan
Milošević (1989-2000), the state had strong control over its citizens.1 The one-party system
assumed that Communists were in charge of political and social life and that any counterideologies should be eliminated, usually using the assistance of a strong secret service (Milic,
2006). During both periods, state news media played a propagandistic role, serving the interest of
the state rather than citizens. As such, they had been clearly perceived by citizens as part of the
state apparatus, and their messages were highly doubted or even profoundly distrusted, as was
the case with Milošević’s media (Glenny, 1996). After the introduction of democracy in the
country in 2000 (TheMacroDataGuide, 2010)2, media workers in Serbia had the opportunity to
1

Besides these examples from the recent past, it has to be noted that Serbia has been under several oppressive
regimes during its history.
2
On the Polity IV index, Serbia (then part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) moved from autocratic country
(score -7) in mid 1990s to democratic country (score +7) in 2000, with the ousting of Slobodan Milošević and with
the consolidation of the democratic government. The Polity index ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full
democracy), where -6 represents the threshold for autocracy, and +6, the threshold for democracy. More on the
democracy in Serbia today can be found in Chapter II.
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learn about Western-style of news media operations through various trainings in the areas of
reporting, production, and management (Hoffman, 2002; Peters, 2010; The Delegation of the
European Commission to the Republic of Serbia, 2009). However, the complex influence of
economic crisis, its impact on the media market, low salaries, low ethical standards, selfcensorship, and political and business pressures, have led to low standards in Serbian journalism
(IREX, 2012). The low journalistic standards and contemporary media practices might be
influencing trust in news media in Serbia. The cultural legacies of general distrust towards other
people noted during Communism and authoritarianism might also be impacting news media
trust. These two explanations about the origin of trust in news media are reflected in two
theoretical traditions that compete as dominant perspectives about the source of trust in
institutions: cultural theories, which hypothesize that trust in all institutions is exogenous, and
performance theories, which hypothesize that trust is endogenous to institutions. The main
purpose of this dissertation research is to examine the influences of cultural and performance
factors on trust in news media in Serbia, by conducting a survey on a stratified random of the
Serbian population (N=544). Before testing these theories, it was necessary to explore the
meanings of trust in news media and trust in other people in Serbia, in order to properly
operationalize these concepts and establish their conceptual equivalence needed for their
adequate measurement. This was done by 20 in-depth interviews with representatives of the
Serbian population. The rationale for conducting this study is presented below.

Dissertation Research Rationale
Due to the history of oppressive rule that destroyed social capital, the conceptualization
of trust in a post-Communist country might differ from Western perspectives. In Western
literature, trust has carried a positive connotation of a foundation of social order and cohesion
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(e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; 2000) necessary for the functioning of governments and
institutions (Luhiste, 2006), as well as for all stable relationships (Misztal, 1988). Low levels of
social trust were feared to bring instability and unproductivity (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam,
1993; 2000), and in the domain of news media, potential inability to properly inform citizens
(Gaziano, 1988; Muller, 2010). In Eastern Europe, however, the relationship towards trust has
been somehow different. Due to the controlling rule of past regimes, distrust in everything and
everybody that did not belong to immediate circles of family and close friends spread to the
entire region and might have become part of the cultural heritage (Lovell, 2001; Paldam &
Svedsen, 2001; Sztompka, 2000; Traps, 2009). During Communism, for example, Eastern
Europeans perceived generalized trust as “naïve” or even “stupid” (Sztompka, 2000) and thought
that news media, being part of an authoritarian state apparatus, were sources of lies and
manipulations (e.g., Sztompka, 2000). Research shows that these beliefs did not disappear with
the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, as people in the region stayed generally skeptical
about trustworthiness of people that they didn’t know personally, state institutions, as well as
news media (e.g., Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010; GfK Croatia, 2012; IREX, 2012; Mishler &
Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000). Having lived in an atmosphere where fear, suspicion and
intolerance dominated public life, it is not even clear whether the people in the region could
differentiate trust from fear, risk, or faith (Macek & Markova, 2004). As Mishler and Rose
(1997) explain, the meaning of trust is different for a Westerner than for a Pole or Ukrainian.
Even if Americans say they distrust Congress, this does not mean that they endorse its abolition
or even favor fundamental reforms. In post-Communist societies, Mishler and Rose (1997) note
that about a quarter of all citizens favor the suspension of parliament, and even more think it
could happen.
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One of the goals of this dissertation is to delve into the meanings of trust in news media
and trust in other people in Serbia, in order to verify whether these concepts in Serbia are
conceptually equivalent with their Western operationalizations, which have been widely used as
measurements of trust in news media and other people. By doing so, this dissertation research
tries to discover the position of Serbians towards their news media and other people, as well the
characteristics the news media should have in order to be considered trustworthy in Serbia. Trust
in news media and trust in other people have been studied for a long time in Western literature
(e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Cole, 1973; Jacobson, 1969; Flanagin & Metzger, 2000; Kiousis, 2001;
Mishler & Rose, 2001; Kim, 2005; Kohring & Matthes, 2007; Roper, 1985; Westley & Severin,
1964), but their meanings have not been qualitatively assessed in Eastern Europe. By exploring
the meanings of trust in other people and in news media in one of the Eastern European
countries, this dissertation makes the first step in properly defining the concepts in this region,
which is necessary for their accurate operationalization and measurement.
The main goal of this dissertation research is to test the factors that affect trust in news
media in Serbia. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the levels of trust in news media in Eastern
Europe have been measured mostly by surveys in the scope of assessing trust in all institutions in
the region (e.g., Macek & Markova, 2004; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000). While these
surveys have documented levels of trust in the press, television and radio, they have not
identified the variables that might affect that trust. Cultural and performance theories have
opposing views of what might influence trust in institutions. Cultural theories posit that
predisposition towards trust as part of cultural heritage determine people’s attitude towards it
(e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Inglehart, 1990). These theories
have been supported by a number of psychological studies that have shown that attitudes towards
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trust are learned during a person’s childhood and formative years (Traps, 2009), have a
remarkable stability over time (Bjornskov, 2007), and take decades rather than years to adjust, as
well as by studies that have shown that generalized sense of trust towards other people has been
positively correlated with trust in political and social institutions (Cole, 1973; Brehm & Rahn,
1997; Dowley & Silver, 2002; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton, 2001) and news media (Pjesivac
& Imre, 2013). In contrast, performance theories view trust as endogenous to institutions and
consider it a consequence of institutional functioning. These theories assume that, simply,
institutions that perform well are likely to be trusted (e.g., Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton &
Norris, 2000; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). In the domain of news media, these theories have
indirectly been supported by studies that have found that sensationalized news stories (e.g.,
Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000), biased reporting, serving the interests of political regimes and
businesses rather than the public (e.g., Liu & Bates, 2009; Open Society Institute, 2005) can hurt
the believability in news.
Following the assumptions of cultural and performance theories, this dissertation tests the
assumption that both generalized trust and journalistic performance play important roles in
determining trust in news media in Serbia. Although, when tested separately both factors have
been shown to have effects on trust in institutions, studies that have tested cultural and
performance theories together have generated ambiguous results: some researchers found that a
cultural factor prevailed in people’s evaluation of trust in institutions (e.g., Luhiste, 2006),
whereas others have noted that a performance factor had better empirical support (e.g., Misher &
Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). Taking into account these contradictory results, this
dissertation research further examines the strength of the effects of cultural and performance
factors in predicting trust in news media and tests several extraneous variables that could
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potentially moderate the relationship between the independent variables and the criterion
variable. This dissertation also explored, due to the lack of an adequate conceptualization of
news media performance in the literature, the meaning of this concept among the Serbian
population. A measure of news media performance was then developed, pretested, and used in
the survey portion of this dissertation study.
Understanding where trust in news media originates is important for testing the
competing theories, but it also has significant implications for the consolidation of new
democracies. If trust in news media, as one of the important institutions in democratic societies,
is rooted in deep social norms and is culturally determined, there is little that can be done to
cultivate, in the short run, trust in them in a transitional society. In other words, if the culture of
trust is path dependent, it will take decades rather than years to develop trust necessary for news
media to function effectively. However, if trust originates in the performance of news media,
new media systems in Eastern Europe can generate increased trust by abstaining from
unprofessional practices, a change that would not take generations to be implemented (Mishler &
Rose, 2001). By singling out cultural factors from performance factors, this dissertation tries to
distinguish between the importance of the past (culture) and the present (performance of the
media) in evaluating the news media. It therefore adds to the understanding of how strong the
“habits of the heart” are in a country where 55-years of communism and authoritarianism might
have severely undermined the trusting disposition of citizens. In this regard, the study adds to the
understanding of the social character of Eastern European peoples, a variable unfairly ignored in
the studies of democratic processes in the region (Meštrović, Letica, & Goreta, 1993).
The next Chapter will present a background on news media in post-Communist countries
and provide a brief history of Serbia and its news media. It will be followed by a Chapter that
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delves deep into the literature on the concepts of trust and news media relevant for this study; it
sets this study’s theoretical framework by providing an overview of cultural and performance
theories of institutional trust and outlines the study’s research questions and hypotheses. Chapter
4 explains the methods that will be used for this dissertation research; Chapter 5 describes the
results of this dissertation research; and Chapter 6 integrates the existing theories with the results
of this study in order to discuss possible implications of this research for the literature on trust in
news media in Eastern Europe.
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CHAPTER II:
BACKGROUND
News Media in post-Communist Countries
The landscape of east Europe is a mosaic of different nationalities that have their own
languages, religions, and cultures. The region that spreads from the border with Russia in the
east, to Czech Republic in the west and from Estonia in the north to Albania in the south, has
been, through history, subordinate to empires of Europe: the Ottoman Empire in the south, the
Russian Empire to the east, and the Austro-Hungarian and Prussian empires to the west. During
these rules, the peoples of Eastern Europe have struggled to develop or preserve their national
identities against attempts to assimilate them. Thus, when they obtained independence, most
after World War I, virtually all were economically behind and politically troubled. Interwar
leaders, most of whom were authoritarian, were unable to deal with old ethnic issues and new
demands of development. This increased the vulnerabilities of the countries in the region and
made them an easy target for German invasion that started with the occupation of Poland in
1939. World War II proved devastating for the region, with countries such as Poland, Ukraine,
Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states, suffering great loss of life as well as physical destruction
(Wolchik & Curry, 2011).
Although Communist parties came with the 1917 October revolution in Russia and were
briefly established in 1921 in some other Eastern European states, Communists consolidated
their power following World War II, after victorious Soviet troops marched in many of these
countries. The Communist rule intended to put everything under its control and direction. The
one-party system was established with active mobilizations of the population into Party
membership. All state institutions as well as companies were put under Communist control.
Private land and other property were seized from owners, and intellectuals who had connections
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with the West or who had simply criticized the new power structures were put on trials, sent to
labor camps, or in worst cases executed (Wolchik & Curry, 2011).
Under Communism in Eastern Europe, it was generally accepted that news media served
the state. The Communist party controlled the information that was disseminated through the
news media, as knowledge distribution was vital for the survival of the ruling ideology (O’Neil,
1997). The mass media were usually conceived as gigantic institutions headed by party
representatives. Journalists were considered to be public officials and censorship and selfcensorship were widespread. Journalistic professionalism, in a Western sense of the word, did
not exist, but journalism was expected to be carried in accordance with functional necessities and
Communist party ideology. Thus journalism was considered to be a sort of community
profession, serving for what was the best for the community defined by the Communist party
(Gross, 2002). This model of the press was described by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956)
as the Soviet-Communist model. Inspired by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist thought, SovietCommunist model of the press assumed that mass communication systems should be integral to
the state. Conceived to have an instrumental role, news media were meant to be spokespersons of
the dominant ideology. Under the tight control of the ruling elites, news media were conveying
the words of the Communist party to large masses, as it was assumed that the truth was to arrive
to collective deliberation only by the Party. In that context, only state media were allowed to
exist (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956). It has to be noted though that the level of state
control of news media varied between countries of Eastern Europe as the system of Communism
itself was different across the region. In Romania, for example, the classical model of Stalinism
persisted, whereas in Poland the decay of a pure Communist system that dated back to the 1950s
allowed for media diversification. In Czechoslovakia, the relaxation of control over media
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culminated in the late 1960, whereas in East Germany, the Russian invasion of 1968 brought an
extremely rigid and controlled media system (Sparks, 1997).
The shift from Communism to the new system represented a fast and dramatic change for
the region. Within two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the countries that belonged
to the Communist system had to pass from “state socialism” to capitalism and liberal democracy.
Political parties emerged and the fundamental legal and institutional structure of the societies
started to change (Hallin & Mancini, 2013). This shift to a fundamentally different political and
economic system was reflected in the changes in news media as well (Jakubowicz, 2005). In the
short period of time, journalists obtained unprecedented freedom from state control, although
mass media still faced the challenge of transformation from state to private ownership (Hallin &
Mancini, 2013). Media systems had to face two separate but interrelated stages: transition and
transformation. As Gross and Jakubowicz (2013) describe, in the transition stage, old political
and media systems collapse and take with them old methods of controlling the media. For
Eastern European countries, this represented a transition away from the Communist media
system. During the time immediately after the transition, old systems of control, which included
censors, were no longer effective, and many new newspapers and eventually, private radio and
television stations appeared. It was the time when thousands of new journalists and others, who
considered journalism as a tool for political advocacy, entered the profession. In the
transformation stage, the evolution from one stable state of the media system to another is
expected to happen. In Eastern European countries, the transformation assumed formulation of
full-fledged media policies that espouse the principles of freedom of speech, conformity with
Western standards, and the creation of a stable new media system, whatever its nature. In most
former Communist countries, both transition and transformation were expected to ultimately
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create a mass media system that would introduce and support Western type of journalism into
Eastern European practice (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013).
However, as the situation in post-Communist countries has been quite dynamic, mass
media systems have, in the last twenty years, achieved different forms and stages of development
in various countries in the region. In some countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and the former
Soviet countries, the changes in media systems were mainly dictated by the ruling elites
simultaneously with political and social changes. The changes were made at the top level but the
majority of media professionals remained in their posts and the structures imposed by
Communist regimes did not experience big disruptions. Media policy and changes were
negotiated between elite groups without the participation of mass population (Sparks, 1997). In
other countries, bureaucracy briefly lost control of the change due to disruptive events such as
velvet revolutions3. In these countries, transition remained in suspension for a considerable time,
and then moved forward, or even reverted to the previous situation, such as the case with
Ukraine (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013). In Serbia and Croatia, on the other hand, extreme
governments took control of the mass media systems for a certain period of time (Sparks, 1997),
whereas in Slovakia the new government led by Vladimir Mečiar severely attacked journalists by
legal, economic and even violent pressures, which substantially slowed down the process of
journalistic professionalization in the country (Johnson, 2013).The media of East Germany were
absorbed into an already existing capitalist system (Sparks, 1997), whereas in Belarus, state-run
and strictly controlled outlets dominated the media landscape (Manaev, Manaeva, & Yuran,
2013).

3

Civil and/or opposition protests against the regimes in some countries of Eastern Europe, which led to the
overthrow of the ruling regimes.
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The variations in post-Communism in the region have created a deficiency of a common
theoretical model for studying news media in the region. Hallin and Mancini (2004) have
compared media systems in capitalistic advanced democracies by grouping them into three
models: the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, the North/Central European or
Democratic Corporatist Model, and the North Atlantic or Liberal Model. In a later work, the
authors recognized the need for the development of a new Model which would group Eastern
European media systems. They found that media systems in Eastern Europe share certain
similarities with their Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, especially in the domain of
state intervention in the media sector. In both regions, there is a strong role of the state in
regulating and funding media as well as in defining news agendas. In both regions, there is a
formidable connection between party politics and media, reflected in state intervention through
politically connected private actors in media enterprises. Noting these similarities, Hallin and
Mancini (2013) argue that in setting theoretical boundaries for media systems in Eastern Europe,
much more attention should be paid to the role of the state in controlling the media sector,
through processes of politicized privatizations, advertising and domination over public
broadcasters. In addition, they recognize that foreign influences have been much more present in
the development of Eastern European media systems than those in Western Europe. For
example, both extensive foreign ownership and the importation of Western models of
professional practice have represented major factors that affected media in Eastern Europe.
Finally, Hallin and Mancini (2013) argue that a unifying media theory for the region should
consider the interplay between media, civil society and political parties, taking into account that
civil society is still underdeveloped in Eastern Europe and that political parties represent more
authoritative institutions than a bridge between state and civil society.
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Jakubowicz (2013) proposes that media systems in the region should be studied in
relationship with socio-political circumstances, as they are, as the author claims, asymmetrically
interdependent. To explain this association, he uses three criteria: the scope of political and
administrative control over the media, specific institutional solutions, and normative attitudes of
political elites. The first criterion assumes that the level of control of the media in the region
depends on whether the country is democratic, semi-democratic or autocratic. Democratic
countries are, according to him, those where the process of democratic consolidation and the
progress of economic reforms are well advanced (e.g., the countries of Eastern Europe that have
entered the European Union). Semi-democratic countries include, according to Jakubowicz’s
(2013) classification, the countries that have been less successful in creating a stable democratic
system, which resulted in violent conflicts, creation of regimes that resemble their socialist
predecessors, or creation of hybrid regimes that combined liberal tendencies with aspects of the
socialist past (e.g., Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan). Authoritarian regimes within Eastern Europe
differ from Communist dictatorships in some respects but deny their citizens fundamental
political rights (e.g., Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus). Media freedom and independence is
higher in democratic countries, where competitive politics and media pluralism prevail, and
progressively lower in semi-democratic countries characterized by oligarchization, and
authoritarian countries, where the author notes a return to strict censorship (Jakubowicz, 2013).
Especially important for news programs are general media orientations that Jakubowicz
(2013) sees as being developed in five different directions in Eastern Europe: 1) idealistic
orientation, endorsing the introduction of direct, participatory communicative democracy; 2)
idealistic-mimetic, oriented toward the introduction of an idealized Western media system
involving more elements of citizen participation; 3) mimetic, straight transplantation of the
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Western media system; 4) materialist, promoting privatization of all media as a way of
eliminating state or political control over them; and 5) atavistic, involving continuation of new
forms of effective command-and-control systems, by allowing political elites to control the
media. Idealistic and materialist orientations never gained support in post-Communist countries.
Jakubowicz (2013) writes that democratic post-Communist countries have adopted mainly the
mimetic orientation, semi-democratic ones a mixture of mimetic and atavistic orientations, and
the autocratic ones primarily atavistic orientation.
In terms of specific institutional solutions, Jakubowicz (2013) explains that postCommunist countries can be categorized with regard to their particular choice of executive
power structures (presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary), legislature (single or double
chamber), political parties (adversarial or consociational), and electoral system (majoritarian,
mixed). The institutional choices correspond with some of the key characteristics of media
systems in post-Communist countries, particularly in the broadcasting sector, where broadcasting
regulatory authorities represent a direct extension of political powers. Finally, Jakubowicz
(2013) notes that attitudes of political elites influence media freedom and independence in
Eastern Europe. In some countries two major paradigms prevail: liberal, which favors the
complete withdrawal of the state from the media, and the paradigm of service to national values,
which assumes that media should be in service of the reconstruction and reinforcement of
national identity and support national cultures. Despite this duality, political culture in Eastern
Europe generally favors control of media by political elites, which regard media as tools of
political agitation and propaganda, a means of political mobilization rather than political
information (Jakubowicz, 2013).
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In Jakubowicz’s (2013) typology Serbia falls under the group of democratic countries
that are assumed to have fairly stable democratic institutions and media systems that resemble
either a mimetic one, which imitates the Western style, or a selective-atavistic one, where
privately-owned print and broadcast media might be beyond the control of the ruling
establishment,4 but where the public service is still controlled by the state.

The Case of Serbia
After World War II Serbia was part of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY), a one party socialist-communist country composed of six republics and two
autonomous provinces, each representing different ethnic groups. Under the idea of “brotherhood
and unity” Yugoslavia incorporated Muslims, Eastern Orthodox, and Catholics; Serbs, Croats,
Slovenes, Bosniacs, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Albanians, Hungarians, Italians, Slovaks,
Checks, Turks, and others. The country was ruled by Josip Broz Tito, who seized power with his
Communist-led partisans during World War II and governed until his death in 1980. Tito’s ruling
system was characterized as a form of liberal communism with open borders and heavy
international borrowing (Cox, 2002). Thanks to the implementation of liberalizing economic and
political reforms, Yugoslavia had been broadly integrated into international economic, political
and cultural development. Its unique international position allowed the country to adopt an open
foreign policy between the two Cold War blocs and to develop special relations with newly
independent countries by playing a prominent role in the movement of non-aligned countries.
The country was neither a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization nor NATO, and adopted
an economic strategy that was socialist but not Soviet, espousing self-management decision
making within the firms, trying to decentralize the economic decision-making, and liberalize

4

Other research notes, however, that political and economic influences are exercised over Serbian public as well as
private media. This will be further discussed later in this chapter, as well as in Chapter III.
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foreign trade and the banking system. The country’s socialist regime was more open, transparent,
and accepting of non-Marxist ideologies than any other country in Central and Eastern Europe.
Its citizens enjoyed opportunities to travel, work, and study abroad, while the literature and
culture forbidden in the east, from George Orwell’s 1984 to punk rock and neoliberal economics,
was prominent in the Yugoslav market (Baskin & Pickering, 2011).
Despite its relative openness, Tito’s Yugoslavia kept control over its citizens. Milovan
Djilas, a Communist political and theorist turned into one of the most prominent dissidents in
Yugoslavia, described that the Communist bureaucrats had political control, managerial power
over state enterprises and nationalized property, and exclusive right of distribution of wages and
national wealth. According to him, self-management in enterprises represented an illusion of
some kind of a new democracy, as workers’ management did not lead to the participation in the
division of profits (Djilas, 1998). Simultaneously, those who openly criticized the Communist
ideology or opposed the Communist system were publically reprimanded or sent to jails, one of
which was a notorious prison on the island of Goli Otok [Bare Island], where an estimated
32,000 male political prisoners were subjected to forced labor (Dedijer, 1984). The entire society
was pervaded by the infamous secret police UDBA, which was in charge of spying on citizens,
making lists of regime opponents, and even conducing secret executions of non-loyal citizens
(Djilas, 1998; Milic, 2006).The activities of UDBA and the presence of Goli Otok scared the
people to the point that even those who were brave enough to oppose the regime openly, thought
of committing suicide rather than being sent to labor camps on the otherwise uninhibited island.
Milovan Djilas, once a senior official in the Communist Party, who turned against the regime,
described his distress, “The shadow of Goli Otok, the concentration camp (…), loomed also over
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us. And with it the awful fear, ever suspected, ever dismissed, that there existed a secret,
inconceivable place of torment for separatists and turncoats” (Djilas, 1998, p. 168,9).
The news media in Yugoslavia existed both on national and regional levels. Thus, for
example, each unit of the Yugoslav federation had a radio-television system that functioned
separately (Veljanovski, 2005), with 180 local stations supplementing the main broadcasting
institutions. Broadcasters offered news programs not only in the main languages of SerboCroatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian, but also in minority languages such as Albanian,
Hungarian, Romanian, Turkish and Slovakian (Paulu, 1974). On the federal level, the daily
newspaper Borba, the news agency TANJUG, Radio Yugoslavia, and short-lived television
station Yutel operated as pan-Yugoslav media outlets (Volčić, 2007). News media were, for the
most part, controlled by the single party – the Communist Party. That control was less rigid than
in other communist countries, and the freedom of the press was guaranteed by the Yugoslav
Constitution and other laws (Pešić, 1994). In terms of freedom of expression, Paulu (1974)
described Yugoslavia as “the most liberal country in the Eastern European bloc” (p. 474).
Western magazines and newspapers were sold all over the country. There was no pre-censorship
and bookstores sold books that were not sympathetic to the regime or to Communism in general,
such as translations of the works of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn or George F. Kennan’s Memoires.
Yugoslavia never jammed foreign radio broadcasters and maintained friendly relations with the
BBC and Voice of America staffs (Paulu, 1974).
However, freedom of the press was limited. As Pešić (1994) describes, the name, person
and work of the leader, Tito, was protected from criticism. The Constitution also stated that “no
one may use these freedoms and rights (…) in order to disrupt the foundations of the socialist
self-management democratic order” (Pešić, 1994, p. 12). Besides Tito’s name, the basic
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Communist system was also not to be criticized, the animosities of Yugoslavia’s nationalities
were not to be incited and foreign intervention was not to be invited by undue criticism of the
Soviet Union. In addition, “hostile propaganda” was punishable by prison sentence. Thus,
individuals who wrote critical pieces about the Communist systems in Yugoslavia or in the
Soviet Union in foreign newspapers or domestic publications, such as academic journals, would
be sent to jail or the issues carrying problematic articles would be banned (Paulu, 1974). For
example, once Milovan Djilas openly started criticizing the Communist regime, and was sent to
jail, he could no longer publish his political or even literary works in Yugoslavia, and had to
send them to the United States for publication (Djilas, 1998).
The control over the media was maintained through government and Communist party
bodies: Ministry of Information and the Federal Executive Council, and through the League of
Communists with its ideological commissions. The Ministry for Information planned and
supervised the development of the information network of the country and reinforced the
ideological activities of the Party. For example, the Ministry carried the budget of the news
agency TANJUG on its books while the Executive Committee of the government planned it. The
editors of news media would come to the Ministry for “briefing sessions” on the foreign policy
line and selection of government policy statements and certain sensitive stories. Although these
formal controls were somewhat relaxed after the 1956, the government kept a fairly firm control
of the news media. Thus it still had the right to appoint three members of the Workers Council in
TANJUG and establish its larger presence through media workers’ membership in the
Communist Party. Chief editors and media directors were members of the League of
Communists as well as the substantial number of journalists. In addition, the Party formed its
“activs” within news organizations. They consisted of a party secretary and a seven-member
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secretariat that “educated the membership as well as the ‘collective’ [people working in a
particular news organization] on political and ideological matters (Robinson, 1977). As Tito said
in 1973, “We Communists have the right to interfere in everything. I am chairman of the League
of Communists and I have the right to interfere. We have the right to interfere to insure the
correct implementation of the general policy of the party, the proper development of socialism,
the proper development of social relations and brotherhood and unity, for which we shed a sea of
blood” (Paulu, 1974, p. 474).
Furthermore, it was implied that journalists were supposed to serve the government. As
Taylor and Kent (2000) write, “journalists were employed by the state, for the state and to serve
the state” (p. 356). Yugoslavia’s journalistic code of conduct integrated the “responsibility to
implement the politics of the League of Communists” (Veljanovski, 2005, p. 4) and a journalist
was defined as a “socio-political worker who, conscientiously adhering to the ideas of MarxismLeninist, (…) participates in the establishment and development of socialist self-management of
society” (Pešić, 1994, p. 12). Tito considered that the press could not be “independent” and
“autonomous” but saw it as a mechanism for the implementation of a bigger social plan – the
construction of Socialism on all levels (Paulu, 1974, p. 479). Other doctrines of the journalistic
code, which did not differ that much from the doctrine of professional journalism in the West,
offered the possibility for Yugoslav journalists to present their professional work to the world
(Veljanovski, 2005), especially in the area of foreign news reporting. Thus, news agency
TANJUG was the eight biggest world news agency and “had gained a reputation which no other
Communist states’ agencies could approach” (Pešić, 1994, p.13). It offered a news perspective
alternative to those of news agencies of the major powers, while employing the Western
journalistic practice. The agency played a pivotal role by being the first to break news of events
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such as the last day in office of the first legally elected Prime Minister of the Congo, Patrice
Lumumba, before his assassination in 1961; the U.S. ‘Bay of Pigs’ invasion of Cuba that same
year; the US-aided military coup d’état against Chile’s Popular Unity government and its
democratically elected President, Salvador Allende, in 1973; the U.S. bombardment of Tripoli in
1986; and the overthrow of the Communist regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania in 1989
(Vukasovich & Boyd-Barrett, 2012).
In the matter of domestic affairs, however, the Yugoslav media were state media that
supported the ruling Communist party. Typical news programming included information about
party leaders and governmental policies. They were never critical of the government and
showed the commonalities of the Yugoslavian people rather than differences (Taylor & Kent,
2000). Any attempts for investigative journalism were thwarted by the state. Media criticism of
certain events in the society could exist only if condoned by the Party. People who led the press
and television were carefully chosen, using the loyalty to the Party as the paramount criterion. In
that sense, Yugoslav Communism exercised strict control role over the news media (Milic,
2006). Thus, as Paulu (1974) notes, Yugoslavia might have been the most liberal of all Eastern
European societies but “should not but be equated with typical Western democracies” (p. 474).
After Tito’s death Yugoslavia continued to exist with rotating leadership and reforms did
not work well. By 1990, Yugoslav debt to Western banks had grown to $20 billion,
unemployment reached 15.9% (in the least developed region, Kosovo, it was even 38.4%), and
inflation rates had substantially grown. With the rising ethnic tensions and the proclamation of
independence by Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia was on the edge of dissolution; bloody ethnic
wars ensued leaving around 140,000 dead and millions of displaced (Baskin & Pickering, 2011;
International Center for Transnational Justice, 2009).
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Serbia was the biggest of the Yugoslav republics, and after the dissolution of the country,
stayed in the federation with the smaller republic of Montenegro until 2006, when Montenegro
declared independence. In December 1990, Slobodan Milošević, a mid-level official, won the
first multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia since World War II. His newly
formed Socialist Party of Serbia, the successor of the Communist party of Serbia, won the
majority of seats in the Parliament. His victory was considered to be a result of big rallies where
he highlighted major nationalistic issues. By the time he became the president of Serbia he had
already engineered the fall of the governments of the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, put
his key followers in media, and was considered to be the “boss of Serbia” (Cox, 2002; Sotirović,
2009). In literature, he has been described as a nationalistic leader who ruled the country as an
authoritarian and, while allowing some opposition, brutally interfered with the elements of
democracy (Cox, 2002).
During Milošević’s rule news media were either under strict control of the state or were
severely persecuted by the regime. Although the new laws allowed the formation of private
media and formally guaranteed “freedom of the press and other forms of public dissemination of
information” (Pešić, 1994, p. 16), the main media were state media: Radio-Television of Serbia,
news agency TANJUG, and daily Politika. Milošević took full control of all of them. For
example, at Radio-Television of Serbia (RTS) the government appointed all members of the
managing board and the general manager after the 1991 law enabled the centralization of three
state broadcasting centers into one (Veljanovski, 2005). The regime put its followers in key
positions and selected the journalists according to criteria related to patriotism (Pešić, 1994,
p.17). Those who did not obey those criteria were sent off to so-called “compulsory vacation” for
an indefinite period of time. More than 1,000 staff members were forced to leave because the
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regime considered them politically unsuited (Open Society Institute, 2005). Simultaneously, state
media were the main source of information for impoverished people hit by the severe economic
crisis. For example, RTS was the only broadcaster to cover the majority of the country (96%)
with average viewership of 3.5 million for its main news program (Pešić, 1994, p.15).
Unlike in the Communist era, independent reporting in Serbia did exist during the 1990s
and was reserved for private media, but they were severely persecuted by the regime.
Independent journalists were arrested for supposed treason or libel and often called the “stooges”
of Western powers (Cox, 2002). The 1998 Information Law banned, among other things, the
“breach of reputation and honor of individuals” (Article 11) and broadcasting of foreign
programs (Article 27) while Article 69 envisaged draconian punishments for breaches of the act
(Information Law of Serbia, 1998). Just in the first year after its adoption, more than 20 media
were punished for breaching the law – many of them were completely closed while others had to
pay millions of dinars in fines (Kaljević, 1999). Besides enduring harassment from Milošević’s
regime, independent journalists faced low payments. During hyperinflation in 1993, a
journalist’s monthly salary could buy a jar of pickles or beets from the mostly empty shelves of
Serbian stores. On the other hand, journalists working for news programmers of the statecontrolled media were very well paid, some of them even rewarded with apartments. Their
loyalty during the 1990s was to be proven by defending the nation during bloody ethnic wars,
which usually consisted of glorifying tradition and Serbian historical greatness, while claiming
an international conspiracy against the Serbs. The control over the news media was supported by
the powerful, former Communist State Security Service (SDB), with its paid professionals or
patriotic volunteers infiltrating the media as journalists or other media workers (Milic, 2006).
This mix of existence of private and public media, in which the criticism of political machinery
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and officials in power is severely punished, corresponds most closely to Siebert, Peterson, and
Schramm’s (1956) authoritarian model of the press. Originated out of the philosophy of the
absolute power of the leader and his government, in which the society (i.e., the leader) keeps the
right to prohibit the propagation of dangerous opinions under the pretext of preserving public
peace and order, this press model assumes that the chief purpose of mass media is to support and
advance the policies of the government. Thus, social control is imposed from one institution (the
government) to another (the press), and censorship and licensing are considered as justifiable
means for media control. In authoritarian press systems, existence of privately operated media
are allowed, but various methods of establishing the restraints over them are employed: from
granting special permits to selected individuals to engage in mass information dissemination and
introducing a licensing system for individual printed works, through employing prosecution
before the courts for violation of accepted and established rules of behavior, with treason and
sedition as the basis for prosecutions of persons suspected of disseminating information inimical
to authorities, to special taxation designed to limit the profit of private media (Siebert, Peterson,
& Schramm, 1956).
On October 5, 2000, Milošević’s regime was toppled in a massive demonstration in the
capital, Belgrade. Milošević was forced to step down and recognize the results of the September
24, 2000 federal elections in which the candidate of a coalition of democratic parties won.
Western countries supported the results of the elections and welcomed the country into the
international community by restoring diplomatic relations, sending millions of dollars in aid and
accepting the country into different international organizations (Cox, 2002). The toppling of
Milošević finally opened the way for the news media to function in a non-repressive
environment. However, the inherited problems, as well as the connections of new authorities
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with organized crime and secret services made the job more difficult (Milic, 2006). Serbia’s state
television had to be transformed to a public service broadcaster and the Broadcasting Agency of
the Republic of Serbia was formed, representing the first time in Serbia’s history that an
independent regulatory body was entrusted to act as a controller of the broadcasting sector
(Veljanovski, 2005). However, the lack of media law implementation postponed the
transformation of state television, while other state media, such as the major dailies Politika and
Večernje Novosti, along with Belgrade’s Studio B Television remained partially or fully owned
and controlled by the state. News agency TANJUG was still receiving government help, making
it more competitive than the two private national news agencies, Beta and Fonet (IREX, 2012;
Open Society Institute, March 28, 2006).
Today, Serbia is characterized as a democratic country by several organizations that
measure the level of freedom in the world, but their assessments of the level of country’s
democratization range from almost full institutionalized democracy to flawed democracy. On
Polity IV index5, which ranks the level of state democratization from -10 (full autocracy) to +10
(full institutionalized democracy), the country scored 8 for the period 2005-2010. This means
that Serbia obtained high scores on two elements: 1) the presence of institutions and procedures
through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders;
and 2) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive
(TheMacroDataGuide, 2010). Freedom House (2013)6 ranked Serbia as a free country. On a
scale for political rights and civil liberties ranging from 1 (the most free) to 7 (the least free),
5

The latest version of the Polity Project, the Polity IV, is a continuation of a research program established by Ted
Robert Gurr in the 1970s. Originally, the aim of the project was to measure political system durability. In subsequent
years, the analytical scope was broadened to encompass the issue of regime type more generally, and today the
project’s main index is a measure of the degree of democracy and autocracy.
6
Freedom House is an American organization that measures the levels of freedom around the world considering that
freedom is possible only in democratic political environments where governments are accountable to their own
people; the rule of law prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, and belief, as well as respect for the rights
of minorities and women, are guaranteed.
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Serbia obtained a freedom ranking of 2, civil liberties ranking of 2, and political rights ranking of
2. The report described the country as an electoral democracy with largely free and fair
elections, present political pluralism, generally free press, constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
religion, where citizens enjoy freedoms of assembly and association. However, the report noted
that corruption and human trafficking remained serious problems in Serbia, that judicial
independence, independence of media from political parties, and the representation of ethnic
minorities in the government had to be improved, while religiously motivated incidents
diminished. The Democracy Index 2012 (Economist, 2012)7 considered Serbia as a flawed
democracy with the overall score of 6.33 (on a scale from 1 to 10). The report included almost all
Eastern Europe countries in this category (except the Czech Republic) noting that the countries
of the region lag behind the countries in Western Europe in political participation, political
culture, and, in case of Serbia, the functioning of the government. Taking into account the
findings of these reports, which indicated that Serbia reached satisfactory levels of electoral
process, political pluralism, and the presence of democratic institutions, but noted the problems
with the functioning of the government, political culture, and some civil liberties, this
dissertation will consider Serbia as a formal but not yet a fully developed democracy.
In terms of news media, today, Serbia has 134 registered television stations, 39 cable
televisions, 377 radio stations, and 517 print media outlets. In total, the country has 1,000 media
outlets for 7.1 million people, making most of the outlets unsustainable. Although the news
media in the country are no longer experiencing extreme government pressures, as they had
during the Communist and Milošević’s eras, violations of freedom of speech are still present.
Political removals of editors and journalists, prohibitions to individual journalists to enter public
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The Democracy Index is an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit that measures the state
of democracy in 167 countries around the world.
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press conferences, attacks on journalists, trumped-up court cases against journalists, as well as
cases of state officials verbally attacking journalists remain common occurrences (IREX, 2012).
At the same time, professional standards in Serbian journalism have suffered due to the
impact of the economic crisis on the media market, low salaries, worsening ethical standards,
and heightening self-censorship. IREX’s8 panelists described situations in which the news media
have often missed coverage of serious political, economic, and social problems. Journalists often
base a story on a single source, and fail to do background research. Some are prone to
sensationalized reporting using vulgar and other inappropriate language. According to IREX’s
panelists, Serbian journalists do not possess qualified knowledge to cover specialized topics such
as economics, justice, or ecology, and are often prone to biased reporting (IREX, 2012; IREX,
2011). In addition, Anticorruption Council of the Government of Serbia (2011)9 described
corruption as one of the main problems of Serbian news media. Being closely aligned with
specific political parties or other centers of power, Serbian editors and journalists are often
inclined to publish rumors, insinuations, and half-truths (Miller, 2006-2007).
In sum, the literature on news media in post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe,
although lacking a common theoretical framework, has pointed out some shared characteristics
of media systems in the region. After the fall of Communism in 1989, most of the counties, albeit
in different ways, went through the process of transition, during which the old systems of control
became ineffective. However, the processes of news media transformation in these countries,
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International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) is an international nonprofit organization, based in the United
States, which works in transitional, conflict, and post-conflict environments, and uses specialized training and
consulting in supporting the sustainability of news media.
9
Anticorruption Council of the Government of Serbia is an expert, advisory body to the Serbian government,
founded with the mission of discovering corruption activities, proposing measures to fighting the corruption
effectively, and monitoring their implementation. The body was established by the Serbian Government on October
11, 2001, with the members appointed by the government. Its former president, Ms Verica Barać, was known as one
of the biggest fighters against the corruption in Serbia, who openly defied political and economic centers of power in
the country.
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which by definition should include the evolution from one stable system to another, from one in
which news media serve the state to one in which they serve citizens, have still not been
completed (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013; Hallin & Mancini, 2013). In Serbia, the media system
transitioned in 1989 from a Communist one, in which all media were under state control, to an
authoritarian one, in which one part of the news media were under the control of the ruling
regime, and the other were independent but severely persecuted. Functioning in a not yet fully
developed democratic society, news media in Serbia today try to imitate the Western journalistic
style, but face problems with economic and political pressures, journalistic unprofessionalism,
and violations of press freedoms (Anticorruption Council of the Government of Serbia, 2011;
IREX, 2012).
In this complex situation, in which historical, political, and social developments tie with
the transformation of media systems, it becomes hard to discern what leads people to trust news
they see, hear or read. Is it the quality of contemporary news reporting or the general distrustful
predisposition that has spilled over from the Communist past that determines the present
relationship of Serbians towards their transitional media systems? Scholars have found that in
terms of political institutions both explanations are possible in Eastern Europe (e.g., Luhiste,
2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). What’s astonishing is that the news
media have attracted less scholarly attention, despite their central role in democratic systems.
The goal of this dissertation study is to determine the origins of trust in news media in Serbia and
thus explain deeper the relationship of Serbians with their news media.
The next Chapter will delve into the scholarly literature on trust and news media, will
introduce this study’s theoretical framework by providing an overview of cultural and
performance theories of institutional trust, and will present its research questions and hypotheses.
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CHAPTER III:
CORE CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Concept of Trust
Trust is omnipresent in social relationships and as such has been attributed with multiple
meanings. The oldest connotation of trust equates this notion with faith in supranatural power on
which man feels dependent. As such trust is present in all religious beliefs and represents more
of a commitment to something than a cognitive understanding. The second concept closely
connects trust to confidence. It assumes the confidence in or reliance on some quality or
attributes of a person or thing, or the truth of a statement (Misztal, 1988). Sociological theories
of trust in modern societies, however, have differentiated trust from confidence and hope.
Modern human societies are complex entities that have shifted from communities based
on fate to those moved by human agency. In this more dynamic context, humans, who need to
face the future more actively and constructively, deploy trust as an active anticipation of the
unknown future (Sztompka, 2000). For example, politicians have to trust the viability of
proposed policies, inventors have to trust the reliabilities and usefulness of new products, and
common people have to trust representatives who act on their behalf in the domain of
government, economy, judiciary, or science (Dahrendorf, 1990). In this regard, trust is always
oriented towards future actions, towards situations in which people have to deal with uncertainty
and risk. As Sztompka (2000) states, when we are almost certain about the future and have a
high degree of control over it, there is practically no need for trust. Thus trust requires believing,
even more, believing despite uncertainty. It involves an element of risk resulting from our
inability to monitor other’s behavior (Misztal, 1988). As Luhamann (1994) explains, one can
choose to buy or not buy a used car risking that the car turns out to be “a lemon,” or hire a
babysitter leaving her unsupervised in the apartment; unless one is ready to waive the associated
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advantages, one cannot avoid taking risks in building trustworthy relationships. For Sztompka
(2000) this belief represents a bet that we place on the future contingent actions of others.
This meaning of trust included in modern sociological theory, incorporates two main
components: beliefs and commitments. When we believe, we hold specific expectations about
how things will happen in the future or how another person will behave in the future. Barber
(1983) has distinguished between the three kinds of expectations that people hold when they
allocate trust. The most general is the expectation of the persistence and fulfillment of the natural
and moral social orders. Under the first one, trust accounts for the expectations, which all
humans in a society internalize, that the natural physical and biological orders, as well as the
moral social order will persist and be realized. It is what people mean when they say, “I trust that
heavens will not fall,” or “I trust human life to survive.” Second is the expectation of the
technically competent role of performance, such as trusting the doctor to perform the operation
well (Barber, 1983). As Fukuyama (1995) writes, “we trust a doctor not to do us deliberate injury
because we expect him or her to live by the Hippocratic oath and the standards of medical
profession” (p. 26). And the third expectation assumes that partners in interaction will carry out
their fiduciary obligations and responsibilities. This expectation includes the belief that people
will in certain situations place others’ interests before their own (Barber, 1983).
Besides the contemplative consideration of future possibilities, trust involves
commitment through action, a bet on someone, an expectation about the action of others which
has a bearing on our own actions. According to Sztompka (2000), trusting involves three
different types of commitments: anticipatory, responsive, and evocative. Anticipatory
commitment assumes that people act toward others because they believe that the actions which
they carry out will be favorable to their interests, needs and expectations. For example, a man
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marries a particular woman because he believes that a woman will be a good mother. Responsive
trust involves the act of entrusting some valuable object to somebody else and expecting
responsible care. For example, this kind of commitment occurs when a person leaves a child with
a baby-sitter, place parents in a nursing home, or deposit savings in the bank. The third type of
commitment happens when people act on the belief that the other person will reciprocate with
trust - we trust intentionally to evoke trust. This is particularly characteristic for the close,
intimate relationships, among family members or friends. For example, a mother allowing her
daughter to return late in the evening from a date (Sztompka, 2000).
In modern societies, trust is directed at various objects, the targets of trust. The most
fundamental target of trust is another person. We can allocate our trust either to people in general
or to a particular person. In the former case, the trustors experience generalized trust while in the
latter case they experience particularized trust. Generalized trust assumes trust towards people
we do not know, towards complete strangers (Uslaner, 2002), whereas particularized trust arises
in face-to-face interactions and can be thought of as reputation (Bjornskov, 2007).10 The next,
more abstract target of trust is a social role. Independent of the concrete incumbents, some roles
evoke more trust than others. Mother, friend, doctor of medicine, priest, judge, notary public are
considered trusted social roles. Other roles, such as the bazaar merchant, used-car dealer,
prostitute, secret agent, spy, imply apriori distrust. Of course, the definition of some roles as
trustworthy may differ between societies, depending for example, on the social practices of
cheating and corruption (Sztompka, 2000).
The final target of trust is trust in institutions. Institutional trust refers to “confidence in
institutions under conditions of risk” and means that when one does not have full information

10

Further discussion about generalized and particularized trust will be presented later in this chapter as they are
especially important for Cultural and Performance Theories of Trust.
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about the intention and outcomes of governance, one will still be confident that governing
institutions will not misuse their power (Luhiste, 2006, p. 478). In this context, individuals place
trust in institutions such as the school, the university, the army, the church, the courts, the police,
the banks, the stock exchange, the government, the parliament, or the industrial enterprise
(Sztompka, 2000). The amount of trust that people vest in various institutions differ among
societies. It also undergoes changes in time, although these changes are relatively slow and
require not only modifications in the functioning of institutions but also physiological changes in
people who vest trust (Luhiste, 2006). Sztompka (2000) describes one of these changes in Polish
institutions. Due to its long history of foreign domination and oppression, the army and the
Catholic Church in Poland were considered as the embodiments of national struggle and
continuing identity and have always stood at the top of trusted institutions. But after the fall of
Communism in 1989, the author observed the advancement of new democratic institutions, such
as the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman to high positions in the trust hierarchy, as well as
the relative demise of the Catholic Church, which was no longer so important in its unifying role.
In sum, the review of the concept of trust shows that its meaning has changed from
passive connotations of faith and confidence to a more active anticipation of the unknown future,
whose meaning implies insufficient knowledge about the outcomes of future actions, and the
awareness of risk. In such capacity, trust can be targeted towards individuals, social roles, or
institutions. Conceptualizing trust in its modern sociological meaning, this dissertation research
studies trust in news media as an institution. News media have been studied both as a social and
a political institution. In terms of as a social institution, defined as an organization that provides a
“support system for individuals as they struggle to become members of a larger social network”
(Silverblatt, 2004, p.35), news media have been looked to as guidebooks for social behavior that
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convey societal norms and values (Silverblatt, 2004). The political angle has mainly related news
process to the structure of the state and the economy, as well as to the economic foundation of
the news organization. In this regard, news media as an institution have been studied as statecontrolled organs of propaganda but also as autonomous forces in politics that, independent of
political parties, affect political processes. At its best, the latter conceptualization of news media
is one in which journalism is capable of standing as spokesperson of civil society and monitoring
the work of the government (Schudson, 2002). This dissertation measures the institution of news
media against this ideal and uses sociological theories as well as theories of modern journalism
to conceptualize individual trust in news media.

Conceptualizing Trust in News Media
In consolidated democracies of Western Europe and Northern America, news media have
been considered one of the key institutions necessary for the surveillance of decision makers,
scrutinizing government performance, and reporting and interpreting ongoing events (Graber,
2010). Thus the study of trust in them has had a long tradition (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus
& McCann, 2003). In over eight decades of research, Western academic literature has generated
three separate, although not always clearly distinguished, lines of research about trust in news
media: 1) believability of news media organizations, 2) credibility of news media, 3) and trust in
news media as an institution.
1) The studies in the field of believability in news media organizations started in the
1930s, when the newspaper industry became concerned that an increasing number of
people were turning to radio. It gained momentum again with the arrival of television
in the 1950s, when Roper started asking about the believability of different media
(Roper, 1985). Namely, the Roper organization began regularly asking people which
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medium they would believe if they got conflicting reports of the same news from
radio, television, magazines, and newspapers. At first, newspapers were judged to be
more believable than television, but in 1961, television became the most-believed
medium (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus & McCann, 2003). Having widely
criticized Roper’s question for bias against newspapers, scholars have moved from
defining trust in news media as believability of news organizations to looking at the
multidimensionality of the construct (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus & McCann,
2003).
2) Studies on media credibility have dealt with three types of media credibility: source,
article, and organizational credibility. Defined as “the amount of believability”
attributed to a source of information by the receivers (Bracken, 2006, p. 724), source
credibility can affect attitude change. Receivers were found to be persuaded more by
sources they find more credible then by those they view less positively (McCroskey,
Hamilton, & Weiner, 1974; Pornpitakpan, 2004). The research in this domain mainly
relied on Yale Communication Research Program and Carl I. Hovland’s findings that
credibility of the source is comprised of two components: expertise, “the extent to
which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions,” and
trustworthiness, “the degree of confidence in the communicator’s intent to
communicate the assertions he considers most valid” (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley,
1953). Later, scholars proposed other dimensions of source credibility such as
dynamism, composure, and sociability (e.g., Berlo, Lemert & Mertz, 1970; Markham,
1968; Whitehead, 1968). In television studies, Markham (1968) found that besides
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trustworthiness, the entertainment factor, consisting of showmanship and dynamism
is important for TV anchors to be perceived as credible.
Article credibility focuses on the message itself. Research has shown that in some
cases message factors may be more important than source factors when assessing
credibility (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus, & Mccann, 2003). For example,
recipients turn to message cues when issue involvement, knowledge, and personal
relevance are high (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) or in situations in which little
information is available about the source of a message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1988). In
media research, characteristics of news stories are found to influence the level of
credibility that the audience attributes to them. For instance, Fico, Richardson, and
Edwards (2004) found that balanced or imbalanced story structure influenced the
perceived bias, which further influenced perceptions of newspapers credibility. The
authors explained that these results indicated that news audiences can distinguish
between balanced and imbalanced stories and give the balanced one greater trust.
The credibility of news media organization refers to the extent to which a media
organization has been perceived by the audience as (a) factual and accurate
(believability dimension) and (b) concerned mainly about the community’s interest
(community affiliation dimension) (Meyer, Marchionni, & Thorson, 2010). This
definition stems from Gaziano & McGrath’s (1986) study, which created a 12-item
scale that represented a credibility dimension. It included the perceived fairness,
accuracy, bias, trustworthiness, respect for people’s privacy and their interest,
factuality, separation of facts from opinion, and journalistic training. Their scale was
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refined by Meyer (1988), who indicated that two factors, believability and community
concern, best reflected dimensions of credibility of a medium as organization.
3) The third line of research in the area of trust in news media dealt with the concept of
trust in news media as institutions. Studies that have examined trust in news media in
this context were mainly big international public opinions polls (e.g., General Social
Survey, 1972-2006; Eurobarometer 2001-2006; World Values Survey, 2010-2012) or
academic studies based on the secondary data analysis of these polls (e.g., Mishler &
Rose, 1997; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Luhiste, 2006). In them, news media were
considered as one of the social, political, or non-profit institutions of a particular
country, and the trust in them was conceptualized as the amount of confidence people
put in press, television or/and radio.
This dissertation research treats news media as an institution of a democratic society but
moves away from conceptualizing trust in it as the amount of believability, confidence, or
credibility. The decision to do so partly stems from the fact that others have not been able to
validate past measurements of the concept. For example, West (1994) found that Meyer’s (1988)
model did not fit the data well (GFI=.87 and .85); Gaziano and McGrath (1986) used only
exploratory techniques; whereas the studies that relied on the data from polling organizations
(Eurobarometer 2001-2006; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Luhiste, 2006;
World Values Survey, 2010-2012), have used a single item in measuring trust in news media as
institutions. More importantly, the conceptualization of trust in news media was not theoretically
derived in these studies, which led to the confusion of notions of credibility and trust in the
literature (e.g., in Kiousis, 2001; Tsfalti & Capella, 2003, 2005). Drawing from the research of
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Kohring and Matthes (2007), this dissertation research relies on sociological theories of trust and
the theories of modern journalism and society to define trust in news media.
As discussed in the section above, the concept of trust in modern societies allows people
to deal with the risk of the open future, allowing them to compensate for giving up control to
someone else. In this situation, the complexity of modern societies demands from social actors to
become selective of other social actors (Barber, 1983; Luhmann, 1979; Sztompka, 2000). In the
act of trusting, the trusting actor does not know whether his or her trust is warranted, but has to
selectively connect his or her action with a certain action of other social factors under the
condition of perceived risk (Kohring, 2004, cited in Kohring and Matthes, 2007). As Kohring
and Matthes (2007) note, news media are expert systems in modern societies that have their own
organizational structure, specialist language, and logic of action. Not being able to control the
effectiveness of these systems by themselves, individuals have to invest a certain amount of trust
in news media, risking that news media will not betray their expectations. The societal function
of news media consists of selecting and conveying information about the events in modern
societies, thus enabling the public to fulfill their need for orientation in their social environments.
In this process, journalists cannot provide all information about any possible issue, but have to
inform the public selectively, which makes relying on news reporting itself a risky action
(Kohring & Matthes, 2007). Following this line of reasoning, trust in news media is
conceptualized as trust in news media selectivity, rather than in absolute truth. When reporting
about issues, personalities, and events, news media selectively choose some information over
other information, and people take the risk when trusting these specific selections (Kohring &
Matthes, 2007). Thus the audience does not invest their trust in an ultimate truth of news media,
but rather in their selectivity.
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From this theory, Kohring and Matthes (2007) derived four dimensions of journalistic
selectivity: “trust in selectivity of topics,” “trust in selectivity of facts,” “trust in accuracy of
depictions,” and “trust in journalistic assessment.” Trust in selectivity of topics assumes that trust
is associated with the selection of reported topics and that the recipients trust that the news media
will focus on those topics and events that are relevant to them. Trust in selectivity of facts
concerns the selections of facts or background information assuming that the way in which an
event is contextualized is relevant to trust in news media. Trust in accuracy of depictions
presupposes that recipients trust the verifiable and approvable accuracy of depicted facts. Finally,
trust in journalistic assessment takes into consideration the trust that recipients put in the
journalistic evaluation of an event (Kohring & Matthes, 2007).
When conceptualizing trust in news media, this dissertation research uses Kohring and
Matthes’s (2007) trust in journalistic selectivity. Although this conceptualization of trust in news
media has been used previously in research (e.g., Holbert, 2011; Holbert, Hmielowski, & Weeks,
2011), it has not been expanded to the region of Eastern Europe, where the relationship of
individuals towards trust has been somehow different.
Trust in post-Communist Countries
Even though there were obvious national varieties in the rigidity and style in which
Communists ruled in different countries of Eastern Europe (e.g., Romania was not the same as
Yugoslavia; Poland was not the same as Czechoslovakia), the Communist regime succeeded in
creating a common cultural framework, over and above distinct national cultures. It was a unique
syndrome of values, rules, norms, codes, and standards typical for the Soviet bloc as a whole,
called the “bloc culture.” Citizens of Communist countries of Eastern Europe shared the life
under so-called “real-socialism” that has produced the unique legacy of a peculiar cultural-
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civilizational syndrome (Sztompka, 1996; 2000). Besides a common institutional framework of
autocratic polity and command economy, the Communists imposed a “philosophy of
dependence” instead of self-reliance, collectivism and conformity instead of individualism,
equality of not only opportunities but outcomes, extremism in beliefs and intolerance (Seweryn
Bialer, quoted in Reisinger , Miller, Hesli, & Maher, 1994, p. 195).
One of the consequences of bloc culture was the widespread erosion of trust. Grandiose
false promises of Communist regimes, the failure to deliver those promises, and oppressive rule
which included the strong activities of secret services in controlling the citizenry, have produced
a generalized distrust in everything that was linked to the state and its institutions (Traps, 2009).
Authorities both central and local were perceived as alien and hostile; the government was seen
as the arena of conspiracy, deceit, cynicism, or at least stupidity and inefficiency. Trusting the
state or the ruling party was considered as naiveness or stupidity, and actively supporting the
regime was seen as treason. On the other hand, citizens developed particular skills in outwitting
the state. They recognized that the ability to beat the system, using all the means necessary, even
evasion of laws, was a widely accepted virtue. Sociologists later coined the term “parasitic
innovativeness” to describe this characteristic (Sztompka, 2000).
The erosion of trust in post-Communist countries is explained by Paldam and Svedsen’s
(2001) dictatorship theory. It argues that trust levels in Central and Eastern Europe deteriorated
due to the oppressive behavior of the communist dictatorships. For example, Romania’s dictator
Nicolae Ceausescu created an internal intelligence agency known as Securitate that may have
used as many as 700,000 citizens as informers. Other communist regimes had similar agencies:
the Soviet KGB or East Germany’s Stasi, both known worldwide for their brutal treatment of
citizens merely accused of being political dissidents. In this atmosphere, it may have been
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entirely rational not to trust people other than the closest family and friends (Bjornskov, 2007).
The theory posits that dictatorships destroy trust by devastating social capital, which is achieved
by the atomization of human relations. Communism made a fundamental division between the
two spheres of life, private and public, and encouraged social atomization. Unable to trust
anybody but close friends and family, individuals withdrew to the private sphere or to their inner
selves (Wheaton & Kavan, 1992). Atomized individuals were distrustful, uninterested in public
matters, and unwilling to spend energy on shared goals (Petrova, 2007). Paradoxically,
communist dictators themselves became distrustful. As Milovan Djilas witnessed, to Stalin, the
world of politics as well as the world in general was a world of enemies. “If you wanted to
survive as your own master,” Djilas (1998, p. 14) described his impression of the Soviet
dictator’s thoughts during one of their encounters in 1944, “you dared not trust a soul. Everyone
but yourself was either a crook or a knave. You had to battle it out, you dared not rely on
anyone’s strength but your own” (p. 14). Atomization of individuals was achieved by controlling
the citizens through secret services, creating fear and distrust, and abolishing all voluntary
organizations. In order to attain its main goal of the creation of a new socialist person and the
elimination of a capitalist person, Communist regimes brought all voluntary organizations under
the leadership control of the Communist party: even the boy scouts were replaced by official
party scouts (pioneers). By doing this, the party, in every realm of life, told people effectively
what to do and made almost all decisions on their behalf. There was no room left for
entrepreneurship, experiments and voluntary organization into social groups (Paldam & Svedsen,
2001).
The erosion of trust in Communist societies represented the opposite of what the rulers
intended to produce by conducting severe control of the citizenry. Despotic, dictatorial, and
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totalitarian systems attempt to directly institutionalize trust and turn it into a strongly sanctioned
formal demand. In such a system, citizens are expected to trust unquestionably the monarch,
dictator, or the leader. They are expected to ignore any relevant evidence about the deeds or
misdeeds of the ruler and to avoid making evaluations or critiques of the ruler. One should “trust
the leader unconditionally, not because of what he does, but because of who he is, just as one
trusts one's father, a priori and without any proofs of trustworthiness really being needed”
(Sztompka, 2000, p. 148). Citizens are expected to allocate the same levels of trust to the whole
system of authority: feudal monarchy, or national socialism, or dictatorship of the proletariat.
The principles of the regime should not be questioned and are to be treated as truths. In
democratic regimes, in contrast, trustworthiness is primarily based on two criteria: accountability
and pre-commitment. Accountability assumes that rulers are best trusted when the rule of law
can be relied upon to force them to abide by their trust. Pre-commitment treats the Constitution
as the guarantee of continuity. Thus, democracies institutionalize distrust by using principles of
democracy, whereas autocracies institutionalize trust by demanding total and unconditional
support for the rulers and the system of rule (Sztompka, 2000).
Although Communism fell in 1989, skepticism towards strangers, as well as towards
institutions prevailed in Eastern Europe. Analyzing World Values Survey (WVS) data from
1995, Miheljak (2006) found that level of generalized trust, or trust in strangers, was relatively
low in all the central and eastern European countries under examination. For example, only
15.3% of participants in Slovenia thought that most people could be trusted, 16.9% in Poland,
17.9% in Romania, 22.5% in Hungary, and 22.8% in Croatia. The fourth wave of the WVS,
which included 21 countries from the region, showed average generalized trust at 22%, whereas
the fifth WVS wave, which covered 9 countries from the region, showed average generalized
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trust at 21%. For comparison, the respective value in the fourth wave was 38% for the EU 15
countries and 36% for the USA (Aasland, Grodeland & Pleines, 2012). In terms of trust in
institutions, Mishler and Rose (1997) analyzed the comparative data from New Democracy
Barometer surveys that were conducted in November 1993 and March 1994 in seven central and
eastern European Countries (Bulgaria, the Check Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and Slovenia) and in two republics of the former Soviet Union (Belarus and Ukraine).
The main findings indicated that skepticism predominated in the region in terms of trust towards
15 institutions. In Rose’s (1994) study, citizens of Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, and Poland were asked whether they trusted or distrusted key institutions of civil
society. The respondents in all countries expressed distrust of seven out of ten institutions. The
author noted that in all these countries, levels of public trust in institutions were significantly
lower than the levels that researchers typically found in both Western Europe and the United
States.

Trust in News Media in post-Communist Countries
During the Communist period, media, as state institutions, did not enjoy the confidence of
citizens. General suspicion of everything that came from the public domain, was supported by
the discrepancy between official statistics and everyday observation, between the messages of
the media and everyday knowledge. Common wisdom, “TV lies,” was shared among citizens. In
contrast to general distrust in state media, there was a naïve faith in the information coming
either from private sources or foreign media (e.g., Radio Free Europe, Voice of America,
Deutsche Welle) (Sztompka, 2000). Citizens of Tito’s Yugoslavia were aware that the state
media served the interests of the state. Although they usually accepted the message, they did not
always trust the source (Glenny, 1996). Scholars note that such an ambivalent position is not
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uncommon in authoritarian media systems. Halpern (1994), who explored media dependency in
Chile, found that state-controlled media suffered from low credibility, but that, in an
authoritarian political system, media dependency might have a significant impact on political
perceptions. The author explained that the media environment in an authoritarian political system
is characterized by a lack of functional alternatives for political information; state-controlled
mass media represent the main source of news. As Taylor and Kent (2000) explained, “even
though citizens mistrusted the source of the state-controlled messages, the state ideology behind
the messages was a part of their everyday existence” (p. 357).
After the fall of Communism, mass media, although more independent, had trouble
regaining trust due to their instrumental role during real-socialism. Although citizens did
distinguish between state and independent media when attributing trust11, in general, attitudes
towards news media remained negative. In Poland, for example, in 1993, 48% of people still did
not believe television, and 40% distrusted newspapers (Sztompka, 2000). In other Eastern
European countries, skepticism towards media prevailed too. Mishler and Rose’s (1997) study
showed that people in seven eastern and central European countries and two republics of the
former Soviet Union, were generally skeptical towards their media. On a 7-point scale, the scores
11

During the 1990s, in Slovakia, the first private television station Markiza, formed by the American
media group, Central European Media Enterprises, was highly critical of the government of Vladimir Mečiar and its
main newscast was quickly rated by the viewers as the most objective and trustworthy. It was especially trusted by
respondents aged 18 to 24, those with university education, residents of cities with population of more than 100,000,
and by the Hungarian minority. In contrast, the viewers saw public TV as the least trustworthy (Johnson, 2013). In
Serbia, radio station B92, financed mainly by foreign donations, played a major role in informing and mobilizing the
citizenry during 1996-1997 student demonstrations against Slobodan Milošević’s regime’s attempt to fake the
outcome of municipal elections (Cheterian, 2009), while at the same time dissatisfied citizens protested against the
propagandistic reporting of the state television (Open Society Institute, 2005). In Georgia, even today, any
association of the media with the state raises suspicion. Thus, state financial support for television company Rustavi
2 decreased public trust in the medium (Berekashvili, 2009). Ukrainian journalist Andrii Shevchenko described in
2006 that “the society had no trust, absolutely no trust, in the national state television” (Cheterian, 2009). Even in
Belarus, where from 1997 to 2008 the level of trust in state media was higher than the level of trust in independent
media, the state media seem to have lost people’s support. In 2008, 2009, and 2011, an independent public opinion
agency measured higher levels of trust in independent media than in state media, concluding that distrust for state
media has grown rapidly (Manaev et al., 2013).
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for trust in media institutions ranged from 3.2 in Romania to 4.0 in Slovakia (Mishler & Rose,
1997). Similar trend was detected in Croatia. For example, Baloban and Rimac’s (1999) survey
showed that only between 2% and 3 % of Croatians completely trusted the media; Čuvalo’s
(2010) analysis of the 2009 data indicated that, on average, Croatians’ level of trust in media,
when compared to trust in other institutions, was among the lower ones; whereas a study from
2011 conducted by an audience research agency GfK showed that only 21% of participants said
they trusted news media (GfK Croatia, 2012).
In Serbia, general distrust prevails today among the general population. Gallup Balkan
Monitor (2010) found that the Serbs together with Macedonians are the most pessimistic people
in the Balkans, with a particular trend in diminishing trust in national institutions. Mass media
together with national government and judiciary are the least trusted institutions. Only between
35% to 41% of respondents said they trusted these institutions, which represented a significant
drop from their 2008 survey. The same year, another polling agency, Strategic Marketing from
Belgrade, conducted a national survey of the Serbian population. The results showed that
Serbians had quite low levels of trust in media in general. Almost every third respondent thought
that information coming from the media was too scarce to enable the proper understanding of
problems. In the survey, 73% of respondents thought that there was some form of censorship in
the media, with 26% describing content control as prevalent. According to surveyed Serbians,
political parties, the government, oligarchs, people involved in organized crime, as well as the
international community controlled the information in Serbian media. Although the majority of
them (57%) said they trusted television the most, this medium was simultaneously perceived as
the one under the biggest control. Respondents rated private television B92 (44%) as the most
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trusted medium, followed by the private television Pink (35%) and the public broadcaster RTS
(35%) (Strategic Marketing, 2008).
Scholars have derived two major explanations about the origins of distrust in news media
in post-Communist countries. Under the first explanation, distrust in news media has been
understood as a spill-over from generalized distrust in other people and distrust in all other
institutions. Studies that have subscribed to this explanation, found that origins of distrust in all
institutions in Eastern European countries can be found in their Communist and socialist legacy
that destroyed trustworthy social relationships (e.g., Aasland, Grodeland, & Pleines, 2012;
Bjornskov, 2007). Other group of explanations saw distrust in news media among Eastern
Europeans as a consequence of bad journalistic practice. This line of reasoning described that
news reporting in post-Communist countries has been generally on a very low level, lacking
proper training, objectivity, neutrality, and being under severe economic and political pressures
(Gross, 2002; IREX, 2012; Johnson, 2013; Spasovska, 2010). The mixture of low journalistic
standards, political activism, and representation of self-interest rather than public interests can
contribute to a society’s diminished trust in journalism as an independent agent (Johnson, 2013).
These two major explanations about distrust in news media, coincide with two groups of theories
that explain the origins of institutional trust: cultural and performance theories. This dissertation
research uses these two groups of theories to examine the factors that influence trust in news
media in Serbia.

Cultural and Performance Theories of Trust
Cultural theories differ from performance theories in the extent to which trust is
conceived as exogenous or endogenous to social and political institutions (Mishler & Rose,
2001). According to cultural theories, the origins of trust lie outside of the institutions. They
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originate from the character of the people, are deeply rooted in cultural norms and beliefs and are
learned early in life (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Inglehart,
1990). In contrast, performance theories view trust as endogenous to institutions and consider it a
consequence of institutional functioning. They treat trust as consequence not a cause of
institutional performance (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Dasgupta, 1988; Hetherington, 1998).
Cultural theories assume that cultural heritage plays a significant role in determining the

value systems of societies. Thus, as Inglehart (2006) notes, large differences exist between value
systems of the historically Catholic or Protestant societies and the historically Orthodox societies
in Europe. According to these theories, trust is a fundamental property engrained in the base of
every society and as such is shaped by culture. Defined as “a system of attitudes, values, and
knowledge that is widely shared within a society and transmitted from generation to generation”
(Inglehart, 1990, p. 18), culture determines the trust norms that individuals carry within them.
Virtually from birth, individuals learn first from their parents and immediate family and then
from school friends, coworkers and neighbors, to trust or distrust people. They obtain this
particular trusting or distrusting characteristic by experiencing how others in their culture treat
them and how, in return, others react to their behavior (Mishler & Rose, 2001). This creates a
particular “collective programming,” which influences the processes the trustors use to decide
whether and whom to trust (Triandis, 1972). Indeed, research shows that some countries are
inherently more trusting than the others: people in the United States and France, and China and
Japan differ on the basis of trust (Olson & Olson, 2000). In Norway, Denmark, and the
Netherlands, about 60% of people believe most other people can be trusted, whereas in Brazil,
the Philippines, and Turkey about 10% trust others (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Fukuyama
(1995) writes that the French have a tendency not to trust their superiors to make honest
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evaluations of their work; Almond and Verba (1963) found that Germans and Italians rank
relatively low on interpersonal trust; Huff and Kelley (2002) found that American managers
show higher levels of trust than Asian managers, while Doney, Cannon and Mullen (1998)
propose that various cultural dimensions, such as power distance or individualism and
collectivism, may influence general trusting mechanisms of a particular population.
According to cultural theories, generalized sense of (dis)trust is learned early in life, is
largely stable through the lifetime, and is not shaped by immediate experiences. Using
longitudinal General Social Survey data (1972-1996) about immigrants in the United States of
different ethnic backgrounds, Uslaner (2008) has shown that roots of generalized trust go back
far in time. He found that people whose grandparents came to the United States from countries
that have high levels of trust (Nordic and the British) tend to have higher levels of generalized
trust than Italians, Latinos and African Americans. Generalized trust does not refer to faith in
specific persons but reflects a more general notion that people, especially those who may be
different from oneself, have a shared faith (Uslaner, 2008). Also referred to as social trust,
generalized trust assumes trust towards people that we do not know, towards complete strangers.
It is a belief that most people can be trusted and is largely based on moralistic values as it does
not have foundations in experience (Uslaner, 2002). This kind of trust arises when “a community
shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular and honest
behavior” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 153). As Rothstein and Stolle (2002) describe, trusting strangers
indicates the “potential readiness of citizens to cooperate with each other and the abstract
preparedness to engage in civic endeavors with each other” (p. 2). Generalized trust, as trust
towards people that we do not have information about, should be distinguished from
particularized trust, which arises in face-to-face interactions and can be thought of as reputation
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(Bjornskov, 2007). It represents the notion that we should have faith only in the people like
ourselves. Whereas generalized trust embraces the idea that most people are part of our moral
community, particularized trust restricts that moral community to our own kind. Generalized
trusters get the optimistic trust trait from their parents, while particularized trusters rely heavily
on their experiences and stereotypes in deciding whom to trust (Uslaner, 2002). The difference
between the two is clearly made in Banfield’s (1958) famous study of a village in Southern Italy,
in which individuals were connected by exceedingly strong bonds within families but not at all
between families. The author coined the term “amoral familialism” to describe the phenomenon
where no trust exists between people who do not know each other through families or kin
groups.
Studies on Eastern European countries have found that explanations for generalized sense
of distrust in the region can be found in their Communist and socialist legacy (Aasland,
Grodeland, & Pleines, 2012). Using survey data from 1997, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003,
Bjornskov (2007) discovered that the Communist past had a clear effect on perceptions of trust,
as these countries were about eight percentage points less trusting than otherwise comparable
countries. In-depth interviews with elite representatives of East Central Europe, South East
Europe, and the Western Balkans, revealed that people in this region distinguished between “us”
and “them” between “our people” and “others.” Whereas the former usually enjoy their full trust,
the latter are generally viewed with skepticism, a clear relic of communist past’s atomization of
human relations (for discussion see e.g., Petrova, 2007; Wheaton & Kavan, 1992). Besides these
studies that directly assessed the influence of Communist past on the perceptions of trust in
Eastern Europe, other studies indirectly supported these claims. Measuring the levels of
generalized trust in the region, these studies found that people in post-Communist countries
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traditionally have lower levels of generalized trust than those in established democracies (e.g,
Hankiss, 1990; Macek & Markova, 2004; Musil, 1992).
The spill-over effect: Cultural theories further assume that a generalized sense of trust

influences the success of group actions. People who trust each other are more likely to cooperate
with each other in forming and maintaining both formal and informal institutions such as choirs,
bowling leagues, community association, even big companies. In these instances interpersonal
trust spills over into other forms of cooperation (Almond & Verba, 1963; Fukuyama, 1995;
Putnam, 1993). For Almond and Verba (1963) interpersonal trust is a prerequisite for the
formation of secondary associations, which in turn is essential for effective political participation
in any large democracy. In this regard, a generalized sense of trust allows citizen to join their
forces in social and political groups, and it enables them to come together in citizens’ initiatives
more easily. This is in the heart of Robert Putnam’s (1993) idea of social capital. In his study on
regional governing in Italy he defined social capital as “features of social organization, such as
trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated
actions” (p. 167). He posited that a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place
extensive trust in each other will be able to accomplish more than a group lacking these qualities.
In the presence of trust in others, people have stronger social capital, they are able to form social
networks, participate in voluntary organizations, which leads to higher participation in politics
and ultimately greater political stability (Putnam, 2000). As Putnam (1993) put it, without norms
of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement, “amoral familialism, clientelism, lawlessness,
ineffective government, and economic stagnation, seems likelier than successful democratization
and economic development” (p. 183).
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Fukuyama (1995) explained how generalized trust spills over to create a large and
measurable economic value. Describing how trust influences successful functioning of firms, the
author claimed that the greatest economic efficiency is not achieved by rational self-interested
individuals but by a group of individuals, who, because of trustworthy relationships based in a
preexisting moral community, are able to work together effectively. He found that in high-trust
societies, where people trust one another, the functioning in enterprises is more productive as
everybody is operating according to a common set of ethical norms. High-trust societies, as
Fukuyama (1995) described, can organize their workplaces on a more flexible and more grouporiented basis, with more responsibility delegated to lower levels of organizations. On the other
hand, low-trust societies must impose a series of bureaucratic rules on their workers, who in turn,
find their workplace less satisfying if they are not treated like adults who can be trusted to
contribute to their community. Rothstein and Stolle (2002) pointed out that high level of
generalized trust lubricates harmonious functioning of organizations by eliminating friction and
minimizing the need for bureaucratic structures that dictate the behavior of people who do not
trust each other. Fukuyama’s (1995) analysis showed that high-trust societies, such as Germany,
Japan and the United States, with plentiful social capital, were able to develop large, private,
hierarchically managed business organization. In contrast, economies of relatively low-trust
societies, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, France and Italy, have been traditionally populated by
family businesses as the reluctance to trust non-kin has delayed or prevented the emergence of
modern, professionally managed organizations. Although, one might conclude, from these
studies’ findings, that higher levels of trust have usually been noted in rich countries, it has to be
pointed out that, in terms of general sense of trust, “what matters is not how rich a country is, but
how equitable is the dispersion of income” (Uslaner, 2002, p. 181). Analyzing cross-national
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survey data from 1997, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003, Bjornskov (2007), found that GDP per capita
did not have a significant effect on generalized trust, and that poorer countries, such as India or
Indonesia, had above-average trust levels. The author found, however, that at a country level,
income inequalities, religion, form of government, and a presence of Communist past affected
trust in people that one doesn’t know.
General trust can also spill over to trust in institutions. Cole (1973) analyzed national
survey data from 1964, 1968, and 1970 and found that trust in people had a statistically
significant effect on trust in political institutions, when age, race, gender, social class, education,
efficacy, and employment status were controlled for. Analyzing the General Social Survey data
from 1972 to 1994, Brehm and Rahn (1997) found that the direct effect of generalized trust on
confidence in government institutions was positive, and the fourth largest in the model with 14
independent variables. The authors concluded that the confidence in government requires the
trust in other people too. In Newton’s (2001) analysis of the relationship between social trust and
confidence in parliament, 30 out of 42 nations analyzed using World Values Survey data 19911995, had positive correlations between the two variables. The author did find that some of the
newly democratized nations (e.g., Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Chile, and South Africa)
were the exception to this trend. He explained that higher confidence in the parliament in these
countries might be the expression of faith in the principles of democracy as a form of
government, rather than a satisfaction with the parliament as an institution. Some other studies
have also found that in new democracies and non-liberal regimes, social and institutional trust
were not significantly correlated. Rohrscheider and Schmitt-Beck (2002) discovered that
generalized trust had different effects on institutional trust in East and West Germany ten years
after the unification. In West Germany, generalized trust was a significant predictor of
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institutional trust, whereas in East Germany the coefficient had the right sign but was too small
to attain statistical significance. This finding resembles the pattern found by Almond and Verba
(1963) in their comparison of old and new democracies in the 1950s. The authors found that in
established democracies, like Britain and the United States, generalized trust transferred to the
political realm, but not in new democracies, as West Germany was back then. Kim (2005) even
found that in South Korea, generalized trust and institutional trust were negatively correlated. In
the analysis of data from a national survey, the author found that social trust was the most
influential predictor of trust in parliament and political parties, solely explaining eight percent of
the variance in political trust12. A newer study, however, showed a remarkably strong association
between social trust and institutional trust regardless of the level of country’s democratization.
Analyzing data from 2010 European Social Survey, Boda and Medve-Balint (2012) found a
correlation of .96 between the two variables across both Eastern and Western European
countries.
Some newer studies seem to point out that generalized sense of trust has spilled over to
the area of trust in news media in some countries. Analyzing the association between generalized
trust and individuals’ perceptions of trust in news media on a sample of Croatian youth, Pjesivac
and Imre (2013) found that generalized trust had a positive and statistically significant effect on
trust in news media, when the effects of age, gender, media use, religion, and political party
affiliation were controlled in the regression model. Cook and Gronke (2001) analyzed General
Social Survey’s longitudinal data from 1973 – 1998. The authors found that the confidence in the
media among American audiences was strongly predicted by a measure of generalized

12

It has to be noted, however, that Kim (2005) used a different measure of generalized trust than previously
mentioned studies.
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confidence in other institutions, but that education, age, income, partisanship, ideology, and
strength of partisanship had independent effects upon confidence in the press.
Performance-based theories appeared as a reaction to society-centered and historically-

determined approaches. They posit that trust in institutions depends on perceived successful
functioning of institutions. In other words, the better the citizens believe the institutions function,
the higher their trust in them (Luhiste, 2006). In this regard, trust and distrust are conceived as
rational responses of individuals to the performance of institutions (Mishler & Rose, 2001). For
Coleman (1990), for example, a potential trustor decides to place trust or revise his estimate of
the trustee’s trustworthiness based on information from trustee’s actions. In Dasgupta’s (1998)
words, a person’s trustworthiness is derived from their behavior which, with time, constitutes
their reputation. Trust and confidence are, under these theories, not regarded as the direct
products of social conditions that are associated with well-developed social capital. Instead,
because all citizens are exposed to institutional actions, trust in institutions is considered to be
randomly distributed among various different cultural and social types. Institutions that perform
well are likely to elicit the trust of citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively generate
feelings of distrust and low confidence. The general public, the theories assume, recognizes
whether government or institutions are performing well or poorly and reacts accordingly
(Newton & Norris, 2000).
In the literature, the performance approach is also studied under the notion of institutioncenter approach (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002) or institutional theories (Mishler & Rose, 2001). The
core of the new institutionalism lies in the claim that institutions matter in regards to the
influence on human behavior through rules and norms and that their structure is a function of
rational choice (Orren & Skowronek, 1995). According to this group of theories, social capital
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does not exist independently of institutions, but institutions create, channel and influence the
amount and type of social capital. The capacity of citizens to develop cooperative ties and
establish social trust is, in this account, influenced by the government institutions and policies
(Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). As the contributors to Lijphart and Waisman (1996)’s book showed,
institutional design has real consequences for government performance and therefore for public
trust in institutions.
Institutional theories emphasize two main aspects of performance that are important for a
trustworthy relationship: policy and economic performance. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and
Limongi (1996) analyzed the survival and the death of political regimes in 135 countries between
1950 and 1990, and found that in poorer countries, economic performance is crucial for the
survival of democracy. The authors showed that poorer democracies had a larger probability of
dying in a year after their per capita income fell than if their income raised. In contrast, economic
growth was shown to be conducive to the survival of democracy – the faster the economy grew,
the more likely it was that the democracy would survive (Przeworski et al., 1996). Political
outputs of institutions matter equally, especially in new democracies. Thus, in countries where
individual liberties and the rule of law have been systematically repressed, citizens are likely to
value institutions that succeed in reducing corruption, removing restrictions on individual liberty,
and providing increased freedoms. For example, despite nearly two dozen major corruption
scandals that have hit Argentina in the first part of the 1990s, no investigation has ended in trial.
Polls showed that more than 80% of Argentinians did not trust their country’s judicial system,
and that corruption ranked second, behind low salaries, among issues that most concerned them
(Diamond, 1999). Mishler and Rose (2001) write that in post-Communist countries both
economic and political factors matter in institutional performance. Socialization into a state-
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controlled economy has taught citizens to hold government accountable for economic conditions.
In addition, neither freedom nor the rule of law can be taken for granted in these countries,
taking into account that after the collapse of Communism new forms of corruption have appeared
including the massive transfer of wealth through the privatization of state enterprises.
Performance of institutions has been found to influence trust in them. Bouckaert et al.
(2002) identify two lines of research addressing the link: macro-performance theory and microperformance theory. The former refers to comparative studies that explain trust variations across
countries and over time as the result of variations in factors such as unemployment, economic
growth, inflation, and the stability of government. Thus, Anderson (1995) explained that the
German government lost public support between 1980 and 1982, as the unemployment rate rose
after the 1980 elections. The author found support for his claims in empirical findings from other
countries, as his longitudinal comparative analysis (1960-1992) demonstrated a negative
correlation between unemployment rate and trust in public institutions in five European
democracies: Great Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, and Netherlands. Newton and Norris
(2000) conducted a cross-national analysis of 1980-84 and 1990-93 World Values Survey data of
17 trilateral democracies. Having found a large proportion of respondents that replied they had
“a great deal” or “quite a lot” confidence in public institutions, such as police, legal system,
armed forces, parliament, and civil service, as well as in non-profit and private institutions, the
authors concluded that these responses were likely to be a good gauge of how well the political
system is actually performing. The micro-performance group of studies denotes the ones that link
trust to changes in the quality or the perception of institutional service delivery. Thus, DeHoog,
Lowery and Lyons’s (1990) research conducted in Kentucky showed an important role for local
government efficacy and attachment to local community for citizens’ satisfaction levels. Glaser
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and Hildreth (1999) demonstrated, on a survey of a Midwestern American city with a population
more than 300,000, that citizens classified as rating government performance high and
registering a high willingness to pay increased taxes were the most positive about local
government responsiveness to honor citizen values. Some scholars claim that it is precisely in the
performance of institutions that we should look for the reasons for traditionally low institutional
trust in Eastern Europe. Boda and Medve-Balint (2012) found that the levels of social trust,
personal happiness, and religiousness demonstrated a statistically significant, positive association
with institutional trust across the countries of Eastern and Western Europe, whereas other
variables (such as income, age, gender, media consumption, education, type of domicile,
membership in a minority group) did not have a significant effect on institutional trust in both
regions. The authors concluded that the examinations for lower trust in institutions in Eastern
Europe should be looked for elsewhere. The authors suggested looking at the perceived low
performance of institutions, as they might be highly politicized and thus less trusted in Eastern
than in Western Europe.
In the domain of news media, trust has been associated with the levels of journalistic
performance. In order to be considered trustworthy, news media have to practice news reporting
in accordance with set standards and ethical norms, which define journalistic professionalism
(Deuze, 2008). Most of Western journalism studies equate journalism with professionalism if it
meets the following criteria: its reporting is fair, objective, and well-sourced; journalists follow
recognized and accepted ethical standards; journalists and editors do not practice self-censorship;
journalists cover key events and issues; pay levels for journalists and other media professionals
are sufficiently high to discourage corruption and retain qualified personnel within the media
organization; entertainment programming does not eclipse news and information programming;
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technical facilities and equipment for gathering, producing, and distributing news are modern
and efficient; and quality niche reporting and programming exist (investigative, economic,
business, local, political) (Deuze, 2008; IREX, 2013). In Eastern Europe however, although
journalists are aware of the standards of professionalism (e.g., fairness, objectivity, balance,
impartiality and independence) their daily routines prove to be different. In many countries of the
region, there have been no standards for writing news stories, using sources, and respecting the
rules for the separation of facts from opinions (Gross, 2002; Spasovska, 2010). Gross (2002)
observed that Polish journalists in 1990-1992 lacked the basic skills in objective news reporting;
Romanian journalists throughout the 1990s were more devoted to ideological and political rather
than to professional values, whereas Albanian journalists remained inclined to writing
propaganda. Johnson (2013) quoted Martin Šimčeka, a former newspaper editor, who described
that “Slovak newspapers present a highly superficial and blurred picture of the world and the
country … based on scraps of information without any attempt at analysis” (p. 159).
A great majority of new journalists who entered the profession in the 1990s in Eastern
Europe did not have any formal training. This is in contrast to Western practices where
journalistic education has been considered a keystone in the professionalization process
(Lippman, 2008) and where the majority of journalists working in the newsrooms hold
journalism qualifications (Weaver, 1998, 2007). In Eastern Europe, the Communist era merged
journalism education with political education in order to prepare journalists for their positions as
socio-political workers (Spasovska, 2010), or teachers and spiritual leaders of society (Gross,
2002). Journalism programs were often part of political science colleges as was the case with
former Yugoslavia (Spasovska, 2010). After the fall of Communism, official university programs
continued to exist and were to a certain extent modified but kept the same philosophy according
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to which politics, journalism, and literature were mixed in order to create journalists as analysts,
critics, and commentators rather than reporters or explainers. This conception has led journalists
to consistently mix facts and opinion (Gross, 2002). At the same time, Western governments,
non-governmental organizations, and private foundations have attempted to further media
development in Eastern Europe by sending an influx of venture capital (Sparks, 2005) and
conducting workshops and hands-on training for journalists. Media workers have learned about
Western-style media operations and management, especially with regard to the news media
(Hoffman, 2002; Peters, 2010). Despite these efforts, the journalistic practice has stayed in poor
shape. IREX’s Media Sustainability scores indicated that from 2001 to 2012, average scores for
these countries, on a scale from 1 to 5, ranged from 1.52 to 1.86. These scores put all the
countries in the region under the category of unsustainable mixed systems, which, under IREX’s
categorizations, indicates that these countries minimally meet objectives of professional
reporting (IREX, 2012a).
In addition, journalists in the region are often under strong political and business
pressures that damage professional standards. Influenced by a particular party or ideology,
journalistic reporting became biased and incomplete (Gross, 2002). Political partisanship
infiltrated publicly owned media, while politically favored media would get preferential status in
access to information (IREX, 2012a). IREX (2012a) panelists from Albania, Bosnia, Moldova
and Georgia said that siding with a particular party or government severely hurt news media’s
objective reporting. Thus one panelist from Georgia stated, “The largest television stations
uncritically convey the government’s ideas and projects, while opposition-leaning stations do not
do enough to balance their criticism of the government” (pp. 10, 11). In Macedonia, due to heavy
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political pressures, journalists have had difficulties following professional standards and often
have opted for censoring themselves to protect their jobs (Spasovska, 2010).
Studies that have tested the cultural and performance theories of trust in institutions
together have generated ambiguous results. Analyzing survey data from Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, Luhiste (2006) found that both cultural and performance variables influenced citizens’
trust in political institutions. In other words, institutional trust depends on how much the
individual trusts other people as well as on how well they believe economic and political systems
function. On the other hand, in Mishler and Rose’s (2001) study, performance reasoning was
found to be a better explanation of the origins of political trust than cultural theories. The authors
tested the data from ten post-Communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe and the former
Soviet Union and found that institutional trust is substantially affected by both political and
economic performance while being almost wholly unaffected by interpersonal trust or by
socialization influences. Analyzing two waves of the World Value Surveys conducted in the
early 1980s (1981-84) and the early 1990s (1990-93) that included 47,000 respondents in 17
trilateral democracies, Newton and Norris (2000) found that social trust is not strongly associated
with measures of confidence in institutions at the individual level. Socially trusting people were
not necessarily politically trusting, and vice versa. In addition, confidence in public institutions
was not at all well explained by the social and economic variables usually associated with
attitudes and behavior. Life satisfaction, education, income, gender, age, and membership in
voluntary associations explained little of the variance in confidence in parliament, the civil
service, or the police. Instead, their research provided substantial support for theories that focus
on the performance of governments and political institutions to explain citizens’ declining
confidence in them.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
This dissertation study starts by asking about the levels of three main variables used to
test cultural and performance theories. Previous studies that have measured trust in news media
and generalized trust in Eastern Europe have done so either using different measures or different
populations (e.g., GfK Croatia, 2012; Luhiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Strategic Marketing,
2008; World Values Survey 2010-2012). Moreover, perceptions of news media performance
have not been measured on a developed scale in the region. This dissertation study, therefore,
begins by describing the levels of trust in news media in Serbia, as well as the levels of two other
main variables in this study: generalized trust and perceptions of news media performance.
RQ1: What are the levels of trust in news media, generalized trust, and perceptions of
news media performance in Serbia?
Following the assumptions of cultural and performance theoretical perspectives, this
dissertation hypothesizes that both generalized trust and assessments of news media performance
play a role in determining trust in news media in Serbia. The cultural perspective, which posits
that cultural heritage plays a significant role in determining the value systems of societies, claims
that a nation can have a trusting or distrusting disposition depending on its dominant culture.
This (dis)trusting disposition is reflected in the nation’s generalized sense of trust towards other
people. Generalized trust or social trust, according to the cultural view, represents a
characteristic, engrained in the culture of certain people that is long-lasting and inheritable (e.g.,
Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990, 2006; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner, 2008). The
macro-cultural theories hold, that most post-Communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe
have a predisposition to distrust, which is inherent in authoritarian political cultures (e.g.,
Bjornskov, 2007; Keenan, 1986). Previous literature found evidence that generalized trust is
positively associated with trust in political and social institutions in liberal democracies (Cole,
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1973; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Newton, 2001), as well as in post-communist countries (Mishler &
Rose, 2001; Dowley & Silver, 2002), although some studies found that this correlation might not
be significant or can even have a negative association in new democracies (e.g., Almond &
Verba, 1963; Kim, 2005; Rohrschneider & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). On the other hand, the
performance perspective posits that potential trustor decides to place trust based on the
information from other social actor’s actions (Coleman, 1990). Conceiving trust or distrust as
rational responses of individuals to successful performance of other individuals or institutions,
these theories assume that trust in institutions depends on perceived successful functioning of
institutions. Institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the trust of citizens, whereas those
that perform badly will elicit the feelings of distrust (e.g., Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton &
Norris, 2000; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). The empirical tests of the performance theoretical
perspective have indicated that economic and political performance, as well as service delivery,
influence trust in institutions (e.g., Anderson, 1995; Diamond, 1999; Glaser & Hidreth, 1999;
Newton & Norris, 2000). Taking into account that these separate tests of cultural and
performance factors have found support for both theories, this dissertation research applies these
theoretical perspectives to news media, as one of the important institutions of any democratic
society. In the area of news media, cultural and performance theories have not been tested
directly, but studies have shown that sensationalism in news stories, serving the interests of
political regimes and businesses rather than the public (e.g., Liu & Bates; Open Society Institute,
2005), can hurt the believability of news media. This finding could indicate that performance
aspects matter in the assessment of trust in news media. Also, the cultural setting of postCommunism, as well as the positive correlation between generalized trust and trust in institutions
in general and news media in particular found in post-Communist countries (e.g., Luhiste, 2006;
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Pjesivac & Imre, 2013), could indicate that the cultural factor could play a significant role in
determining trust in news media in Serbia. Thus this dissertation hypothesizes that both factors,
cultural and performance, will have significant influences on trust in news media in Serbia.
H1a: Generalized trust will significantly influence trust in news media in Serbia.
H1b: News media performance will significantly influence trust in news media in Serbia.
In addition to separate tests of cultural and performance factors, several studies have
empirically tested together the two competing explanations. These tests generated ambiguous
results: while some researchers found that the cultural factor prevailed in people’s evaluation of
trust in institutions (e.g., Luhiste, 2006), others have noted the bigger influence of the
performance factor (e.g., Misher & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). Since it remains
unclear which factor, cultural or performance, might play a stronger role in determining the
levels of trust in institutions, and taking into account the fact that the two frameworks have not
been used together to examine trust in news media separately from trust in other institutions, this
dissertation research asks the following question:
RQ2: Which of the two factors, cultural or performance, plays a greater role in
determining trust in news media in Serbia?
Literature has identified several additional variables that might potentially moderate the
relationship between our independent variables (generalized trust and news media performance)
and the criterion variable (trust in news media). In two of Cole’s (1973) studies, age appeared
significant in the model that tested the relationship between generalized and institutional trust.
In Cook and Gronke’s (2011) study age had an independent effect on trust in news media. Other
studies (e.g., Alesina & la Ferrara, 2000; Gleaser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000;
Putnam, 2000) have found the so-called cohort effect, where older generations appeared to be
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more trusting than their younger fellow citizens. On the other hand, studies on trust in Eastern
Europe suggested that older generations in a post-Communist country, raised under the influence
of Soviet block culture, could be particularly distrustful (e.g., Sztompka, 2000). In sum, previous
literature has pointed out that age might moderate the relationship between generalized trust and
trust in news media, but is not unanimous about the directionality of this effect. Thus, this
dissertation hypothesizes:
H2: The relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media will be moderated
by age of Serbian participants.
Literature has also found that the level of education can amplify or dampen the effects of
generalized trust on trust in institutions. Thus, Cole (1973) found, in his studies from 1964 and
1970, that more educated people were more likely to trust institutions; and in Cook and Gronke’s
(2011) study, education had an independent effect on trust in news media. Knack and Keefer
(1997) and Knack and Zach (2002) argued that trust is created in the educational system by
making individuals better informed and better at interpreting perceived information. Moreover,
as Bjornskov (2007) argues, schooling might have an important socialization effect that may give
young people a more positive attitude toward strangers. Although these studies did not exclude
the alternative causal effect, as trust might lead to better educational outcome, their results
suggest that there might be an interaction effect of generalized trust and level of education in
predicting trust in news media. Thus this dissertation hypothesizes that:
H3: The level of education will moderate the relationship between generalized trust and
trust in news media.
Luhiste (2006) noted that people’s trust in institutions could be affected by their political
affiliations. The author explained that, for example, a Social Democrat living under the rule of a
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right-wing coalition might display less support for institutions because he or she simply does not
support the parties in power. This party preference explanation, as Luhiste (2006) observed, has
been empirically confirmed by analyses that suggested that ‘‘winners” displayed higher trust in
political institutions than ‘‘losers’’(e.g., Price & Romantan, 2004). Thus, it can be inferred that
political affiliation might be another moderator of the relationship between generalized trust and
trust in news media.
H4: The relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media will moderated
by political party affiliation.13
When testing the hypotheses, this dissertation study statistically controlled for several
variables in order to limit the possibility of Type I error caused by a spurious association
between the dependent and independent variables (Hayes, 2005). The control variables used in
this study - trust in government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news, media
use, gender, and income – were all found in the literature to be related to news media or
institutional trust (e.g., Bennet, Rhine, Flickinger & Benner, 1999; Chafee, 1982; Golan & Day,
2010; Jones, 2004; Lee, 2010; McLeod, Rush & Friedrcih, 1968; Kiousis, 2001; Tsfalti &
Cappella, 2003; Westley & Severin, 1964).14

13

Originally, Ethnicity was also to be tested as a possible moderator. However, as the great majority (86.9%) of the
participants of this study declared themselves as Serbians, enough variability could not be reached. Thus the
hypothesis predicting that ethnicity could moderate the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news
media was dropped.
14
A more detailed description of control variables used in this dissertation study can be found in chapter 4.

66

CHAPTER IV:
METHODLOGY
In order to answer the above research question and test the hypotheses, this dissertation
undertook two steps. The first step had the goal of providing a better understanding of the notion
of trust in Serbia and of ensuring the proper operationalization of three main concepts used in
this study: trust in news media, generalized trust, and news media performance. This was done
by in-depth interviews with representatives of the Serbian population. Based on the findings of
these interviews, as well as on the review of the relevant literature, a survey questionnaire was
then constructed to test the impact of cultural and performance factors on trust in news media. I
will first present the method for in-depth interviews, which will be followed by the survey
method.

In-depth Interviews
The three main concepts used in this study are: trust in news media, generalized trust, and
news media performance. The first two have been defined and operationalized in the Western
literature (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Kohring & Matthes, 2007), whereas news media performance
has not been clearly delineated in the literature. In-depth interviews were meant to establish the
conceptual equivalences of trust in news media and generalized trust provided in the Western
literature with their meanings among the Serbian population, as well as to discover the dominant
aspect/s of news media performance among Serbians. Conceptual equivalence would allow the
constructs of trust in news media and generalized trust to be applied on a new population,
whereas the conceptualization of news media performance would allow for its proper
operationalization.
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Conceptual equivalence focuses on the presence (or absence) of meanings that
individuals attach to specific concepts: the meaning of the concepts under study should be the
same across cultures if the constructs and/or measures are imported from one culture to another
(in this case from Western cultures to an Eastern European culture) (Gudykunst, 2002). In other
words, the conceptual definitions of the constructs under study need to be constant across
cultures (Levine, Park, & Kim, 2007). The constructs in question: trust in news media and
generalized trust were reviewed carefully in the literature review section. It was established that
generalized trust, or trust in people that we do not know, conceptualized as the belief that most
other people try tried to be fair, helpful, and can be trusted, has been used on Eastern European
populations (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; European Social Survey 2002-2012/13; Luhiste, 2006;
Mishler & Rose, 2001). However, the notion has been taken from previous, mainly Western
research15 without proper qualitative assessments of its meaning for Eastern Europeans. The
peoples in this region, as the literature showed, due to complex historical and socio-political
circumstances, might have a different relationship with trust than their Western counterparts
(e.g., Mishler & Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000)16. The construct of trust in news media, defined as
trust in journalistic selectivity (Kohring & Matthes, 2007), has not been used so far on Eastern
European populations. Trust in news media in these countries has not been theoretically derived
but just assessed in big public opinion polls17 (e.g., Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010; GfK Croatia,
2012; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000). Although these studies have recorded basic
attitudes regarding trust in the fourth estate in the region, they have not addressed questions
15

The term dates back to Rosenberg’s (1957) faith in people construct.
During the oppressive and controlling rule of Communist regimes, when news media’s role was to serve the state
rather than the people, trusting other people or government institutions has been considered as a “naïve” and
“stupid” character flaw, rather than a precondition for social cohesion. News media, being part of the authoritarian
state apparatus, represented another source of government lies and manipulations (e.g., Sztompka, 2000).
17
In these polls trust in news media has been assessed by one question that asked the respondents to indicate their
level of trust in news media as one of the institutions.
16
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regarding the relationship of Eastern Europeans towards their media systems or the
conceptualization of trust in news media systems.
Finally, the review of the literature showed the lack of adequate conceptualization of
news media performance. Studies that have tested the influence of performance on institutional
trust have used both macro outputs (political and economic), and micro outputs (service
delivery), as indicators of performance for political, social, and non-profit institutions. For
example, the country’s GDP (Przeworski et al., 1996), unemployment rate (Anderson, 1995),
levels of corruption and individual liberties (Diamond, 1999), have been used as macro measures
for the success of political institutions, whereas satisfaction with institutional attachment to local
communities (DeHoog, Lowery & Lyons, 1990), and honor of citizens’ values (Glaser &
Hildreth, 1999) have been used as micro outputs for successful institutional performance.
However, these outputs could not be considered as adequate indicators of news media
performance, as their levels are not dependent on the work of news media. In order to clarify
which performance outputs would be more suitable for conceptualizing news media performance
in contemporary Serbia, this dissertation explored prevalent aspect/s of news media performance
in the discourse of the Serbian population.
In order to discover whether Eastern and Western conceptualizations of trust in news
media and trust in other people overlap as well as what the proper conceptualization for news
media performance is, in-depth, semi-structured interviews with representatives of the Serbian
population were conducted. The method enabled the researcher to access the mental world of
individuals and reach for their understandings of trust in other people and in news media, as well
as news media performance (McCracken, 1988). These understandings might be numerous, and
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the researcher was able to unlock them only by intruding into the authors’ world (Lacity &
Janson, 1994).
Participants

Twenty individuals were interviewed. Qualitative research allows for small samples, even
single cases, as its purpose is to reach for the depth rather than the breath of phenomena (Patton,
2002). The participants were selected using a purposeful, snowball method. The first participants
were the individuals known to the researcher and the rest were selected based on their
recommendation. Following Patton’s (2002) recommendations, snowball sampling was used
because it allowed for location of information-rich cases from which we could learn a lot about
the issue in question. The exact number of participants was determined when the point of
redundancy was reached in data collection. In other words, when the saturation was attained and
no new information was emerging from interviews, the researchers stopped the recruiting of new
participants (Patton, 2002).
The purpose of the sampling was to identify the individuals that experienced the main
phenomena in question. In other words, the researchers tried to identify individuals who, in
various degrees, followed news media and thus were assumed to attribute levels of trust in them,
and were able to assess their performance18. Serbians interviewed in this study ranged from weak
news media followers, who only “watched news when their parents turned on the TV” (P11)19, to
veracious ones, who turned on the TV even “before they got up” from bed (P14). Television was
the most popular medium among Serbian participants, with all of them watching daily news at
least once a day. The most popular TV station among our interviewees was RTS, the public
broadcaster, followed by B92, a private TV station with national coverage, Studio B, Belgrade’s
18

It was assumed that, with regards to trust in other people, there was no need to look for information rich cases.
In parenthetical form, as well as before citing a direct quote, a participant will be referred to as P, and will carry
the corresponding number. For example, here P11 represents “Participant 11.”

19
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TV station, and TV Prva, another commercial TV station with national coverage20. In terms of
newspapers, Serbians interviewed in this study read mostly tabloid-like Blic, a daily newspaper
owned by the Swiss company Ringier, as well as Politika and Večernje Novosti, both with
unclear state ownership in them and a history of serving as state propaganda tools. Serbians
interviewed in this study rarely bought newspapers, but rather read “whatever was available at
work” (P4; P13) or what other family members (usually older ones) bought (P5). Interviewed
Serbians also read online news on their home and work computers, or smartphones. The minority
of participants listened to the radio (P16) or followed foreign news media (P5; P7; P10; P12;
P15).
The purpose of the sampling in this study was also to represent different age groups,
different levels of education, and different gender of participants. The number of participants per
age groups was the following: 19-24 (3), 25-35 (8), 36-45 (2), and 46-63 (7). There were 13
women and 7 men in the sample. All of the participants live, work or study in Belgrade, the
capital of the country, although some of them were not born in the city. The educational level
ranged from high school diploma to various college degrees (Associate, Bachelor’s, and
Master’s).
Instrument

The researcher, a native Serbian speaker, conducted interviews with all participants. The
researcher worked from an interview guide that was composed of open-ended questions. The
interview guide was meant to be a conversation starter, while the course of the interview was
designed largely by the respondents. The interviewer was trained to probe the stream of thought
of the respondents in order to capture important constructions necessary for reaching the

20

RTS (15 regular followers), B92 (9 regular followers), Studio B (5 regular followers), and Prva TV (1 regular
follower)
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meanings the participants assigned to the phenomena (Haley, 1996). The questionnaire served as
a guarantee that all of the important research terrain was covered (McCracken, 1988).
All questions asked the participants to position themselves with regards to trust in news
media, trust in other people, and news media performance. They were meant to explore
interviewees’ expectations of news media reporting, the relevance and assessment of the four
trust in news media factors defined in Kohring & Matthes (2007) (trust in selectivity of topics,
selectivity of facts, accuracy of depictions, and journalistic assessment), participants’
expectations for trustworthy strangers, and the dominant aspect/s of news media performance.
Using open-ended and situational questions, the interview guide did not contain direct inquiries
but was designed to indirectly access participants’ constructions. The open-ended nature of
qualitative interviews allowed for exploratory, unstructured responses which were essential for
reaching deep understandings of the phenomena in question (McCracken, 1988). Please see
Appendix A for the complete interview guide.
Data Analysis

All interviews were conducted in person, in May 2013, in Belgrade, Serbia, in locations
convenient for participants, and lasted from 35 minutes to one hour. The shorter interviews were
with younger participants, who had less opinion about the topics. Interviews were taped on a
digital audio recorder and transcribed in their entirety by outside, professional transcribers.
The data were analyzed using thematic analysis, a method for identifying, analyzing, and
reporting patterns (themes) within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In conducting the thematic
analysis the researcher followed six steps suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006). First, the
researcher familiarized herself with the data (interview transcriptions) through immersion into
the depth and the breath of the content. In order to do that, the researcher engaged in repeated
readings of the data, actively searching for meanings and patterns. Then the researcher generated
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initial codes, a list of ideas of what is in the data and what is interesting about them. This was
done by writing notes on interview transcriptions and using highlights and pens to indicate
potential patterns. In phase three, the researcher sorted different codes into potential themes, and
collated all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified themes. In this regard, a theme
was considered as one if it captured something important about the data in relation to the
research questions, and represented some level of patterned response or meaning within the
dataset. The prevalence of the theme was considered both on the level of the entire dataset (all
the transcribed interviews) and individual data item (individual transcribed interview) (i.e., How
many times did the theme appear across the different interviews? Did it appear anywhere in each
individual interview? Did the theme capture something important about the research questions
within the individual data item and across the dataset?). In step four, the researcher refined the
themes, determining whether there was enough data to support a particular theme, as well as
whether themes had internal homogeneity (whether data within a particular theme cohered
together meaningfully) and external heterogeneity (whether there were clear and identifiable
distinctions between themes). Finally, the researcher defined and named the themes (step 5) and
wrote the analysis (step 6).
Results of in-depth interviews

Trust in news media. The thematic analysis of the interviews showed that the
interviewees distinguished between four factors of trust in news media. The first factor – trust in
selectivity of topics - was reflected in the theme that suggested that Serbians trusted the news
that were addressing all the people, not only privileged ones. Serbians expected news media to
select topics that are relevant for the larger community and not only for smaller, elitist, societal
groups, such as politicians or media owners (e.g., P17). In this regard, they expected journalists
not only to concentrate on “official visits of politicians” (e.g., P15; P19) in their reporting, but to
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investigate the consequences of public officials’ actions. In the view of interviewed Serbians,
news media objectivity is reflected in the coverage of topics that have wide societal implications.
Thus, they thought that newscasts and news pages should cover a “broad range of information”
(P8), such as social issues (P6; P9), educational issues (P6; P9; P10), international stories (P14),
human interest issues (P15), as well as cultural issues (P8; P9; P11) and avoid celebrity news and
exclusive coverage of crime stories (P1).
The second factor – trust in selectivity of facts- was reflected in the theme that suggested
that Serbians trusted news reporting that included diverse points of views that are important for
the news story. In order to be considered as “fair” (P1), “unbiased,” and “neutral” (P19)
journalists should, according to interviewed Serbians, represent different opinions in their
reports, should find the balance between governmental and independent sources in their reports
(P1), and should be able to find “good” sources that are knowledgeable about the topic (P14;
P17; P19). The facts reported in the story should be essential for the topic and not trivial,
presented only to increase the ratings or circulation (e.g, P1; P6; P12).
The third factor – trust in accuracy of depictions – was reflected in the theme that
suggested that in order for Serbians to trust the information presented in news stories, they have
to be accurate and precise. The accuracy and precision are, according to interviewed Serbians,
achieved by reporting the facts of an event in a short, clear, and concise form (P2; P3; P7; P9;
P13; P14). Thus news media should not “twist” or “embellish” news stories or take a particular
angle when reporting, but “just report truthfully what happened” (P2). This should be achieved
by answering who, what, where and when, as four basic journalistic questions, while avoiding
answering why something had happened (P4).
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The expectation for refraining from a more elaborate expression of journalistic opinion in
news stories led to the fourth factor – trust in journalistic assessment. It was reflected in the
theme that suggested that, in Serbians’ opinion, journalistic criticism in news stories is welcomed
only when it’s well- founded. In that context, interviewed Serbians thought that journalists
should openly talk about the problems in the society and not “beat around the bushes” (P15), but,
at the same time, avoid journalistic commentary when it makes the story longer (P2) and leads
the readers/viewers astray from making their own conclusions (P13).
Generalized trust. The thematic analysis of the interviews showed that when talking
about trusting other people, Serbians, indeed, mainly talked about others’ perceived helpfulness,
trustworthiness, and fairness. In this regard, the interviewees did not make a distinction between
people they did not know personally and those that they did. Interviewees almost unanimously
stated that to trust other people meant to be able to “rely” on them. This was reflected in the
expectation that other people would be willing to provide help when needed (P4), or “during
hard times” (P12). The expected help ranged from small everyday favors to moral help in dealing
with serious life problems and was not to be asked but was expected. For interviewed Serbians,
providing aid symbolized the expression of “respect” toward individuals in need and their
families. Allocation of trust depended then on “a personal feeling” that others were sincere in
their wishes to assist (P4). In contrast, people who did not choose to offer help would be
considered as “selfish,” the ones that “look only after their own interests” (P5); or the ones “who
would sell their own mother for a personal benefit” (P12).
The second theme - trustworthiness of others - was mainly reflected in others’ perceived
sincerity and openness. These characteristics assumed that trustworthy persons should be very
direct in conversations, that they would tell the truth “no matter what” (P6). Serbians interviewed
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in this study considered revealing the complete truth in any situation as a quality, and the proof
that such a person is acting in accordance with her beliefs, no matter the consequences. In their
view, people are not expected to embellish the truth even in everyday exchange of pleasantries
and daily rituals. Telling the truth was viewed as “revealing” and “liberating” (P6), as it helps
fight “the false morals” (P6). For interviewed Serbians things could only be “black and white,
not grey” (P9) making ambiguity in relationships not welcomed (P9). If a person is not
completely open, he/she risks being characterized as “sly” (P3), “insidious”, and “treacherous”
(P2). Being “smooth-spoken” (P2; P14) or flattery is not seen by a Serbian eye as a value but as a
vice, a “mask” that people put on when they want to hide something (P14).
This seemingly blatant openness did have some limitations. The third theme reflected that
interviewed Serbians expected trustworthy people to be “fair” (P1; P3), to respect others by, for
example, not invading their privacy, not insulting them, or talking behind their backs (P1; P8;
P9; P20). Although recognizing the values of these characteristics, interviewed Serbians thought
that it was almost impossible to find strangers who would be open, trustworthy, fair, and helpful.
Asked to evaluate a hypothetical person who goes openly into relationships with others, who
thinks that people are, in general, ready to help rather than to use others, and who thinks that
people, generally, tend to be fair rather than look only after their own interests, participants of
this study described such a person as “naïve” (P8; P13), “foolish” (P4; P6; P9), “gullible” (P10),
“stupid” (P4), “unrealistic” (P6), somebody who “lives in a fairy tale” (P19), “does not have
enough life experience,” and “does not understand the environment she lives in” (P13).
Participants also indicated that this person would, most probably, be taken advantage of in the
Serbian society (P12; P15). They acknowledged, however, that this hypothetical person would be
considered as “normal,” “nice,” “right” (P2; P9) in another country but would not be able to
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survive in Serbia where “conditions of living are different” (P4) and where everybody tries to
“cheat on you” (P4). Almost all of the participants of this study completely trusted only family
members and closest friends. Most thought that other “people would try to cheat you on every
corner” (P2; P4), and that they would do so “intentionally” without “choosing means to achieve
their goals” (P4). Some interviewees thought that even people who spontaneously start
conversations in public places usually have other intentions, such as stealing from your purse
(P10) or committing some sort of fraud (P13; P17), illustrating the prevalent thought of most
participants that, “it is in the human nature to use good people” (P6).
News media performance. Serbians interviewed in this study saw the performance of
news media in the context of the performance of institutions in general. Interviewees complained
that institutions of public interest and their employees were inefficient and incompetent (e.g.,
P1; P6; P7; P13; P19). They accused employees in city and federal administration of sending
people back “five times to bring a different paper” (P13), of making them pay for unnecessary
paperwork (P19) and wait unreasonably long (P13), of dragging the work (P7), and of making
mistakes without taking responsibility for them (P6). Participant 8 had problems with the
judiciary system. Her two ongoing civil litigations have been dragging for 15 and 20 years in
courts. Participant 13 complained about public schools. “Every time a judgment is about to be
made in my cases,” she said, “they change the judge!” “Educational system is falling apart,”
participant 13 stated. “Students are beating professors and professors only think of how to keep
their positions so they can get their salaries. Grades are allocated randomly, A, B, C, D, F, it
doesn’t matter!”
The inefficiency and incompetency of institutions were attributed to one dominant reason
that emerged as the overarching theme in interviews – corruption. Processes of hiring personnel,
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managing and leading projects in all institutions, were perceived as corrupted. Participant 12
claimed that “five to six thousand euros” would get one a teaching job in a high school in Serbia;
participant 18, that “300 to 3000 euros” would get one a passing grade in state medical school;
participant 6, that she paid 200 euros to get the needed documentation from the City Planning
Agency; participant 3, that his former employer, one of Belgrade’s municipalities, was rigging
the tenders for construction works; whereas participant 10 refused to be expert witness in a court
case because she realized that the judge was “dragging the case for seven years so the lawyers
could get paid more.” Participants 9 and 10 described that in health care in Serbia, personal
connections are key for getting adequate help and that most of the doctors in public hospitals
would refer patients to their private health practices “in order to make more money” (P10). They
considered that all the institutions are corrupted “from the bottom to the top” (P4), to the point
that, as participant 4 explained, “in order to get anything done, one has to bribe literally
everybody from doormen, through cleaning ladies, clerks to people on the top.”
In this general atmosphere of perceived institutional dysfunction due to corruption, news
media were perceived as being under the influence of economic and political centers of power
and thus unable to professionally fulfill their job. Interviewees believed that media owners, news
editors but also political parties censor the news content. Participant 17 thought that journalists
publish only official information that politicians give them during press conferences and are not
allowed to release any unofficial information from other sources. Other participants believed that
journalists take money to publish certain stories, and that, pressured by political and economic
centers of power, circulate information that they have to (P9). For example, some participants
stated that political parties pay news media to create scandals before elections (P3; P7).
Participant 7 gave the example of the tabloid Kurir, which he considered as a newspaper paid to
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defame whoever it intends to (P7). Most interviewees considered corruption in journalism in
Serbia so prevalent that it led them to perceive “journalism as a very bad profession” in which
“very few journalists write objectively, but are ready to write whatever, if you pay them” (P13).
Some of them even thought that all news media are inherently set to lie, that they have been set
up as tools of falsification, a “very well designed “system of lies”, fraud and manipulation that
“Hitler called the most powerful weapon” (P6). Controlled by different sources of power, news
media, private or state, domestic or foreign, were seen as pure instruments for the realization of
their controllers’ interests (e.g., P13; P6; P4).
This perception of widespread corruption in all intuitions led people not to trust the
system at all. For example, participant 6 described a couple of cases of unreported domestic
abuse, which, according to her, stayed undocumented mainly because the beaten women were
afraid that the authorities would not be able to protect them from violent husbands. Others
thought that there was a great disparity between the institutions and the citizenry and that
omnipresent corruption has made it practically impossible for them to abide by the law on an
everyday basis (e.g., P13).
Summary of in-depth interviews: The thematic analysis of 20 in-depth interviews with
representatives of the Serbian population showed that the meanings of trust in news media and
generalized trust among the Serbians are equivalent with their Western conceptualizations. It was
found that interviewed Serbians perceived trust in news media as trust in journalistic selection
and that they distinguished between four factors of trust in news media provided in Kohring and
Matthes (2007): trust in selectivity of topics, trust in selectivity of facts, trust in accuracy of
depictions and trust in journalistic assessment. In other words, interviewed Serbians expected
trustworthy news reporting to select topics that are relevant for citizenry, to focus on important

79

facts, to be unbiased and include different points of view, to be accurate and precise in its
depictions of events, and to have well-founded assessments. As far as the concept of generalized
trust is concerned, in order for Serbians interviewed in this study to trust strangers, they have to
be sincerely helpful, fair, open, and direct. This conceptualization overlaps with the Western
notion of generalized trust or trust in people that we don’t know that dates back to Rosenberg’s
(1957) faith in people concept and is widely used in public opinion surveying (e.g., European
Social Survey, 2002-2012/13; World Values Survey 1990-2010/12). Finally, in-depth interviews
discovered that the most problematic aspect of news media performance among the interviewees
was perceived corruption. They thought that widespread corruption in Serbian news media, as
well as in other institutions, prevent them from professionally fulfilling their jobs. This finding
corresponds with the literature showing that corruption, an area of vulnerability for transitional
countries, is one of the most serious problems in Serbia. A United Nation’s report (UNODC,
2011) showed that Serbian citizens ranked it as one of the most serious problems facing their
country and that 13.7% of Serbian citizens, age 18 to 64 had either direct of indirect exposure to
a bribery experience with a public official. As the in-depth interviews found conceptual
equivalences between Western and Serbian notions of trust in news media and generalized trust,
and discovered that the most troubling aspect of news media performance is perceived
corruption, this dissertation research proceeded with using these three constructs in a survey of
the general population of Serbians in order to test the impact of cultural and performance factors
on trust in news media in Serbia.

Survey
In order to test the impact of cultural and performance factors on trust in news media in
Serbia and the effects of moderator variables, a survey on a stratified random sample of the
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Serbian population was conducted. Survey research is ideal for asking about opinions and
attitudes (Nardi, 2006); it enables us to answer how people perceive and evaluate the issues in
questions, and allows us to assess not only what they think about them, but also how they differ
in their perceptions (Hocking, Stacks, & McDermott, 2003). Also, providing an “efficient and
accurate” means of assessing information about a targeted population (Zikmund & Babin, 2007,
p. 128), surveys allow us to construct a sample of people that represent those within the
population we seek to describe (Hocking, Stacks, & McDermott, 2003).
Participants and Sampling

Only men and women (N=544), who were at least 18 years of age and were living in
Serbia, were recruited for participation in the survey using a stratified random sampling
technique. This method allowed representativeness of the sample, as the number and type of
sampling was sufficient, with an acceptable 5 percent error, to generalize the findings to the
entire population (Hocking, Stacks, & McDermott, 2003). Also 544 participants were enough to
satisfy the minimum of 5 observations for each independent variable in order for results to be
generalizable (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). The participants were recruited by IPSOS
Strategic Marketing agency, an international company with over 15 years of experience, assisting
approximately 1,000 researchers a year from the academic, governmental, and private sectors
around the world with their research studies.
The participants for this study were recruited from the general population in Serbia,
excluding the Kosovo region, using the stratified random sampling method. Initial strata were
created by using Census 2011 population data for Serbia and considering two variables: six geoeconomical regions (Vojvodina – Northern Serbia, Belgrade-the capital, West Serbia, Central
Serbia, East Serbia, and South Serbia) and two types of settlements (urban and rural). The
distribution of respondents to initial strata was based on proportional criterion – percentage of
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respondents per stratum was proportional to its size. Thus, in this research, Vojvodina was
represented by 27.4% of total participants; Belgrade by 25.2%; West Serbia by 11%; Central
Serbia by 14.2%; East Serbia by 8.8%; and South Serbia by 13.4% of total participants.
Participants in urban areas represented 60.7% of total participants and in rural areas the
remaining 39.3%. Population strata proportions from Census 2011 were matched in order to get
the sample structure similar to population structure. The sampling frame for the study was the
total number of polling station territories in Serbia (N=8,246), where one sampling point
represented one polling station territory. Households from where the participants were surveyed
were sampled using a random route technique, starting from the given addresses and using
“every fourth house principle.”21 Within each household, the person to be surveyed was chosen
using the Kish Grid, the method that uses a pre-assigned table of random numbers.
The final sample was composed of slightly more women (53.9%) than men (46.1%). The
majority of participants (53.5%) had a high school education. Others had a Bachelor’s degree
(12.1%), Associate Degree (9%), up to 8-grade education (12.8%), a vocational degree (6.6%),
Master’s degree (1.1%), or Doctorate (0.6%), whereas 23 participants (4.2%) did not finish their
elementary school education. The biggest percentage of those who wanted to state their income
made 353 U.S. dollars or less per month per household (24.2%); 21.5% made between $353 and
21

Survey Interviews at the starting point address were not performed. First the data collector had to choose the socalled START. From the starting point, data collectors moved in the direction of increasing house numbers and took
the right side of the street. They skipped three entrances (house numbers) and in the FOURTH house in a row from
the starting point, they looked for the first household where they could interview one person – that was the Start.
From the Start, moving on the right side of the street and in the direction of increasing ordinal numbers, they chose
every FOURTH house number – that is, they entered the FOURTH ADDRESS IN A ROW, then the EIGHT
ADDRESS IN a ROW etc. At every cross-road, they turned right and kept choosing every FOURTH house number.
If it was an apartment building with up to four floors, the interviewers chose up to two apartments in which they
tried to do interviews. If it was an apartment building with five or more floors, they were allowed to choose three
apartments. In case of villages the Step was reduced to two.
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$660; 13.2% between $660 and $1179; 3.7% made more than $1179 per month per household,
whereas 0.7% did not have any income in the last month. The average age of the sample was
47.98 years (SD = 17.39), with a range from 18 to 89. The distribution of the sample per age
group was the following: 18-29 (16.5%); 30-39 (20.8%); 40-49 (16.5%); 50-64 (25.9%); 65+
(20.2%).
Most of the participants (47.4%) didn’t identify with any political party; 40.5% identified
themselves with center-right and nationalistic parties22; and 10% identified with center-left
parties23. The remaining 2.1% of participants either sided with other parties or did not want to
answer the question. The great majority of participants were of Eastern Orthodox religion
(84.9%). The rest were Catholics (6.1%) and Muslims (1.5%), belonged to other religions
(1.3%), were not religiously committed (4.4%), or did not want to indicate their religious
affiliation (1.8%). In terms of ethnicity, the great majority of participants in this study declared
themselves as Serbians (86.9%). The others were Hungarians (4.2%), Bosnians (1.1%), Croats
(0.9%), and Bulgarians (0.7%); 3.9% sided themselves with other ethnics groups and 2.2%
refused to state their ethnicity. Finally, most Serbians interviewed in this study used television as
their main source of information (67.1%). Television was followed by the Internet (16.7%),
newspapers (11.2%), and radio (3.7%), whereas 1.3% of participants did not answer this
question.
Procedure

Data were collected by face-to-face surveying of participants. Ninety-three professional
and well-trained IPSOS Strategic Marketing data collectors were deployed to survey the sampled
22

30% identified themselves with the ruling Serbian Progressive Party; 7.4% with the ruling Socialist Party of
Serbia, party of the ousted ruler Slobodan Milošević; 1.8% with the Democratic Party of Serbia; 0.7% with the
Serbian Radical Party; and 0.6% with Dveri.
23
7.7% identified themselves with the Democratic Party; 0.9% with the Liberal Democratic Party; 0.4% with the
League of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina; 0.6% with the United Regions of Serbia; 0.4% with the SocialDemocratic Party of Serbia; and 0.2% with the Hungarian minority party
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population in the six geo-economic regions of Serbia. The participants were reached at their
homes and asked to take the survey. The survey was administered in an electronic form, on
tablets, portable computer devices. After the participants acknowledged their consent to
participate in the study, they were asked to answer the survey questionnaire. Data collectors read
each question to participants and entered their answers. That way, it was made possible for the
illiterate and semi-literate to answer the questionnaire. The participants first answered questions
about trust in news media, then about generalized trust, and then questions about news media
performance. Blocks that measured two independent variables (generalized trust and news media
performance) were separated by a block of questions about participants’ socialization activities.24
Participants then completed measures that assessed potential moderator and control variables
(age, education level, political party affiliation, and ethnicity, gender, income, trust in
government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news, and media use). The
complete list of survey questions is provided in Appendix B.
The questionnaire was developed first in English and then translated into Serbian. In
order to establish the linguistic equivalence, the questionnaire was back-translated following the
suggestions of Gudykunst (2002). Two bilinguals fluent in both Serbian and English, and
holding degrees in philology and translation, assisted. One of them translated the English
questionnaire to Serbian and the other back-translated it. The variations in original wording were
reconciled. The questionnaire was then sent to IPSOS Strategic Marketing Agency, where two
researchers, with extensive background in opinion polling in Serbia, looked at all the questions.
24

News media performance was measured again at the end of the survey by a separate measure. This will
be explained in more detail in the “Measures” section. Also note that socialization activities as well as some
additional variables measured on this questionnaire (trust in other institutions, life satisfaction, personal happiness,
satisfaction with democracy, cosmopolitanism, main source of information, place of birth of participants and their
parents, citizenship, and religious affiliation) were not used in this study.
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After IPSOS’s researchers made smaller wording changes, the questions were then entered into
IPSOS’s software for electronic data collection and were ready for administration. The data were
collected between October 12 and October 23, 2013.
Measures

Dependent variable: Trust in News Media was measured by Kohring and Matthes
(2007) scale. The scale consisted of 16 items that measured four latent factors: trust in
“selectivity of topics,” “selectivity of facts,” “accuracy of depictions,” and “journalistic
assessment.” Responses were given on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree)
to 7 (Strongly Agree). Participants were asked to think about news media in Serbia in general
when rating their level of agreement with statements about news media presentation of the topic
of economic crisis.25 The scale was successfully validated in Germany (Kohring & Matthes,
2007), United States, and China (Radovic & Rui, 2012). Before using it on a Serbian sample for
the purposes of this dissertation, the scale was pretested on a sample from another Eastern
European nation - Croatia. The fit was satisfactory: CFA: χ2/df = 4.378; CFI=0.928; GFI= 0.905;
RMSEA=0.083, pclose=.000. Testing the scale on a Serbian sample for this dissertation, the fit
of the trust in news media scale was found to be satisfactory: CFA: χ2/df = 4.665; CFI=0.954;
GFI= 0.905; RMSEA=0.082, pclose=.000. In addition, factor loadings, the explained variance of
first and second order factors, were high in both cases (for first order factors, factor loadings
ranged from λ=.749 to λ=.906; for second order factors, factor loadings ranged from λ=.905 to
λ=.948). Finally, the Cronbach’s Alpha was highly satisfactory for the individual factors:
selectivity of topics: .901; selectivity of facts: .901; accuracy of depictions: .916; and journalistic
assessment: .903.
25

In Kohring and Matthes (2007) the topic used was “unemployment.” The researcher decided to avoid
unemployment in this dissertation as it is considered to be the most serious problem affecting Serbia today
(UNODC, 2011) and as such could bias participants’ answers.
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Independent variables: Generalized Trust was measured by three items from the
European Social Survey (2002-2012/13). The items asked the respondents to indicate whether,
generally, other people can be trusted or one can’t be too careful in dealing with people; whether
most people would take advantage of you or would try to be fair, whether most of the time
people would try to be helpful or are mostly looking out for themselves. The responses were
offered on an 7-point scale ranging from 1 to 7. The items used in this scale date back to
Rosenberg’s (1957) faith in people scale that originally consisted of five items assessing the
degree of confidence in trustworthiness, honesty, goodness, generosity, and brotherliness of
people in general. These items were slightly reworded and summed into three items by the
Survey Research Center (1969) – the items used in this research. Since then, the scale has been
widely used to tap into the concept of generalized trust, either in its one-item format (e.g., World
Values Survey, 1990-1995/6; 2005/6-2010/12), two-item format (General Social Survey, 1972-;
World Values Survey, 1999-2002) or three-item format (European Social Survey, 20022012/13). Rosenberg’s (1957) original scale used a Guttman-type scale and the Survey Research
Center’s (1969) scale also used a forced-choice response format. In this dissertation, the
European Social Survey’s (2002-2012/13) format was used as it allowed for the variable to be
tested as continuous rather than dichotomous. Research has shown that the three items in the
European Social Survey (ESS) are reliable and cross-culturally valid. Testing the scale in two
waves of ESS, 2002 and 2004, Reeskens and Hooghe (2008) showed that the items demonstrate
metric equivalence in 24 countries, indicating that the factor loadings of the generalized trust
concept were equal across European countries (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008). Sturigs and Smith
(2010), however, found some problems with the two-item format of the scale. The authors found
that, counter to the widespread assumption that these questions measure trust towards people in
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general, a substantial number of respondents reported having thought about people who are
known to them personally (Sturigs & Smith, 2010). To ensure more coherent interpretation and
following the suggestions of Reeskens and Hooghe (2008) who suggested applying adequate
control methods when using the generalized trust scale, for this dissertation, an additional
explanation was added in the question instructions. Specifically, the instructions asked the
participants to think about the people they DO NOT know when answering generalized trust
questions. The 3 items of the Generalized Trust scale were subjected to principal components
analysis (PCA) using SPSS 20. Prior to performing PCA, the suitability of data for factor
analysis was assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed that all the coefficients were
of .547 and above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin value was .710, exceeding the recommended value
of .6 (Kaiser 1970, 1974); Bartelett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical
significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. Principal components analysis
with Varimax rotation revealed the presence of one component with eigenvalues exceeding 1,
explaining 73.039 % of the variance. The inspection of the component matrices showed that
three items loaded quite strongly on one factor (from λ=.851, λ=.877; λ=.835). Finally, the
Cronbach’s Alpha was highly satisfactory for the generalized trust scale: α= .815.
News Media Performance: Based on the results of in-depth interviews, which suggested
that corruption might be in the core of the news media performance concept, this dissertation
research measured the news media performance by two proxy corruption variables.
The first variable was Trust in Corrupt Journalists, for which a scale was developed. The
goal was to separate the performance trust factor from a trait-oriented cultural trust factor
(generalized trust). Thus the researcher concentrated on measuring the assessment of corruptive
behavior of journalists. In order to do that, vignette-based questions were developed. Vignettes
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have been defined as the “use of stories which represent hypothetical situations to elicit
preferences, judgments, or anticipated behavior” (Wason, Polonsky, & Hyman, 2002).
Vignette-based surveys have been used for more than 30 years in behavioral sciences in
such fields as marketing, environmental economics, transportation, ethics, and professional
decision making to determine the forces that influence multidimensional judgments, especially
when assessing the quality of professional practices (McFadden et al., 2005; Veloski, Tai, Evans
& Bash, 2005). The premise in the use of this method is that individuals often make choices
through the consideration of the characteristics of specific situations as they occur rather than
through a systematic application of principles. They then make judgments about vignettes as a
basis for inferring the principles that drive individual choices (McFadden et al., 2005). This
might particularly be the case with the assessment of corruptive behavior, as the term carries
negative connotation and a direct question might elicit respondents’ exaggerated negative
reaction. Describing hypothetical situations while humanizing their actors, might, to some extent,
correct for the socially desirable answers. The analysis of in-depth interviews with Serbians
showed that the apriori negative perception of institutional corruption (e.g., P10 – “They are all a
bunch of liars and cheaters!”) fades to some extent when they are presented with real-life
situational events of corruptive processes. For example, for participant 5 it was acceptable to
give presents to medical doctors, because “they have very low salaries and very responsible
jobs.” Participant 6 didn’t mind giving or receiving gifts under the condition “that the job gets
done”, whereas participant 7 even found corruption in politics justifiable if it was used for
greater good (e.g., improving the lives of citizenry). These justifications spilled over to
corruptive news media behaviors, with participants acknowledging that the work of journalists
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“is not easy” or is “very hard” (P6; P8; P10), that journalists are subject to various pressures and
have even been killed if they reported objectively (P10).
Corruption was defined as the “behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding interest”
(Nye, 2009, p. 284). As Nye (2009) describes, corruption includes such behaviors as bribery
(use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of
patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit), and misappropriation (illegal
appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).
Based on these definitions, the researcher developed a scale that tapped into the
dimensions of nepotism and bribery (it was assessed that misappropriation was more applicable
to officials who have access to public funds than to journalists). Six vignette-based situations
were developed: two of them described nepotism situations and the rest described bribery
situations. All the vignettes described hypothetical Serbian journalists who were involved in
corruptive practices. The nepotism dimension was represented in two vignettes that described
situations in which a journalist helped a cousin, a construction worker, get a job as a journalist,
and another one in which a journalist focused a positive news story on his nephew rather than on
somebody else who was more deserving of that news spot. The bribery dimension was
represented in four vignettes that described situations in which journalists took bribes to not
publish incriminating stories about politicians. Each bribery question represented a different
level of story seriousness (starting from the most benign one – covering a love affair, to the most
serious one – concealing politician’s involvement in covering the real unemployment rates), and
was matched with a different amount of bribe given to a hypothetical journalist (starting from the
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lowest one for covering the love affair - return of a favor to a monetary one of 1,000 Euros – for
covering the real unemployment numbers). The bribery stories were additionally based on a
United Nations’ report about the corruption in contemporary Serbia that indicated the most
serious problems that country has been facing and the average amounts citizens pay in bribes
(UNODC, 2011).26
After the face validity of vignettes was assessed by two other senior researchers,
vignettes were pretested on a sample of the Serbian population (N=32). The pretest vignettes
were entered into Qualtrics, an online survey software, and the URL was distributed to a
voluntary sample of Serbian citizens (age range 27-55, M=36.33, SD=8.11; 67% female, 33%
male). The respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very
likely) how likely they thought that a particular hypothetical journalist would work in their best
interest when fulfilling his journalistic duty. The results showed that surveyed Serbians made a
difference between different levels of corruption: nepotism (M=2.94, SD=1.50)27, bribery 1
(M=2.26, SD=1.44), bribery 2 (M=2.03, SD=1.59), bribery 3 (M=1.53, SD=1.07), and bribery 4
(M=1.50, SD=1.07). After the pretest, the vignettes were used in the survey of the general
population of Serbia. In the analysis, the six vignettes were combined to form a scale of trust in
26

A United Nations’ report (UNODC, 2011) found that Serbians considered Serbia’s large unemployment rate to be
the most serious problem in the country, while crime and security were in the middle of the scale. For the purposes
of this dissertation, the researcher used the example of covering up the real unemployment rate to illustrate the
highest level of problem seriousness, and the example of covering up a crime to illustrate the second most serious
problem. The remaining two bribery vignettes illustrated the covering up of less serious problems, such as
politician’s involvement in political scuffles and his involvement in a love affair. These issues were taken from
everyday news in Serbia and were assessed by the researcher to be of a lesser importance than unemployment and
crime. The amounts of bribery cited in vignettes were also based on the UNODC (2011) report. As this report stated
that the average cash bribe paid in Serbia was 165 Euros, the researcher took the round figure of 150 Euros to
represent the bribe for covering up the mid-level serious problem of involvement in criminal enterprise, and the
amount of 1,000 Euros to represent the covering up of the more serious issue - the unemployment rate. The report
also indicated that giving drinks and food prizes and exchanging services were also present in the Serbian bribing
culture, but were usually of a comparatively smaller value that the average cash bribe. Thus the example of bribes in
the forms of “a bottle of Scotch and a packet of cigarettes” and “returning of the favor” were used in two vignettes
to match the covering up of less serious problems such as politician’s involvement in political scuffles and his
involvement in a love affair.
27
Only one nepotism question was included in the pretest.
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corrupt journalists. The scale was reliable with satisfactory Cronbach’s Alpha: α= .873.
Confirmatory factor analysis of the two-factor news media performance concept (nepotism and
bribery) showed that the model fit the data well: CFA: χ2/df = 3.470; CFI=0.992; GFI= 0.985;
RMSEA=0.067, pclose=.140. In addition, the fit of the measurement model was assessed by
conducting a confirmatory factor analysis on the model that included scales for trust in news
media, generalized trust, and trust in corrupted journalists. The confirmatory factor analysis
showed that the fit of the measurement model was satisfactory: CFA: χ2/df = 3.087; CFI=0.949;
GFI= 0.890; RMSEA=0.062, pclose=.000.
Besides trust in corrupt journalists, this dissertation also included the measure of
Perceived News Media Corruption. This single item asked respondents to state how widespread
they thought corruption in news media was in Serbia. The responses were given on a scale from
1(not widespread at all) to 7(extremely widespread). The Perceived News Media Corruption
question was put at the end of the survey (before the demographics), separated from the items
assessing journalistic corruption. This item was successfully used in research that assessed
perceived corruption in the public sector in 33 countries around the world – including Eastern
European countries (e.g., Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010). This measure is different than trust in
corrupted journalists as it taps into the perception of institutional (news media) corruption rather
than situational journalistic corruption. As news media performance has not been measured
before using corruption proxies, and in-depth interviews suggested there might be a difference in
assessment of corruption depending on how you ask the question, this dissertation wanted to
measure the concept by using two measures and explore whether there would be a difference in
the prediction of trust in news media.
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Moderating variables: Age was measured by asking the participants to state their exact
age; Education by asking the participants to state their highest level of education attained; and
Political Party Affiliation by asking the participants to state with which political party they
identify with or supported.
Control variables: Trust in Government was measured by a 7-point scale, which
indicated the different extent (not at all 1 to very much 7) of trust in the government in Belgrade
(Jones, 2004). This variable was chosen following several studies, which found that attitudes
towards the media are strongly related to political trust (Bennet, Rhine, Flickinger, & Bennet,
1999; Jones, 2004; Lee, 2010). Personal Religiosity was measured by 4 items asking participants
how much guidance religion provided in their day-to-day lives, how often they attended religious
services, how important of a role religion played in their lives, and how often they prayed (Golan
& Day, 2010). Frequency was measured on a scale from 0 (never) to 7 (every week) and the
personal importance questions was measured on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
Discussing the problematic interaction between religious audiences and the mainstream media,
Golan and Day (2010), found that religiosity was not directly related to media credibility when it
came to newspapers and magazines, but a significant relationship existed between personal
religiosity and perceived credibility of online news. Interpersonal Discussion of News was
measured on the 8-point scale, which indicated how many days per week a participant discussed
news with friends/family. Studies have shown that interpersonal communication patterns may be
relevant for differences in perceptions of media credibility (e.g., Chafee, 1982; McLeod, Rush &
Friedercih, 1968), while others have found the negative correlation between interpersonal
discussion of news and the credibility of some media (e.g., Kiousis, 2001). Media Use was
measured by asking respondents to indicate how many days per week they read newspapers,
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listen to the radio, watch television, or use the Internet. These variables were included following
Tsfalti and Cappella’s (2003) findings that media skepticism is negatively associated with
mainstream news exposure but positively associated with nonmainstream news exposure.
Gender and Income were measured by standard questions asking the respondents to specify their
biological sex and monthly income per household. Westley and Severin (1964) found that gender
played a significant role in influencing people’s perceptions of news credibility.
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CHAPTER V:
RESULTS
The first research question asked about the levels of trust in news media, generalized
trust, and perceptions of news media performance in Serbia. The results obtained on Kohring and
Matthes’s (2007) 7-point scale indicate that the average level of trust in news media among
Serbians is a little bit above the middle of the scale (M=3.73; SD=1.26). To facilitate the
analysis, this dissertation study followed Mishler and Rose’s (1997) collapse of trust scale into
three categories. Respondents were said to trust other people or news media if they gave them a
positive score of 6 or 7 on the scale; they actively distrusted other people or news media if they
scored it 1 or 2; and they were described as skeptical if they gave other people and news media a
score of 3, 4, or 5. The cutting points for these categories were based on analyses indicating that
individuals scoring 3 or 5 on trust are more similar on a variety of political and social attributes
to those scoring 4 on the scale than to those with scores at either extreme (Mishler & Rose,
1997). Following this categorization, the results of this study show that, on average, Serbians did
not express either very low or very high trust in news media but were rather skeptical about them
(M=3.73; SD=1.26). This indicates that, the average answer was between “slightly disagree” or
“neither agree nor disagree” when it came to the questions about journalistic selection of topics,
selection of facts, accuracy of depiction, and fairness of assessment. When analyzing the latent
factors of the second-order multidimensional construct of trust in news media separately, it was
found that the skepticism category was dominant in all four factors: selectivity of topics
(M=3.85, SD=1.38), selectivity of facts (M=3.75, SD=1.35), accuracy of depiction (M=3.64,
SD=1.37), and journalistic assessment (M=3.71, SD=1.36).
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In terms of generalized trust, the results show that Serbians’ average score was below the
middle of the 7-point scale (M=2.90; SD=1.38). This indicates that, on average, Serbians are
somewhere between active distrust and skepticism when it comes to trusting people that they
don’t know personally. Analysis of separate items showed that the lowest score (M=2.57;
SD=1.59) was for the item that asked the participants to indicate whether they thought that most
people look out for themselves or would rather try to be helpful (1 = most people look out for
themselves; 7 = most people try to be helpful). The results show that, on average, Serbians
thought that people generally try to look out for themselves rather than to be helpful. The
analysis of another item showed that Serbians, on average, thought that one cannot be too careful
when dealing with people that he or she doesn’t know. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represented
that one cannot be too careful when dealing with people and 7 that most people can be trusted,
Serbians’ average score was 3.05 (SD=1.58). The analysis of the final item showed that Serbians,
on average, thought that most strangers would take advantage of them. On a scale of 1 to 7,
where 1 represented that most people would try to take advantage of others if they had a chance
and 7 that most people would try to be fair, Serbians scored 3.08 (SD=1.67).
Finally, in terms of perceptions of news media performance, overall results showed that
Serbians assess corruption in news media negatively. The first measure of news media
performance, labeled as “trust in corrupt journalists” and based on six vignettes which described
hypothetical corrupted practices of individual Serbian journalists, measured how respondents
thought that journalists who engaged in corrupt practices were likely to work in the people’s best
interest. The average score on this measure was 1.65 (SD=0.90). This indicates that Serbians
generally do not have confidence in corrupt journalists, thinking that they are not likely to
represent the interests of the average person. The second measure of news media performance
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was the single-item perceived news media corruption measure. The results showed that Serbians
believe that corruption in news media is highly widespread in their country (M=5.26; SD=1.41).
The average levels of trust in news media, generalized trust, and news media performance are
shown in Table 128.
In the analysis of the following hypotheses and research question, the regression models
were first tested using the news media performance measure of trust in corrupt journalists and
then all the models were retested using the measure of perceived news media corruption. This
was done to explore how the two measures compare since the measure of corrupt journalists is
not an established one.
The first hypothesis argued that both generalized trust (H1a) and news media
performance (H1b) would significantly relate to individuals’ trust in news media. In order to test
this hypothesis a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted using trust in corrupt
journalists as a proxy for news media performance. This technique allowed for prediction of the
effects of the independent variables while controlling for possible effects of age, gender,
education, political party affiliation, income, trust in government, personal religiosity,
interpersonal discussion of news, and media use. Prior to conducting a hierarchical multiple
regression analysis, the relevant assumptions of this statistical analysis were tested. An
examination of correlations revealed that the independent variables, generalized trust and trust in
corrupted journalists, were not highly correlated (r=.18) (correlation matrix of independent and
dependent variables is presented in Table 10). In addition, collinearity statistics (Tolerance and
VIF) were all within the accepted limits (tolerance values for independent variables were .859
and .942, which is well above the threshold of .10 and VIF values of 1.164 and 1.062, which is
well below the cut-off of 10) . Thus it can be concluded that assumptions of multicollinearlity
28

All the tables are located in Appendix C.
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have been met (Hair et al., 2010). Residual and scatter plots indicated assumptions of normality,
linearity and homoscedasticity were all satisfied.
A two-stage hierarchical multiple regression was then conducted with trust in news media
as the dependent variable. At stage one, control variables (age, gender, education, political party
affiliation, income, trust in government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news,
and media use) were entered. Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those
supporting two main political parties in power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of
Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was coded as 1: Male 0: Female. Other
variables were treated as continuous. Control variabes explained 14.8% of the variance in trust in
news media (Table 2). After the entry of generalized trust and trust in corrupt journalists scales,
the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 19.2%, F (11, 355)=7.68, p<.001. The
two independent variables explained an additional 4.5% of the variance in trust in news media, R
squared change=.045, F change (2,355)=9.84, p<.001. In the final model, both generalized trust
(b=.12, p=.021) and trust in corrupted journalists (b=.16, p=.001) were statistically significant.
This indicates that both independent variables have a significant positive influence on trust in
news media. The more trusting an individual is towards strangers, the more he or she is likely to
trust news media in Serbia; the more an individual is likely to believe that journalists in Serbia
act in people’s best interest, even if they are corrupt, the more he or she is likely to trust news
media. Thus the first hypothesis was supported. One additional control variable was statistically
significant in the model: trust in government (b=.32, p<.001). This indicates that despite the fact
that trust in government made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model, two
independent variables (generalized trust and trust in corrupted journalists) still were significant
predictors of trust in news media. However, the effect sizes were small. Analysis of part
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correlations, indicate that, controlling for all other variables, generalized trust explained 1.23%
of unique variance in predicting trust in news media, whereas trust in corrupt journalists
explained 2.50% of unique variance in predicting Trust in News Media.
The second research question asked which of the two independent variables, generalized
trust or news media performance, played a greater role in determining trust in news media. The
results of the hierarchical regression showed that news media performance, when measured as
trust in corrupt journalists, had a higher beta value (b=.16, p=.001) than generalized trust (b=.12,
p=.021). In addition, the effect size for trust in corrupt journalists (squared part correlation
=0.025) was larger than the effect size for Generalized Trust (squared part correlation =0.012),
indicating that trust in corrupt journalists plays a slightly bigger role in predicting trust in news
media than generalized trust.
The second hypothesis argued that the relationship between generalized trust and trust in
news media would be moderated by the age of participants of this study. In order to test this
hypothesis, an interaction between age and generalized trust was entered in the third block of the
hierarchical multiple regression. This hypothesis was not supported. The results show that adding
the interaction between age and generalized trust did not bring any change in the model (R
squared change=.000, F change (1,354)=0.006, p=.937). In the final model, interaction between
age and generalized trust was not significant (b=.014, p=.937). The summary of the third step of
the hierarchical regression with age as moderating variable is presented in Table 3.
The third hypothesis argued that education would moderate the relationship between
generalized trust and trust in news media. In order to test this hypothesis, an interaction between
level of education and generalized trust was entered in the third block of the hierarchical multiple
regression. This hypothesis was not supported either. The results show that the interaction
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between education and generalized trust did not bring significant change in the model (R squared
change=.002, F change (1,354)=1.068, p=.302). In the final model, interaction between age and
generalized trust was not significant (b=-.181, p=.302). The summary of the third step of the
hierarchical regression with education as moderating variable is presented in Table 4.
The fourth hypothesis argued that political party affiliation would moderate the
relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media. In order to test this hypothesis, an
interaction between political party affiliation and generalized trust was entered in the third block
of the hierarchical multiple regression. This hypothesis was also not supported. The results show
that the interaction between political party affiliation and generalized trust did not bring
significant change in the model (R squared change=.001, F change (1,354)=.279, p=.598). In the
final model, interaction between political party affiliation and generalized trust was not
significant (b=.061, p=.598). The summary of the third step of the hierarchical regression with
political party affiliation as moderating variable is presented in Table 5.
After testing the hypotheses using trust in corrupt journalists as a proxy for news media
performance, the regression models were then rerun using perceived news media corruption as a
proxy variable for news media performance. An examination of correlations revealed that the
independent variables, generalized trust and perceived news media corruption, were not highly
correlated (r=-.090). In addition, collinearity statistics (Tolerance and VIF) were all within the
accepted limits (tolerance values for independent variables were .880 and .928, which is well
above the threshold of .10 and VIF values of 1.136 and 1.078 were well below the cut-off of 10).
Thus it can be concluded that assumptions of multicollinearlity have been met. Residual and
scatter plots, in this case too, indicated the assumptions of normality, linearity and
homoscedasticity were all satisfied.
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A two-stage hierarchical multiple regression was then conducted with trust in news media
as the dependent variable and with perceived news media corruption as a proxy for news media
performance. The control variables (age, gender, education, political party affiliation, income,
trust in government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news, and media use),
entered at stage one, explained 14.8% of the variance in trust in news media (Table 6). After the
entry of generalized trust and perceived news media corruption, the total variance explained by
the model as a whole was 23.7%, F (11, 355)=12.513, p<.001. The two independent variables
explained an additional 8.9% of the variance in trust in news media, R squared change=.089, F
change (2,355)=20.806, p<.001. In the final model, both generalized trust (b=.12, p=.013) and
perceived news media corruption (b=-.27, p<.001) were statistically significant. This indicates
that both independent variables significantly influenced perceptions of trust in news media. The
more trusting an individual is towards strangers, the more he or she is likely to trust news media
in Serbia, and the more an individual believes news media in Serbia are corrupt the less likely he
or she is to trust news media. Trust in government was again the only control variable significant
in the model (b=.30, p<.001), indicating that that despite the fact that it made a unique
statistically significant contribution to the model, the two independent variables (generalized
trust and perceived news media corruption) still were significant predictors of trust in news
media. However, analysis of part correlations, indicate that effect sizes were small. Controlling
for all other variables, generalized trust explained 1.35% of variance in predicting trust in news
media, whereas perceived news media corruption explained 6.97% of variance in predicting trust
in news media.
The first research question asked which of the two independent variables, generalized
trust or news media performance, played a greater role in determining trust in news media. The
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results of the hierarchical regression showed that when measured as perceived news media
corruption, news media performance had a higher beta value (b=.30, p<.001) than generalized
trust (b=.12, p=.013). In addition, the effect size for perceived news media corruption (squared
part correlation =0.069) was larger than the effect size for generalized trust (squared part
correlation =0.013), indicating that perceived news media corruption plays a bigger role in
predicting trust in news media than generalized trust.
Although these effect sizes can be considered small (effect size for perceived news media
corruption: squared part correlation =0.069, and for generalized trust: squared part correlation
=0.013), comparison with the regression model in which news media performance was measured
with a proxy of trust in corrupt journalists (effect size for trust in corrupt journalists: squared part
correlation =0.025, and for generalized trust: squared part correlation =0.012) shows that the
effect size for news media performance in the second model was larger than in the first model.
When news media performance was measured by a proxy of perceived news media corruption, it
explained 6.97% of unique variance in predicting trust in news media. When it was measured by
a proxy of trust in corrupt journalists, it explained 2.50% of unique variance in predicting trust in
news media. This represents a difference of 4.47%. Thus it can be concluded that the measure of
perceived news media corruption has a bigger predictive power in explaining trust in news media
than a measure of trust in corrupt journalists.
The hypotheses that predicted moderation effects of age, education, and political party
affiliation were retested using perceived news media corruption as a proxy for news media
performance. Three hierarchical multiple regression models were run. In each model, the
interaction between generalized trust and one of the predicted moderators was entered in Step 3.
The results show that none of the three variables moderated the relationship between generalized
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trust and trust in news media: Age (R squared change=.000, F change (1,354)=.120, p=.729; b=.059, p=.729) (Table 7); education (R squared change=.002, F change (1,354)=.725, p=.395; b=.145, p=.395) (Table 8); or political party affiliation (R squared change=.000, F change
(1,354)=.053, p=.818; b=.026, p=.818) (Table 9).

Post-hoc tests
As the effects of age and education were not found in the moderation analysis, post-hoc
tests were conducted to probe whether different age and educational groups could moderate the
relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media29. For this purpose, Age was split
in two categories: people who are younger than 42 and people 42 and older. The goal was to
separate people who were fully socialized in Communism from those that were not. It was
assumed that those who were 18 when the Communism in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989
could have been fully socialized during the Communist period, whereas the younger ones were
assumed to have had socializing experiences in other regimes too. Based on the literature
review, it was assumed that socialization during Communism could have negative effects on
trust. In terms of the level of education, participants were also split in two groups: those who had
up to a high school degree and those who had more education. Based on the literature review, it
was assumed that those who had at least some college experience, would have been more
incorporated into the educational system and thus more trustful of institutions systems (including
news media) than those who completed only high school, elementary school or did not have any
formal education. The interactions of age group and education group were entered separately in
Steps 3 of the hierarchical regression analyses. All other variables remained the same. An
analysis was first done using trust in corrupt journalists as a proxy for news media performance.
Results show that neither age group nor education group moderated the relationship between
29

Political Party Affiliation had been dummy coded from the start.
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generalized trust and trust in news media. The interaction between age group and generalized
trust did not bring significant change in the model (R squared change=.000, F change
(1,354)=.153, p=.696). In the final model, interaction between age group and generalized trust
was not significant (b=.049, p=.696). The interaction between education group and generalized
trust did not bring significant change in the model either (R squared change=.000, F change
(1,354)=.138, p=.710). In the final model, interaction between age group and generalized trust
was not significant (b=-.048, p=.710). A similar analysis was then conducted using perceived
corruption as a proxy for news media performance. Neither variable was shown to moderate the
relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media: age group (R squared
change=.000, F change (1,354)=.049, p=.825; b=-.027, p=.825) and education group (R squared
change=.000, F change (1,354)=.000, p=.989; b=.002, p=.989).
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CHAPTER VI:
DISCUSSION
Popular trust in institutions is vital for democracy, but in post-Communist countries
skepticism and distrust in all institutions, including news media, have been pervasive (e.g.,
Bjornskov, 2007; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Mishler & Rose, 2001). So too has been the case with
interpersonal trust. Citizens of post-Communist countries either fundamentally distrust both
intuitions and their fellow citizens or at least are deeply skeptical of them. Only smaller groups
of individuals across post-Communist countries have been found in previous research to trust
institutions and people, yet only superficially (Mishler & Rose, 1997). In the preface of their
edited volume on social trust in post-socialist countries, Kornai and Rose-Ackerman describe
dishonesty and distrust as “ubiquitous” in Eastern Europe (Kornai & Rose-Ackerman, 2004, p.
xiv). The authors note that the topics of deception, lying, corruption, and abuse of trust have been
concealed and forbidden to talk about for decades in the region. They warn that it is precisely
during periods of transition, when Eastern European societies come to open up more, that those
topics became visible during everyday conversations among friends, at home, at work, or in daily
press and television.
The main purpose of this dissertation research was to examine the origins of trust in news
media in Serbia, one of the countries of post-Communist Eastern Europe. It was done by testing
cultural and performance factors as possible determinants of trust in news media, through a
survey of the general population in Serbia (N=544). In order to give a more complete picture of
trust in a post-Communist society, this dissertation study also explored the meanings of trust in
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news media and trust in other people in Serbia, through 20 in-depth interviews with
representatives of the Serbian population.
The results of this dissertation study show that more than 20 years after the fall of
Communism and 13 years after the fall of Slobodan Milošević’s authoritative regime, the
pervasiveness of distrust remains present. Serbians who participated in this study expressed
skepticism about their news media and distrust of people they don’t know personally.
Conceptualizing trust in news media as well as trust in other people in the same way as their
Western counterparts, Serbians thought that Western standards, necessary for trust in news media
and other people to occur, such as fair selectivity of news, objectivity, neutrality, accuracy in
reporting or sincerity in helping other people, were not met or applicable in their country.
Looking further at the origins of this distrust, this dissertation tested the influences of two
contrasting explanations, cultural and performance, on trust in news media in Serbia. The results
supported the explanation that both factors play a role in determining trust in news media.
However, the performance explanation, measured as assessments of news media corruption, was
found to be slightly more powerful than the cultural explanation, measured as generalized trust,
or trust in people that we don’t know personally.
The results of this study point out that the relationship of Serbians towards their news
media is a distrustful one, based both on cultural beliefs and more rational assessments of
performance of media institutions. As such, this relationship appears to involve a dense
permeation of social, economic, and historical contexts and demands a holistic interpretation. In
order to do this, this chapter will discuss the combined results of the in-depth interviews and
survey, conducted in May 2013 and October 2013 for this dissertation study. It will interpret the
qualitative and quantitative results in light of existing literature on trust and trust in news media

105

in post-Communist countries. This approach should provide a more complete picture of trust in
general and trust in news media in particular in this transitional country, and allow interpretation
in a larger context. The discussion points will be presented as three overall inferences based on
the holistic consideration of the results of this study.
The first overall inference suggests that Serbians conceptualize trust in news media
according to Western normative standards, but believe that these standards cannot be applicable
to their local conditions. The thematic analysis of 20 in-depth interviews with representatives of
the Serbian population showed that the meaning of trust in news media among the Serbians is
equivalent with its Western conceptualization. The interviewed Serbians perceived trust in news
media as trust in journalistic selection of topics, facts, depictions, and assessments. In other
words, interviewed Serbians expected trustworthy news reporting to select topics that are
relevant for citizenry, to focus on important facts, to be unbiased, fair and include different
points of view, to be accurate and precise in its depictions of events, and to have well-founded
assessments. These factors are also reflected in Kohring and Matthes’s (2007) construct of trust
in news media. The findings of this dissertation study show that Serbians, as Westerners,
recognize that news media selectively choose some information over other, and that audiences
are taking a risk when allocating trust to these specific selections. From the participants’ long
descriptions of the need to have a bigger variety of topics covered in Serbian media, as well as
different points of views included in news reports, it was clear that the Serbians interviewed for
this study recognized the process of journalistic selection of information. In addition, the
expectations by which Serbians judged the trustworthiness of this selection overlapped with the
items used to measure the trust in news media construct in Kohring and Matthes’s (2007) scale:
fairness, neutrality, objectivity, independence, inclusion of different points of view in a news

106

reports, use of reliable and knowledgeable sources in news reports, or selection of topics relevant
for all citizens.
These expectations represent the same normative standards used by audiences in
countries with long democratic traditions when judging their press and they overlap largely with
the perceptions of news media social roles in democratic societies. Although several books have
been written about press systems and models across the world (e.g., Christians, 2009; Hallin &
Manicini, 2004; Siebert, Peterson, & Schramn, 1963), a social responsibility type of model has
been widely accepted as an unwritten contract in Western countries. In this type of model, the
state waives most of its control over the media, while media accept social commitments toward
society and restrain themselves accordingly (Himelboim & Limor, 2010). Journalists pursue
objectivity in two different ways: they either try to stay unbiased in their work as gatekeepers or
they try to advance a social cause as advocates (Janowitcz, 1975); they either try to disseminate
information in a neutral way or they try to have a more adversary role towards loci of power
(Johnstone, Slawski & Bowman, 1972; Weaver et al., 2007). In the pursuit of either of these
paths, Western journalistic practices demand dedication to a common set of values, such as
accuracy, balance, relevance (Elliott, 1988), fairness, justice, responsibility, or civic-mindness
(Plaisance & Skewes, 2003). These values are also in the core of the measurement of the trust in
media construct provided by Kohring and Matthes (2007).
Serbians interviewed in this study showed the ability to perceive the democratic ideals of
journalistic values exercised in the scope of the socially responsible model of the press. In fact,
these principles have been circulating in discourse pertaining to Serbian journalism for a long
time. Even during Communism, when the media were fully under state control, the fourth estate
was nevertheless seen as a “public forum” that was supposed to be a “mirror of events” but also
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an “interpreter” of social realities. In fulfilling their “socially responsible reporting” role,
journalists in the Communist Yugoslavia were supposed, at least declaratively, to “provide
independent and nonpartisan sources of comment and criticism” (Robinson, 1977, pp. 119, 120).
The Constitution itself stated that the press, radio, and television were expected to “truthfully ”
and “objectively” inform the public (Paulu, 1974, p. 467), as well as include a broad range of
topics “of public interest” and integrate diverse opinions (Paulu, 1974, p. 469). Although the
question of what information was considered “truthful” and “objective” might have been left
open, and the definitions of “socially responsible reporting” and other related terms were left
afloat, it has to be noted that these principles were present in the discourse about Yugoslav
journalistic practices. Even during years of Milošević’s authoritarian regime in the 1990s, these
principles kept their place. Independent journalists, who had left state media and formed private
newspapers, had made their decisions to leave based on a desire to protect the values of
journalistic objectivity and fairness against state propagandistic media system. At the same time,
scholars were warning about the bias of state media and their use of one-sided news reporting,
contra posing these practices with Western standards of neutrality and fairness (e.g., Thompson,
1994). Since the fall of the Milošević’s regime in 2000, the principles of Western journalism
have become even more prominent in Serbia. Numerous reporters, producers and news directors
have gone through Western media training, during which they have learned about Western-style
media operations and management as well as about the values of Western-style news reporting
(e.g., Hoffman, 2002; Peters, 2010). The big projects, such as the transformation of state
television into a public service broadcaster, have been set up with the goal of establishing
politically, economically, culturally and ethnically unbiased radio-television entities
(Veljanovski, 2005). The principle of objectivity, neutrality, or independence from political and
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economic interests, have been also clearly cited in the Code of Ethics of Serbian Journalists, a
common document adopted by two competing associations of Serbian journalists in 2006.
In this atmosphere, it is not surprising that participants of this dissertation study well
recognized as their own, the values that had been known as Western values or standard norms for
good journalistic practices and identified them as necessary components of trust in news media.
In fact, there are indications that these standards are now recognized as normative in most
countries around the world as journalistic codes of ethics have become strikingly similar. A
recent study of 242 codes of ethics in 94 countries indicated a rather consensual perception of a
neutral journalistic role across the world with the duties of “distributing information” and
“commitment to social interest” as prevalent. The study also showed that Eastern Europeans
expected even more from their journalists: to be more involved and stand up for the protection of
values recognizable in Western democratic practices, such as protection of peace, democracy,
and human rights (Himelboim & Limor, 2010).
The results of in-depth interviews thus point out that Serbians conceptualize trust in news
media using Western standards of journalistic practices as guidelines. Whether they think that
these norms can be achieved in real life, is a different question. The results of the survey
conducted in the scope of this dissertation (N=544) show that Serbians are skeptical about this.
Scoring the average of 3.73 (SD=1.26) on a 7-point trust in news media scale, the participants of
this study showed that they were not confident that their news media select topics and facts that
are relevant for society, report facts and describe events accurately and neutrally, and express
criticism adequately. The average score was just a hair above the midpoint of the scale. On
Mishler and Rose’s (1997) collapse of the trust scale, this score qualifies as skepticism.
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In mass communication literature, media skepticism has been studied largely by Tsfati
and his colleagues (e.g., Tsfati, 2003; Tsfati & Cappella, 2003; Tsfati & Cappella, 2005). In their
work, media skepticism has been defined as a “subjective feeling of alienation and mistrust
toward the mainstream news media” (Tsfati, 2003, p. 160). In this context, journalists are not
viewed as fair or objective in their reports about society and not always telling the whole story. It
also means individuals believe mainstream media would sacrifice accuracy and precision for
personal and commercial gains, and audiences cannot believe what they read in newspapers or
watch on television. In other words, Tsfati’s definition of media skepticism applies the notion of
mistrust not only to how mass media report but how they function in the society too. In this
dissertation, skepticism towards news media represents a medium stage (scores of 3,4, and 5) on
a trust scale, falling between active distrust (scores 1 and 2) and trust (scores 5 and 6). As the
trust scale used in this study taps into the notion of trust in journalistic selectivity, it can be
inferred that skepticism in this context assumes skepticism towards journalistic selectivity.
Serbians who participated in the survey portion of this dissertation study were skeptical about
journalistic selectivity and didn’t have confidence that their news media select topics, facts and
express their criticism fairly, accurately, and neutrally.
For comparison purposes, it has to be noted that skepticism towards news media does not
exclusively pertain to Serbians. In her previous surveys in America and China, the author of this
dissertation found, using the same scale for trust in news media, that young people in these
countries also didn’t score very high on their trust in news media assessments. Although, young
Americans had higher levels of trust in news media than Serbians surveyed in this study
(M=4.42; SD=0.85; N=322), as well as young Chinese (M=4.28; SD=0.82; N=298), their scores
were still in the domain of skepticism (Radovic & Rui, 2012). Using different scales or single
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items to assess trust in news media, other studies also noted lower levels of trust in news media
in Western societies. Pew Research Center reported in 2011 that 66% of Americans thought that
news stories produced by traditional media outlets were inaccurate (Pew Research Center, 2011),
whereas a world-wide survey conducted in 2006 showed that, in the United Kingdom, 64% of
viewers did not consider that broadcast news media report all sides of the story (BBC, Reuters &
Media Center Poll, 2006).
Skepticism towards mass media does not have to be inherently bad. Some level of
skepticism can be healthy for the development of democratic institutions. Some evidence suggest
that media skeptics are more likely to be knowledgeable about politics or participate in the
political process and thus, as Tsfati (2003) argues, less likely to slide into apathy. Mishler and
Rose (1997) claimed that “healthy skepticism” can facilitate democratic process more than blind
trust. However, the problem with Eastern European countries is not one of healthy skepticism but
of severe skepticism that borders on outright distrust in institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997). This
dissertation showed that in Serbia too, skepticism towards news media can be interpreted as
rather strong than healthy. The score (M=3.73; SD=1.26) is closer to the upper bordering value
for active distrust (2) than to the lower bordering value for trust (6). Falling between the scale
points of “slightly disagree” and “neither agree nor disagree” with the questions about trust in
news media, this average score might indicate that the skepticism among Serbians corresponds
more to a certain degree of mistrust toward mainstream news media than to a positive suspicion
in news media reporting.
The results of in-depth interviews additionally inform this inference. For most of
interviewed Serbians, the values of fairness, neutrality, objectivity, and independence are
impossible to attain. They thought that the influences of political and economic sources of power
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are so strong in Serbia that they prevent journalists from performing their jobs professionally.
Serbians interviewed in this study thought that politicians and media owners, not the journalists,
are the ones who select news topics to cover, or angles to take. In this regard, the participants
were not sure how much journalists in Serbia can report objectively, cover all sides of the story,
or work in the interest of citizens of Serbia. They rather thought that news media became
instruments for the realization of their controllers’ interests, tools of falsification, “systems of
lies,” fraud and manipulation. Willing to take bribes in exchange for covering up important
stories or creating scandals, journalists were seen more as professional deceivers than as
disseminators of relevant information (e.g., P2; P3; P7; P9; P13; P17).
The second inference suggests that skepticism towards news media comes more from the
negative assessment of news media performance than from a cultural predisposition to distrust.
After finding the low levels of trust of Serbians in their news media, as well as discovering their
conceptualization of trust in news media, this dissertation study shifted focus to examining the
sources of news media skepticism in this country. The regression analysis of survey data
collected for this study showed that regardless whether it was measured as trust in corrupt
journalism or perceptions of news media corruption, news media performance played a larger
role in determining trust in news media than the cultural factor of generalized trust. The beta
weight of news media performance factor, either measured as trust in corrupt journalists (b=.16,
p=.001) or as perceived corruption of news media (b=-.27, p<.001), was larger and more
significant than the beta weight for generalized trust (b=.12, p=.021). Consequentially, news
media performance had a larger amount of unique variance in explaining trust in news media
than generalized trust did. Measured as trust in corrupt journalists, news media performance
explained 2.5% of variance in trust in news media, and measured as perceived news media
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corruption, it explained 6.97% of unique variance in trust in news media. On the other hand,
generalized trust explained 1.23% of unique variance in trust in news media.
This suggests that the performance explanation is superior to the cultural explanation
when it comes to explaining trust in news media among the participants of this study. Serbians
viewed trust as endogenous to news media functioning rather than as an exogenous trait rooted in
the character of the people. Performance theories conceive trust or distrust as rational responses
of individuals to the performance of institutions. The potential trustor decides to place trust based
on the information from trustee’s actions: if the trustee performs well, the trustor will trust him
or her (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Dasgupta, 1998; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). Thus institutions that
perform well are likely to elicit the trust of citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively
generate feelings of distrust and low confidence. In the case of this dissertation research, the
more Serbians thought news media were corrupt, the more they distrusted them. Trust in news
media, insulated from the effects of generalized trust, was substantially determined by news
media performance. As citizens negatively evaluated news media for corruption practices, they
were skeptical of their news media.
In the view of Serbians interviewed in this study, corruption is a very serious problem of
Serbian media. The survey results showed that Serbian media are perceived as highly corrupt. On
a 7-point scale, Serbians gave them a very high average score of 5.26 (SD=1.41). During the indepth interviews, participants of this study stated that they thought that news media, under the
influence of politicians or media owners publish information that are in the interests of these
centers of power, not in the interests of people (e.g., P9; P17). They thought that Serbian
journalists intentionally cover up some stories, while promoting others and that they take money
for doing it (P3; P7). For the Serbians interviewed in this study, corruption in journalism is so
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prevalent that those who write objectively are considered as endangered species (P4; P13). But it
is not only in journalism that Serbians recognized the omnipresent corruption. They viewed that
ravaging corruption infiltrated into all institutions of the Serbian society, from state and local
administrations, through educational system to health care, police, and judiciary (P6; P9; P10;
P13). Due to perceived presence of corruption in all institutions, Serbians would go to state
institutions with already prepared bribes. During the in-depth interviews they described how they
would bring money, foods and drinks to representatives of different institutions, but feared that
their interests would still not be fully protected (e.g., P6; P13).
More importantly, Serbians not only considered news media as highly corrupt but also
distrusted corrupt journalists. The survey results of this dissertation showed that, when
evaluating the corrupt journalistic practices in the form of hypothetical situations presented to
them, Serbians clearly sent a message that they did not believe that corrupt journalists would
work in people’s interest. The average score for this question was extremely low: 1.65 (SD=0.90)
on a 7-point scale.
This perception of corruption could have more devastating effects than corruption itself.
As Melgar, Rosi and Smith (2009) point out, it generates a “culture of distrust” towards
institutions and can create a cultural tradition of gift giving, which, in a vicious circle, raises
corruption. Čábelková and Hanousek (2004) found that corruption perception is one of the key
factors in giving a bribe. The higher the perceived corruption in an organization, the more
probable it is that a person dealing with that organization will offer a bribe, therefore supporting
corruption. As Melgar, Rosi and Smith (2009) state, high levels of corruption perception are
enough to cause institutional instability and the deterioration of relationships among individuals,
institutions and states. Serbia’s scores in perceived corruption are worrisome not only judging by
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the data from this dissertation, but also from other sources. Transparency International is a nongovernmental organization that monitors and publicizes corporate and political corruption in
international development. Its 2013 Corruption Perception Index, based on expert opinions,
measured the perceived levels of public sector corruption in countries worldwide, scoring them
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Serbia scored 42, indicating that it is perceived as a
corrupt country in which institutions and leaders are not bribe-free and rather answer to their
powerful friends than to the public. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, an incredible 95% of
countries had a score below 50 (Transparency International, 2013). In terms of news media, high
corruption perception can not only prevent citizens from being properly informed but can further
reinforce the practice of gift giving to news media practitioners and undermine even more their
fragile credibility.
The results of this study supported the findings of other studies that have found
performance explanations superior to cultural explanations in predicting trust in institutions (e.g.,
Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). For example, Mishler and Rose (2001) did not
find evidence that general trust in humankind spills over to trust in institutions. By contrast, their
study showed that institutional trust was substantially affected by both political and economic
performance, while being almost completely unaffected by interpersonal trust or by socialization
influences. Their findings suggested that institutional performance holds the key to developing
trust in political institutions, and that trust can be built more surely and swiftly than the decades
or generations suggested by cultural theories. The superiority of performance explanation in the
Serbian case might have important implications for news media development. If trust in news
media is largely dependent on the performance of news media, then it can be nurtured by
improving the conduct and performance of news media. Journalists can generate trust the old-
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fashioned way: they can earn it by responding to public needs and rooting out corruption
practices. They can also earn it by sticking to the doctrines of fair, independent and independent
reporting. The character and performance of trustworthy news media can generate trust just as
the performance of untrustworthy news media generated skepticism and distrust.
The importance of performance of news media in predicting trust in news media in
Serbia, can be also looked at from the perspective of the relatively smaller contribution of
generalized trust. As pointed out earlier, generalized trust had smaller predictive value of trust in
news media, as its beta weight was smaller than the beta weights of the news media performance
measures, as was the amount of variance it explained in trust in news media. The smaller
contribution of generalized trust in explaining trust in news media might suggest a changing
relationship of Eastern Europeans towards their institutions, especially taking into account the
history of distrust in Eastern Europe noted by numerous researchers (e.g., Aasland, Grodeland &
Pleines, 2012; Bjornskov, 2007; Macek & Markova, 2004; Miheljak, 2006; Paldam & Svedsen,
2001; Petrova, 2007; Rose, 1994; Sztompka, 2000). All these scholars pointed out that during the
rule of oppressive Communist regimes in the region, erosion of distrust was widespread. Due to
the controlling nature of the Communist rules, peoples from Eastern Europe started distrusting
everybody and everything that did not belong to immediate circles of family and friends.
According to some researchers, this general predisposition to distrust spilled into the postCommunist period, as the levels of trust in other people and institutions remained small (e.g.,
Miheljak, 2006; Rose, 1994). Using survey data from 1997, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003,
Bjornskov (2007) discovered that the Communist past had a clear effect on perceptions of trust,
as these countries were about eight percentage points less trusting than otherwise comparable
countries. In-depth interviews with elite representatives of East Central Europe, South East
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Europe, and the Western Balkans, revealed that people in this region distinguished between “us”
and “them” between “our people” and “others.” Whereas the former usually enjoy their full trust,
the latter are generally viewed with skepticism, a clear relic of communist past’s atomization of
human relations.
The results of this dissertation study, which showed that the impact of generalized trust in
predicting trust in news media was statistically significant but small, might indicate that the
predisposition to distrust as predictor of trust in institutions in Eastern Europe might be
changing. For Serbian citizens, performance of news media appears to play a more significant
role in determining trust in news media than generalized distrust. This might indicate that
rational assessments of performance might be starting to prevail over cultural explanations, and
that some Eastern European nations might be moving towards evaluations based on past actions
rather than relying on cultural beliefs and norms that belong more to the domain of faith than
reason.
The third inference suggests that performance should be coupled with culture in
understanding trust in news media in Serbia. Despite the fact that perception of news media
corruption was shown to be a better predictor of trust in news media in Serbia than generalized
trust, as a cultural factor generalized trust was still a significant predictor of trust in news media.
In the model with controls, generalized trust’s beta weight was smaller than the beta weight of
news media performance but still statistically significant. This indicates that together with news
media performance generalized trust had a significant predictive value of trust in news media,
even when controlling for other variables. In addition, the moderation tests showed that the
relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media did not change when the
interaction effects of age, education and political party affiliation were tested. This shows that
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generalized trust positively affects trust in news media regardless of people’s age, educational
level or political party affiliation. Finally, the predictive power of the whole model increased
when generalized trust and news media performance were also entered in the equation, indicating
that these two variables together bring significant variance in explaining trust in news media.
This suggests that trust in strangers cannot be ignored when assessing trust in news media in
Serbia.
Even more so, the results of the survey further showed that levels of trust in people we
don’t know are pretty low in Serbia. In terms of generalized trust, Serbians moved very close to
the active distrust category. Their average score of M=2.90 (SD=1.38) indicates that they thought
that other people would be more likely to look out for themselves and to take advantage of
others, than to help others or be fair. Thus, Serbians thought that one has to be rather careful
when dealing with other people. The results of in-depth interviews provided a deeper look at the
sources of generalized distrust in Serbia. During in-depth interviews participants pointed out that
one can completely trust only family members and closest friends. Most thought that other
“people would try to cheat you on every corner” (P2; P4), and that they would do so
“intentionally” without “choosing means to achieve their goals” (P4). Some interviewees thought
that even people who spontaneously start conversations in public places usually have other
intentions, such as stealing from your purse (P10) or committing some sort of fraud (P13; P17),
illustrating the prevalent thought of most participants that, “it is in the human nature to use good
people” (P6).
These findings suggest that generalized distrust is not only a significant predictor of trust
in news media in Serbia, but a very strong feeling among citizens of Serbia, too. Thus, although
news media performance plays a greater role in explaining trust in news media, trust in strangers
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has to remain an active variable in models predicting trust in news media. Trust in news media in
Serbia significantly does not only depend on how well Serbians evaluate the functioning of news
media, but also on how much people in that country trust others. The results of this dissertation
study showed that the more Serbians trusted strangers and the less they thought news media were
corrupt, the more they trusted news media. In this context, cultural and performance theories that
provide contrasting explanations of the origins of trust, have to be considered not as mutually
exclusive, but as complementary. Cultural predisposition to trust or distrust other people does not
necessarily have to exclude the possibility that people also take into account performance of
particular institutions when attributing trust to them. Although one variable might be stronger
than the other in predictions of trust, taken together they provide a more powerful explanation of
trust in news media. It can also be argued that although on a country level, cultural
predispositions can be stronger than performance assessments in predicting trust (or vice versa),
each individual does carry in oneself both cultural predispositions towards trust and distrust and
possibilities to assess institutional performace. Thus, instead of looking at cultural and
performace theoretical perspectives as competing explanations, a more holistic assessment would
be to integrate them in the same model. They should be used together as long as both variables
keep their predictive values.
In terms of journalistic practices, the complimentary influences of performance and
generalized trust suggest that trust in news media in Serbia can be improved by correcting for
both. If corrupted practices of news media are improved and interpersonal relations ameliorated,
it can be expected that the levels of trust in news media would improve. Although the
improvement of corruption practices is more likely to get bigger increases in absolute numbers of
trust in news media than improvement of generalized trust alone, its coupling with the
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improvement of interpersonal relations could bring even more trust in news media. In addition, it
can bring a more inclusive and productive society overall. Research has already found that
generalized trust positively influences trust in political institutions (e.g., Brehm & Rahn, 1997;
Cole, 1973; Newton, 2001) and spills over to create better organizational functioning (e.g.,
Fukuyama, 1995; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). Following this logic, the increase of generalized
trust could spill over to create a more functional environment for journalists in Serbia too and,
coupled with the decrease in corruptive journalistic practices, could most probably positively
influence the perceptions of trust in the fourth estate.
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CHAPTER VII:
CONCLUSION
In times of the transformation of Serbian news media from an institution that served the
interests of the state during Communism and authoritarianism, to the one that ought to serve the
public, in present, not fully developed democratic circumstances, audiences proved to be
cautious about trusting the newly transformed news media. This dissertation study found that
Serbians conceptualize trust in news media in the same way as their Western counterparts but
thought that normative standards of journalistic fairness, objectivity, neutrality or independence
are not applicable to current conditions in their country. Skeptical towards their news media,
Serbians believe that news media are under political and economic pressures, corrupt,
unprofessional, or even inherently organized as instruments of manipulations. This dissertation
study also showed that low trust in news media in Serbia is determined by low levels of trust in
other people. Serbians do not trust people that they don’t know personally and are deeply
distrustful about their intentions. They think that other people mainly want to use them for
fulfilling their own goals and interests. But even more so trust in news media in Serbia is
determined by poor news media performance. Serbians who participated in this study saw their
news media as highly corrupt and this significantly affected their trust in the fourth estate. The
more they thought the news media were corrupt, the less they were likely to trust them.
This dissertation study has several limitations. Previous studies that tested cultural and
performance impact on institutional trust (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton
& Norris, 2000) based their findings on cross-cultural analyses. Being able to compare the results
among Eastern European countries and between Eastern European and Western countries, they
have been able to interpret the results in a larger context and relative to other similar or different
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societies. This dissertation research examined the determinants of trust in news media in the
Serbian context and thus is not able to interpret its results relative to the impact these factors
might be having in other countries. Futures studies should include more countries in their
analyses in order to see whether the same pattern might be discovered in other Eastern European
societies. In addition, this dissertation based its findings on cross-sectional data. Thus it is not
able to compare the levels of trust in news media in Serbia relative to previous levels of trust in
news media in this post-Communist country. A longitudinal approach would have provided a
more in-depth view of trust in news media in Serbia and would have allowed for a more
substantial interpretation of its levels.
This dissertation study’s finding that news media performance had a higher impact on
determining trust in news media in Serbia than the cultural factor of generalized trust, might be
suggesting that the habit of relying on cultural beliefs in at least assessing news media might be
fading in parts of Eastern Europe. For this claim to be tested, larger comparative studies among
post-Communist bloc countries are needed. Future studies would also have to look into the
reasons of why generalized trust might be a weaker predictor of trust in news media, especially
having in mind that other studies had already pointed out that in new democracies generalized
trust could be a weaker predictor of trust in institutions than institutional performance, but failed
to explain why (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963; Rohrscheider & Schmitt-Beck, 2002).
In addition, the explanatory power of the model that included generalized trust and news
media performance and other control variables was not large. The model in which news media
performance was conceptualized as trust in corrupted journalists explained 19.2% of the total
variance in trust in news media, whereas the model in which news media performance was
conceptualized as perceived news media corruption explained 23.7% of the variance in trust in
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news media. Future studies should include other variables which may be better predictors of trust
in news media. For example, as trust in government, one of the control variables used in this
study was significant and explained more unique variance in trust in news media than any other
variable used in the models, including the two main independent variables, other predictors of
trust in news media might be maybe found among variables that assess trust in different state
institutions.
Finally, the analysis of survey data from this dissertation study showed that the impact of
news media performance on trust in news media in Serbia was stronger when news media
performance was conceptualized as perceived news media corruption then when it was
conceptualized as trust in corrupt journalists. Conceptualized as perception of news media
corruption, news media performance was able to explain 4.47% of the variance more than when
it was conceptualized as trust in corrupt journalists. This indicates that a scale that taps into
general perception of news media corruption might be better than situational vignettes, which tap
into performance of individual journalists. This could also be interpreted as supporting the
findings of in-depth interviews which indicate that the impact of corruption perception might
change depending on how one asks the question. The analysis of in-depth interviews with
Serbians showed that the apriori negative perception of institutional corruption (e.g., P10 –
“They are all a bunch of liars and cheaters!”) fades to some extent when they are presented with
real-life situational events of corrupt processes, in which the individual might benefit.
Participants did not find such corrupt practices repellant any more, but even found them
acceptable (e.g., to give presents to different representatives of state institutions if they would
provide a service in return). In that case, Serbians would justify the acceptance of these practices
by citing low salaries and hard work in the public sector (e.g., P6; P7). These justifications
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spilled over to corrupt news media behaviors, with participants acknowledging that the work of
journalists “is not easy” or is “very hard” (P6; P8; P10), that journalists are subject to various
pressures and have even been killed if they reported objectively (P10). Future studies could
further explore this area when conducting studies in other post-Communist bloc countries. Also,
it has to be noted that the results of this study might have been different if different
conceptualization of news media performance was used. Corruption perceptions were used in
this study as they were found to representat the best news media performance in the Serbian
context. Future studies should test how corruption perceptions would predict trust in news media
in other countries.
In sum, I have attempted, in this dissertation study, to assess the current state of trust in
news media in Serbia, one of the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe. In doing this, I
have tried not only to explain the origins of trust in news media, but to position it in a larger
socio-economic and historical context and explain it in relationship to other types of trust, such
as trust in other people or trust in corrupt journalists. Although at first glance, it might seem that
the results point out to an optimistic shift of Eastern European thinking that started to allocate
trust based on others’ actions and not based on previous beliefs rotted in the national culture, it
has to be noted that Serbians remain deeply skeptical about other people as well as institutions.
Thus, it might be fair to note that the culture of distrust and skepticism has not disappeared in
Eastern Europe, but that it might have only changed its form – from fear to disillusionment.
Past totalitarian regimes in the region persistently stimulated distrust among citizens by
inducing uncertainly and propagating fear. News media’s, as other official institutions’ role was
to propagate state ideology and not to independently inform citizens. Both trust and distrust were
equated with fear. When, in the atmosphere of fear, citizens of authoritarian countries express
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high trust in institutions in public opinion polls it is implied that they do it out of fear (e.g.,
Markova, 2004; Muller, 2013) of possible regime’s repercussions. Privately though, they distrust
everything and everybody, and are terrified that trust might make them more open in
conversations and thus more vulnerable to secret services’ persecutions. In new democracies,
such as Serbia is today, it doesn’t seem that trust is equated with fear any more. Serbians are not
afraid of expressing their skepticism towards their news media and are willing to state their
reasons openly. It seems that in the present context, skepticism towards news media in Serbia
reflects rather a certain disappointment with the performance of the institution. Serbians are
bitter that their news media are not up the Western standards of journalistic professionalism.
They are disappointed that their news media are not reporting fairly, accurately, neutrally, and
that their journalists are corrupt. As is the case with many other countries in which democracy is
fairly a new phenomenon, the low levels of trust in news media in Serbia might reflect, what
Catterberg and Moreno (2005) called, the “post-honeymoon disillusionment” (p. 31). In many
emerging nations, transition to democracy has been followed by aspirations of civil, political,
and economic rights. As a result of these new demands, higher standards for evaluating the news
media emerged after the regime changed. The existence of normative standards of fair and
balanced reporting became not enough anymore. In the Serbian case, the citizens evidently
started demanding their implementation as well.
The results of this study indicate that the basic news needs of vast segments of the
Serbian population have not yet been met, which might have increased people’s skepticism
towards their media systems. The mere fact that the political system changed, only implies that
news media in Serbia have transitioned from Communist and authoritarian to another system of
operation. It does not imply that they have fully transformed into systems capable of unbiased
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and independent presentation of information. For that to happen, a longer period of time might
be needed, a period in which the corrupt practices would be eradicated and mass media systems
transformed from those that serve the elites to those that serve the people. For that to happen, it
seems inevitable that disillusionment will be followed by abrupt sobering and decisive action.

126

LIST OF REFERENCES

127

Aasland, A., Grodeland, A. B., & Pleines, H. (2012). Trust and informal practice among elites in
East Central Europe, South East Europe and the West Balkans. Europe-Asia Studies, 64,
115-143.
Alesina, A., & la Ferrara, E. (2000). Participation in heterogeneous communities. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115, 847-904.
Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Anderson, C. (1995). Blaming the government: Citizens and the economy in five European
democracies. New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Anticorruption Council of the Government of Serbia. (2011). Izveštaj o pritiscima i kontroli
medija u Srbiji [Report on pressures and control of media in Serbia] (Publication No.0700-6614/2011-01). Retrieved from: http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/
Baloban, S., & Rimac, I. (1999). Povjerenje u institucije u Hrvatskoj [Trust in institutions in
Croatia]. Bogoslovna smotra, 68, 663-672.
Banfield, E. C. (1958). The moral basis of a backward society. New York, NY: Free Press.
Barber, B. (1983). The logic and limits of trust. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Bartlett, M. S. (1954). A note on the multiplying factors for various chi square approximations.
Journal of the Royal Statistics Society, 16 (Series B), 296-298.
Baskin, M. , & Pickering, P. (2011). Former Yugoslavia and its successors. In S. L. Wolchik & J.
L. Curry (Eds.), Central and East European politics (pp.277-312). Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield Publichers.

128

BBC, Reuters, & Media Center. (2006). Trust in the media. Retrieved from:
http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcreut.html
Bennet, S. E., Rhine, S. L., Flickinger, R. S., & Bennet, L. L. M. (1999). ‘Videomalaise’
revisited: Public trust in the media and government. Harvard International Journal of
Press/Politics, 4(4), 8-23.
Berekashvili, T. (2009). Trends in Georgia's mass media after the Rose Revolution. In M.
Dyczok & O. Gaman-Golutvina (Eds.), Media, democracy and freedom: The postCommunist experience. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang.
Berlo, D. K., Lemert, J. B., & Mertz, R. J. (1970). Dimensions for evaluating the acceptability of
message sources. Public Opinion Quarterly, 33, 563-576.
Bjornskov, C. (2007). Determinants of generalized trust: A cross-country comparison. Public
Choice, 130(1/2), 1-21.
Boda, Z., & Medve-Balint, G. (2012). Institutional trust in Central and Eastern European
countries: Is it different from Western Europe? Paper presented at the EPSA 2nd Annual
Conference, Berlin.
Bok, S. (1979). Lying: Moral choice in public and private life. Hassocks, UK: The Harvester
Press.
Bouckaert, G., Van de Walle, S., Maddens, B., & Kampen, J. K. (2002). Identity vs
Performance: An overview of theories explaining trust in government. Second Report
“Citizen Directed Governance: Quality and Trust in Government.” Public Management
Institute, Katholike Universiteit Leuven.

129

Bracken, C. C. (2006). Perceived source credibility of local television news: The impact of
television form and presence. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 50, 723-741.
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in
Psychology, 3(2), 77-101.
Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of
social capital. American journal of political science, 41, 999-1023.
Catterber, G., & Moreno, A. (2005). The individual bases of political trust: Trends in new and
established democracies. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 18, 31-48.
Chaffee, S. H. (1982). Mass media and interpersonal channels: Competitive, convergent, or
complementary. In Gumpert. G., & Cathcart, R. (Eds.), Inter/media: Interpersonal
communication in a media world (pp. 62-80). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Chanley, V. A., Rudolph, T. J., & Rahn, W. M. (2000). The origins and consequences of public
trust in government: A time series analysis. Public opinion quarterly, 64, 239-256.
Cheterian, V. (2009). Colour revolutions and the media: Where is the scoop? In M. Dyczok & O.
Gaman-Golutvina (Eds.), Media, democracy and freedom: The post-Communist
experience. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang.
Christians, C. G. (2009). Normative theories of the media: Journalism in democratic societies.
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Cole, R. L. (1973). Toward a model of political trust: A Causal analysis. American Journal of
Political Science, 17, 809-817.

130

Coleman, J.S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge: MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press.
Cook, T. E., & Gronke, P. (2001, April). The dimensions of institutional trust: How distinct is
public confidence in the media. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association. Chicago, IL.
Cook, T. E., & Gronke, P. (2001, April). The dimensions of institutional trust: How distinct is
public confidence in the media. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
Cox, J.K. (2002). The history of Serbia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Čábelková, I., & Hanousek, J. (2004). The power of negative thinking: corruption, perception
and willingness to bribe in Ukraine. Applied Economics, 36(4), 383-397.
Čuvalo, A. (2010). Osobine medijskih publika i povjerenje u medije [Characteristics of media
audiences and trust in media]. Medijske studije, 1(1-2), 40–53.
Dasgupta, P. (1998). Trust as a commodity. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and breaking
cooperative relations. New York, NY: Basil Blackwell.
Dahrendorf, R. (1990). Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers.
Dedijer, V. (1984). Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita. Zagreb, Croatia: Mladost.
DeHoog, R. H., Lowery, D., & Lyons, W. E. (1990). Citizen satisfaction with local governance:
A test of individual, jurisdictional, and city-specific explanations. Journal of
Politics, 52(3), 807-837.

131

Deuze, M. (2008). Understanding journalism as network: How it changes, and how it remains the
same. Westminister Papers in communication and culture, 5, 4-23.
Diamond, L. (1999). Developing democracy: Toward consolidation. Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Djilas, M. (1998). Fall of the new class. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
Doney, P. M., Cannon, J. P., & Mullen, M. R. (1998). Understanding the influence of national
culture on the development of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23, 601-620.
Dowley, K. M., & Silver, B. D. (2002). Social capital, ethnicity and support for democracy in the
post-communist states. Europe-Asia Studies, 54, 505-527.
Flanagin, A. J., & Metzger, M. J. (2000). Perceptions of internet information credibility.
Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 77, 515-540.
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: Social virtues and creation of prosperity. London: Hamish
Hamilton.
Economist. (2012). Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a standstill.
http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index2012.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex12.
Elliott, D. (1988). All is not relative: Essential shared values and the press. Journal of Mass
Media Ethics, 3(1), 28-32.
Eurobarometer. (2001-2006). Standard Eurobarometer. Retrieved from:
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm

132

European Social Survey. (2002-2012/13). Questionnaires. Retrieved from:
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
61&Itemid=580
Fico, F., Richardson, J. D., & Edwards, S. M. (2004). Influence of story structure on perceived
story bias and news organization credibility. Mass Communication and Society, 7, 301318.
Freedom House. (2013). Freedom in the world 2013. Retrieved from:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013#.U0HHdfldXs
Gallup Balkan Monitor. (2010). Insides and perceptions: Voices of the Balkans. Retrieved from:
http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf
Gaziano, C. (1988). How credible is the credibility crisis. Journalism Quarterly, 65, 267-278.
Gaziano, C., & McGrath, K. (1986). Measuring the concept of credibility. Journalism Quarterly,
63, 451-462.
General Social Survey. (1972-2006). Browse GSS variables. Retrieved from:
http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/Browse+GSS+Variables/
GFK Croatia (2012). Povjerenje u profesije/institucije [Trust in professions/institutions].
Retrieved from:
http://www.gfk.hr/public_relations/press/press_articles/009409/index.hr.html
Glaser, M. A., & Hildreth, W. B. (1999). Service delivery satisfaction and willingness to pay
taxes: citizen recognition of local government performance. Public Productivity &
Management Review, 48-67.

133

Gleaser, E.L., Laibson, D., Scheinkman, J.A., & Soutter, C.L. (2000). Measuring trust. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115, 811-846.
Glenny, M. . (1996). The fall of Yugoslavia: The third Balkan war. New York, NY: Penguin
Books.
Golan, G. J., & Day, A. G. (2010). In God we trust: Religiosity as a predictor of perceptions of
media trust, factuality, and privacy invasion. American Behavioral Scientist, 54(2), 120136.
Graber, D. A. (2010). Mass media and American politics (8th ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Gross, P. (2002). Entangled evolutions: Media and democratization in Eastern Europe.
Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Gross, P., & Jakubowitcz, K. (2013). The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. When, now,
and for what purpose is media transition and transformation undertaken (and completed)
in Central and Esatern Europe. In P. Gross & K. Jakubowitcz (Eds.), Media
transformations in the post-Communist world (pp. 1- 14). Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books.
Gudykunst, W. B. (2002). Issues in cross-cultural communication research. In W. B. Gudykunst,
& B. Mody (Eds.), International and intercultural communication (pp. 165-182).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B, J., & Anderson, R. E. (2010). Multivariate data analysis.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.
Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three models of media and
politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

134

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2013). Comparing media systems between Eastern and Western
Europe In P. Gross & K. Jakubowitcz (Eds.), Media transformations in the postCommunist world (pp. 15-32). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Halpern, P. (1994). Media dependency and political perceptions in an authoritarian political
system. Journal of Communication, 44, 39.
Hankiss, E. (1990). In search of a paradigm. Daedalus, 119, 183-215.
Haley, E. (1996). Exploring the construct of organization as source: Consumers’ understandings
of organizational sponsorship of advocacy advertising. Journal of Advertising, 25(2),
19-35.
Hayes, A. F. (2005). Statistical methods for communication sciences. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Hetherington, M. J. (1998). The political relevance of political trust. American Political Science
Review, 791-808.
Himelboim, I., & Limor, Y. (2010). Media institutions, news organizations, and the journalistic
social role worldwide: A cross-national and cross-organizational study of codes of
ethics. Mass Communication and Society, 14, 71-92.
Hocking, J. E., Stacks, D. W., & McDermott, S. T. (2003). Communication Research (3rd ed.).
Boston, MA: Pearson Education.
Hoffman, D. (2002). Beyond public diplomacy. Foreign Affairs, 81(2), 83–95.
Holbert, L. R., Hmielowski, J. D., & Weeks, B. E. (2011). Clarifying relationships between
ideology and ideologically orineted cable TV news use: A case of supression
Communication Research, 39, 194-216.

135

Holbert, R. L. & Stephenson, M. T. (2002). Structural equation modeling in the communication
sciences, 1995-2000. Human Communication Research, 28, 531- 551.
Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L, & Kelley, H. H. (1953). Communication and persuasion:
Psychological studies of opinion change. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Huff, L., & Kelley, L. (2005). Is collectivism a liability? The impact of culture on organizational
trust and costumer orientation: a seven nation study. Journal of Business Research, 58,
96-102.
Huseby, B. M. (2000). Government performance and political support: A study of how
evaluations of economic performance, social policy and environmental protection
influence the popular assessments of the political system (Doctoral dissertation, Inst. for
sosiologi og statsvitenskap, Fakultet for samfunnsvitenskap og teknologiledelse, Norges
teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet).
ed.). Boston, MA: A and B.

Information Law of Serbia. (1998). Retrieved from
www.b92.net/mediji/propisi/word/zakon_repsrbije.doc
Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Inglehart, R. (2006). East European value systems in global perspective. In H.D. Clingemann, D.
Fuchs & J. Zielonka (Eds.) Democracy and political culture in Eastern Europe (pp. 6784). New York, NY: Routledge.
International Center for Transnational Justice. (2009). Transitional justice in the former
Yugoslavia. Retrieved from: http://ictj.org/publication/transitional-justice-formeryugoslavia

136

IREX. (2011). Media sustanability index: Serbia. Retrieved from:
http://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/EE_MSI_2011_Serbia.pdf
IREX. (2012). Media sustainability index: Serbia. Retrieved from:
http://www.irex.org/system/files/u105/EE_MSI_2012_Serbia.pdf.
IREX. (2012a). Media sustability index: Europe and Euroasia. Reterieved from:
http://www.irex.org/project/media-sustainability-index-msi-europe-eurasia
IREX. (2013). Media sustanability index: Serbia. Retrieved from:
http://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/u105/EE_MSI_2013_Serbia.pdf
Jacobson, H. K. (1969). Mass media believability: A study of receiver judgments. Journalism &
Mass Communication Quarterly, 46, 20-28.
Jakubowicz, K. (2005). Post-Communist media development in perspective. Retrieved from:
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/02841.pdf
Jakubowitcz, K. (2013). Post-Communist political systems and media freedom and
independence. In J. Downey & S. Mihelj (Eds.), Central and Eastern European media in
comparative perspective: Politics, economy, and culture (pp. 15-40). Burlington, VT:
Ashgate Publishing.
Janowitz, M. (1975). Professional models in journalism: The gatekeeper and the advocate.
Journalism Quarterly, 52, 618–626.
Johnson, O. W. (2013). Entertaining the people, serving the elites: Slovak mass media since
1989. In P. Gross & K. Jakubowitcz (Eds.), Media transformations in the postCommunist world (pp. 149-165). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Johnstone, J. W., Slawski, E. J., & Bowman, W. W. (1972). The professional values of American
newsmen. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(4), 522-540.

137

Jones, D. A. (2004). Why Americans don’t trust the media: A Preliminary analysis. Harvard
International Journal of Press/Politics, 9(2), 60-75.
Kaiser, H. (1970). A second generation Little Jiffy. Pshychometrika, 35, 401-415.
Kaiser, H. (1974). An index of factorial simplicity. Pshychometrika, 39, 31-36.
Kaljević, B. (1999, October 23). Dosije: Godišnjica zakona o informisanju: Utišani glasovi [File:
The anniversary of the information law: Silenced voices]. Vreme, 459. Retrieved from
http://www.vreme.com/arhiva_html/459/09.html
Keenan, E. (1986). Muscovite political folkways. Russian Review, 45, 115-181.
Kim, J. Y. (2005). “Bowling together” isn’t a cure-all: The relationship between social capital
and political trust in South Korea. International Political Science Review, 26, 193-213.
Kiousis, S. (2001). Public trust or mistrust? Perceptions of media credibility in the information
age. Mass Communication & Society, 4, 381-403.
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic pay-off? A cross-country
investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1251–1288.
Knack, S., & Zak, P.J. (2002). Building trust: public policy, interpersonal trust, and economic
development. Supreme Court Economic Review, 10, 91–107.
Kohring, M., & Matthes, J. (2007). Trust in news media development and validation of a
multidimensional scale. Communication Research, 34, 231-252.
Kornai, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2004). Preface. In J. Kornai, B. Rothstein, & S. RoseAckerman (Eds.), Creating social trust in post-socialist transition (pp. xiv-xix). New
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

138

Lacity, M. C., & Janson, M. A. (1994). Understanding qualitative data: A framework of text
analysis methods. Journal of Management Information Systems, 11(2), 137-155.
Lee, T.-T. (2010). Why they don’t trust the media: An examination of factors predicting trust.
American Behavioral Scientist, 54(1), 8-21.
Levine, T., Park, H. S., & Kim, R. K. (2007). Some conceptual and theoretical challenges for
cross-cultural communication research in the 21st century. Journal of Intercultural
Communication Research, 36, 205-221.
Lijphart, A., & Waisman, C. H. (1996). Institutional design in new democracies. Boulder, CO:
Westview.
Lippmann. W. (2008). Public opinion (first published in 1921). New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace
and Company.
Liu, T., & Bates, B. (2009). What’s behind public trust in news media: A comparative study of
America and China. Chinese Journal of Communication, 2, 307-329.
Lovell, D. W. (2001). Trust and the politics of postcommunism. Communist and PostCommunist Studies, 34, 27-38.
Luhamann, N. (1994). Risk: A sociological theory. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
Luhiste, K. (2006). Explaining trust in political institutions: Some illustrations from the Baltic
states. Communist and post-communist studies, 39, 475-496.
Macek, P., & Markova, I. (2004). Trust and distrust in old and new democracies. In I. Markova
(Ed.), Trust and democtaic transition in post-Communist Europe (pp. 173-194). New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.

139

Manaev, O., Manaeva, N., & Yuran, D. . (2013). Islands in the stream: Reflections on media
development in Belarus. In P. Gross & K. Jakubowitcz (Eds.), Media transformations in
the post-Communist world (pp. 195-214). Lanham, MD: Lexington books.
Markham, D. (1968). The dimensions of source credibility of television newscasters. Journal of
Communication, 18, 57-64.
Markova, I. (2004). Introduction: Trust/Risk and Trust/Fear. In I. Markova (Ed.), Trust and
democtaic transition in post-Communist Europe (pp. 1-24). New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
McCracken, G. (1988). The long interview. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
McCroskey, J.C., Hamilton, P. R., & Weiner, A. N. (1974). The effect of interaction behavior on
source credibility, homophily, and interpersonal attraction. Human Communication
research, 1, 42-52.
McFadden, D. L., Bemmaor, A. C., Caro, F. C., Dominitz, J., Jun, B-H., Lewbel, A., Matzkin, R.
L., Molinari, R., Schwarz, N., Willis, R. J., & Winter, J. K. (2005). Statistical analysis of
choice experiments and surveys. Marketing Letters,16, 183-196.
McLeod, J., Rush, R. R., & Friederich, K. H. (1968). The mass media and political information
in Quito, Ecuador. Public Opinion Quarterly, 32, 575-587.
Melgar, N., Rossi, M., & Smith, T. W. (2010). The perception of corruption. International
Journal of Public Opinion Research, 22, 120-131.
Mestrovic, S. G., Letica, S., & Goreta, M. (1993). Habits of the Balkan heart. College Station,
TX: Texas A&M University Press.

140

Metzger, M. J., Flanagin, A. J., Eyal, K., Lemus, D. R., & McCann, R. M. (2003). Credibility for
the 21st century: Integrating perspectives on source, message, and media credibility in the
contemporary media environment. Communication yearbook, 27, 293-336.
Mihaljek, V. (2006). Slovenia in central Europe: Merely meteorological or a value kinship. In H.
D. Clingemann, D. Fuchs & J. Zielonka (pp. 119-147). Democracy and political culture
in Eastern Europe. New York, NY: Routledge.
Milic, V. (2006). Media in Serbia: From Watch(ed) dog to watchdog. In M. Caparini, P. Fluri &
F. Molnar (Eds.), Civil society and the security sector: Concepts and practices in new
democracies. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Miller, R. F. (2006-2007). The difficult fight against corruption in transitional systems: The case
of Serbia. Transcultural Studies, 2/3, 245-259.
Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of political trust?: Testing institutional and
cultural theories in post-Communist societies. Comparative Political Studies, 34(1), 3062.
Mishler, W., & Rose, R. . (1997). Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil
and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies. The Journal of Politics, 59(2),
418-451.
Misztal, B. A. (1988). Trust in modern societies. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Muller, J. (2010). The (ir) relevance of trust in the news media: Dynamics, causes, and
consequences of trust in the news media in democratic and authoritarian
regimes (Doctoral dissertation, Jacobs University Bremen).
Muller, J. (2013). Mechanisms of trust: News media in democratic and authoritarian regimes.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

141

Musil, J. (1992). Czechoslovakia in the middle of transition, Daedalus, 121, 175-197.
Meyer, P. (1988). Defining and measuring credibility of newspapers: Developing an index.
Journalism Quarterly, 65, 567-588.
Meyer, H. K., Marchionni, D., & Thorson, E. (2010). The journalist behind the news: credibility
of straight, collaborative, opinionated, and blogged “news.” American Behavioral
Scientist, 54, 100-119.
Nardi, P. M. (2006). Doing survey research: A guide to quantitative methods. Boston, MA:
Pearson Education.
Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy. International Political
Science Review, 22, 201-214.
Newton, K., & Norris, P. (2000). Confidence in public institutions: Faith, Culture, or
Performance. In S. J. Pharr & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), Disaffected democracies: What's
troubling the trilateral countries (pp.52-73). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Nye, J.S. (2009). Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis. In A.J.
Heidenheimer & M. Johnston (Eds.), Political corruption: Concepts & contexts (pp. 281303). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Olson, J. S., & Olson, G. (2000). i2i trust in e-commerce. Communication of the ACM, 43(12),
41-44.
O’Neil, P. (1997). Introduction: Media reform and democratization in Eastern Europe. In P.
O’Neil (Ed.), Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe (pp. 1-6). Portland,
OR: Frank Cass.

142

Open Society Institute. (2005). Television across Europe: Regulation, policy, and independence.
Retrieved from
http://www.eumap.org/topics/media/television_europe/national/serbia/media_ser1.pdf
Open Society Institute. (2006, March 28). Srbija: za uskladjivanje sa evropskim standardima za
radiodifuziju neophodne dalje medijske reforme [Serbia: Further media reforms needed
for getting in line with European broadcasting standards] (Press release). Retrieved from
http://www.eumap.org/pressinfo/press_releases/media/serbia/serbianpr.pdf
Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (1995). Order and time in institutional study: A brief for the
historiacal approach. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Paldam, M., & Svendsen, G.T. (2001). Missing social capital and the transition in Eastern
Europe. Journal of Institutional Innovation, Development and Transition, 5, 21–34.
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Paulu, B. (1974). Radio and television broadcasting in Eastern Europe. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
Pešić, M. (1994). Manipulations on Television Belgrade (Master’s thesis, City University,
London, Great Britain). Retrieved from
http://diversity.commedia.net.gr/files/studies/diaforetikotita/manipulation-by-picture.pdf
Peters, B. (2010). The future of journalism and challenges for media development. Journalism
Practice, 4, 268–273.
Petrova, V. P. (2007). Civil society in post-communist Eastern Europe and Euroasia: A crossnational analysis of micro-and macro-factors. World Development, 35, 1277-1305.
Petty, R. E. & Cacioppo, J. T. (1981). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and contemporary
approaches. Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown.

143

Pew Research Center. (2011). Press widely criticized, but trusted more than other information
sources. Retrieved from http://people-press.org/
Pjesivac, I., & Imre, I. (2013, September). Culture and perceptions of trust in news media in
Croatia. Paper presented at the International Conference: Media and the Public Sphere:
Athens, GA.
Plaisance, P. L., & Skewes, E. A. (2003). Personal and professional dimensions of news work:
Exploring the link between journalists' values and roles. Journalism & Mass
Communication Quarterly, 80(4), 833-848.
Pornpitakpan, C. (2004). The persuasiveness of source credibility: A critical review of five
decades' evidence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34, 243-281.
Price, V., & Romantan, A. (2004). Confidence in institutions before, during, and after
“Indecision 2000”. Journal of Politics, 66, 939-956.
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J-A., & Limongi, F. (1996). What makes democracies
endure? Journal of Democracy, 7(1), 39-55.
Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New
York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Radovic, I. & Rui, R. (2012, August). Power distance and trust in news media: A comparative
study of America and China. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association
for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication. Chicago, IL.

144

Reeskens, T. & Hooghe, M. (2008). Cross-cultural measurement equivalence of generalized
trust. Evidence from the European Social Survey (2002 and 2004). Social Indicators
Research, 85, 515-532.
Reisinger, W. M., Miller, A. H., Hesli, V. L., & Maher, K. H. (1994). Political values in Russia,
Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and implications for democracy. British Journal of
Political Science, 24, 183-223.
Robinson, G. J. (1977). Tito's maverick media. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Rohrschneider, R., & Schmitt-Beck, R. (2002). Trust in democratic institutions in Germany:
Theory and evidence ten years after unification. German Politics, 11(3), 35-58.
Roper, B. W. (1985). Public attitudes toward television and other media in a time of change.
New York, NY: Television Information Office.
Rose, R. (1994). Postcommunism and the problem of trust. Journal of Democracy, 5(3), 18-30.
Rosenberg, M. (1957). Occupations and values. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Rothstein, B. , & Stolle, D. (2002). How political institutions create and destroy social capital:
An institutional theory of generalized trust. Paper presented at the 98th meeting of the
American Political Science Association. Boston, MA.
Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E. M. (2005). All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust. World
politics, 58(01), 41-72.
Sims, H. (2001). Public confidence in government, and government service delivery. Ottawa,
Canada: Canadian Centre for Management Development.
Schudson, M. (2002). The news media as political institutions. Annual Review of Political
Science, 5(1), 249-269.

145

Siebert, F.J., Peterson, T., & Schramm, W. (1956). Four theories of the press. Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press.
Silverblatt, A. (2004). Media as social institution. American Behavioral Scientist, 48, 35-41.
Sotirović, V. B. (2009). The 1990 Multiparty Elections in Serbia. Zgodovinski časopis
(Historical review), 63/2009 (140), 3-4, 426-438.
Sparks, C. (1997). Post-communist media in transition. In Corner, J., Schlesinger, P. &
Silverstone, R. (Eds.), International media research: A critical survey (pp.96-122). New
York, NY: Routledge.
Sparks, C. (2005). Civil society as contested concept: Media and political transformation in
Eastern and Central Europe. In R. A. Hackett,& Y. Zhao (Eds.), Democratizing global
media: One world, many struggles (pp. 37–56). New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc.
Spasovska, K. (2010). Journalism under siege: An investigation into how journalists in
Macedonia understand professionalism and their role in the development of democracy
(Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from the University of Tennessee Trace database.
(http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1128).
Strategic Marketing (2008). Poverenje u medije kao izvore informisanja [Trust in media as
sources of information]. Retrieved from
http://www.mc.rs/code/navigate.aspx?Id=4&eventId=6746
Sturigs, P. & Smith, P. (2010). Assessing the validity of generalized trust questions: what kind of
trust are we measuring? International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 22, 74-92.
Sztompka, P. (1996). Trust and emerging democracy lessons from Poland. International
Sociology, 11(1), 37-62.

146

Sztompka, P. (2000). Trust: A sociological theory. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge
University Press.
Taylor, M., & Kent, M. L. . (2000). Media transitions in Bosnia: From propagandistic past to
uncertain future. International Communication Gazette, 62(5), 355-378.
The Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Serbia. (2009). Technical
assistance to RTS, Serbia. Unpublished report in partnership with BBC World Service
Trust, IREX, and ECBJ.
TheMacroDataGuide. (2010). Authority Trends, 1946-2010: Serbia.
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Serbia2010.pdf.
Thomspon, M. (1994). Forging war. Avon, Great Britain: Bath Press.
Transparency International. (2013). Corruption perception index 2013. Retrieved from:
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/
Traps, L. (2009). Communism and trust. Journal of Politics and International Affairs, 63-76.
Triandis, H. C. (1972). The analysis of subjective culture. New York, NY: Wiley.
Tsfati, Y. (2003). Does audience skepticism of the media matter in agenda setting? Journal of
Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 47(2), 157-176.
Tsfati, Y. (2004). Exploring possible correlates of journalists' perceptions of audience trust.
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 81, 274-291.
Tsfati, Y., & Cappella, J. N. (2003). Do people watch what they do not trust? Exploring the
association between news media skepticism and exposure. Communication Research, 30,
504-529.

147

Tsfati, Y., & Cappella, J. N. (2005). Why do people watch news they do not trust? The need for
cognition as a moderator in the association between news media skepticism and
exposure. Media Psychology, 7(3), 251-271.
Veloski, J., Tai, S., Evans, A. S., & Bash, D. B. (2005). Clinical vignette-based surveys: A tool
for assessing physician practice variation. American Journal of Medical Quality, 151157.
Veljanovski, R. (2005). Javni RTV servis u službi grañana [Public broadcasting system in the
service of citizens]. Belgrade, Serbia: Clio.
Volčić, Z. (2007). Yugo-nostalgia: Cultural memory and media in the former Yugoslavia.
Critical Studies in Media Communication, 24(1), 21-38.
Vukasovich, C., & Boyd-Barrett, O. (2012). Whatever happened to Tanjug? Re-loading memory
for an understanding of the global news system. International Communication Gazette,
74(8), 693-710.
UNDOC (2011). Corruption in Serbia: Bribery as experienced by the population. Vienna,
Austria: United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime.
Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The moral foundations of trust. New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
Uslaner, E. M. (2008). Where you stand depends upon where your grandparents sat: The
inheritability of generalized trust. Public Opinion Quarterly, 72, 725-740.
Wason, K., Polonsky, M., and Hyman, M. (2002). Designing Vignette Studies in Marketing,
Australasian Marketing Journal 10(3), 41–58.

148

Wheaton, B., & Kavan, Z. (1992). The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991. Westview
Press.
Weaver, D. H. (1998). Journalists around the world: commonalities and differences. In D.H.
Weaver with assistance of Wei Wu (Ed.), The global journalist: News people around the
world, (pp. 455-480). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Weaver, D. H., Beam, R. A., Brownlee, B. J., Voakes, P. S., & Wilhoit, G. C. (2007). The
American journalist in the 21st century: U.S. news people at the dawn of a new
millennium. New York, NY: Routledge.
West, M. D. (1994). Validating a scale for the measurement of credibility: A covariance structure
modeling approach. Journalism Quarterly, 71, 159-168.
Westley, B. H., & Severin, W. J. (1964). Some correlates of media credibility. Journalism &
Mass Communication Quarterly, 41, 325-335.
Whitehead, J. L. (1968). Factors of source credibility. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 54, 59-63.
Wolchik, S. L., & Curry, J. L. (2011). Democracy, the market, and the return to Europe: From
Communism to the European Union and NATO. In S. L. Wolchik & J. L. Curry (Eds.),
Central and East European politics (pp. 3-30). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers.
World Values Survey. (2010-2012). Surveys. Retrieved from:
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/index_surveys
Yang, K., & Holzer, M. (2006). The performance–trust link: Implications for performance
measurement. Public Administration Review, 66(1), 114-126.
Zikmund, W., & Babin, B. (2006). Exploring marketing research. Mason, OH: Thomson Higher
Education.

149

APPENDICES

150

Appendix A: Interview guide
Date of Interview:___________________

Place:_____________________________

Time:______________________________

Section I – Biographical/Demographic Questions
1. Pseudonym:
2. Sex:
3. Age:
4. Resides in:
5. Occupation:
a. Title:
b. Place of employment:
c. Years practicing:
6. Education:
a. Highest level:
b. Areas of specialty:
7. Family:
a. Marital status:
b. Number, ages of children:
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Section II – Question Categories, Grand Tour Questions, and Planned Prompts
a. Explore trust in other people:
i. What does it mean for you to trust other people?
ii. Who do you trust? Why do you trust them? Imagine a person that you
trust. Please describe him/her.
iii. Which characteristics trustworthy people should have?
iv. How do you decide to trust other people?
v. Who do you distrust? Why? Which characteristics these people have?
vi. Imagine the situation: you are at the bus stop in your place of residence. A
stranger approaches you. What is the first thing that comes to your mind?
Why?
b. Explore trust towards family members, friends, co-workers
i. Imagine the situation in which you would have to give something that is
very dear to you to another person for a particular period of time. Which
person would it be? Why?
c. Explore trust towards strangers
i. Generally speaking, how much should we trust people that we don’t
know? Why?
ii. Generally speaking, how much should one be careful towards other
people? Why?
iii. Describe situations in which people that you don’t know personally helped
you.
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iv. Please tell me what you think about this hypothetical person: This person
is open in relationships with other people that he/she doesn’t know
personally like family or friends. This person thinks that, in general (not
all people, but on average), people are ready to help her and not take
advantage of her, that other people, generally speaking, tend to be fair and
don’t only look for their own interests.
d. Explore trust in institutions.
i. Do you trust institutions? Why ? Did you have some negative-positive
experiences ? Describe them.
ii. Are there some institutions that you trust? Which ones? Why?
iii. If they say that instutions are corrupted – describe some cases of
corruption that you are aware of or that you heard of. What do you
consider as corruption?
e. Explore news media habits
i. Which news media do you follow? Why? On which platforms?
ii. Are their particular actions, routines with which you connect the
consumption of news media (e.g. drinking coffee, waiting for the bus,
watching news with friends, etc.)
iii. Can you describe your particular day in terms of following news media?

f. Explore trust in news media.
i. What does it mean for you to trust news media?
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ii. Which characteristics should media have in order for you to trust them?
Elaborate on each characteristic having in mind Serbian media/foreign
media?
iii. How do media gain your confidence? Describe the process.
iv. Can you describe your perfect news media channel. What should it have?
Why?
v. How would a newscast look like if you were in charge of it?
vi. Can you describe a perfect journalist? Which characteristics should he/she
have?
vii. How would you describe the work of journalists in Serbia? Why?
viii. How would you describe the work of foreign news media? Why?
ix. How would you describe the sources that journalists/media use?
x. How would you describe the work of the news media regarding their
selection of topics?
xi. What do you think about the accuracy of news media reports?
xii. What do you think about the journalistic criticism?
xiii. Which news media you do not trust? Why?
xiv. Can you describe some situations in which news media were helpful to
you?
xv. Generally speaking, what do you think about the work of news media in
Serbia?
xvi. If you had to choose between state and private news media, what would
you choose and why?

154

xvii. Is corruption present in Serbia news media? If yes – how much; where;
how do you know.
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Interview guide - Serbian translation

Datum:___________________

Mesto:_____________________________

Vreme:______________________________

Sekcija I – Biografski podaci
1. Pseudonim:
2. Pol:
3. Godine:
4. Mesto boravišta:
5. Zanimanje:
a. Radno mesto:
b. Mesto zaposlenja:
c. Godine zaposlenja:
6. Obrazovanje:
a. Najviši nivo:
b. Oblast specijalizacije:
7. Porodica:
a. Bračni status:
b. Broj i godine dece:
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Sekcija II – Pitanja
a. Istražiti poverenje u druge ljude.
i.

Šta za vas znači verovati drugim ljudima?

ii.

Kome verujete? Zašto? Zamislite osobu u koju imate poverenja. Opišite je.

iii.

Koje karakteristike ljudi treba da imaju da biste im verovali?

iv.

Kako se odlučujete da verujete nekoj osobi?

v.

Da li postoje ljudi kojima ne verujete? Koji su to ljudi? Koje osobine
imaju ljudi kojima ne verujete?

vi.

Zamislite sledeću situaciju. Nalazite se na autobuskoj stanici u Vašem
gradu i prilazi vam nepoznata osoba. Šta je Vaša prva misao? Zašto?

b. Istražiti poverenje u članove porodice, prijatelje, kolege.
i.

Zamislite sada situaciju u kojoj treba da poverite nešto što vam je
dragoceno nekoj drugoj osobi. Koja bi to osoba bila?

c.

Istražiti poverenje u nepoznate ljude.
i.

Šta mislite, uopšteno govoreći, koliko čovek treba da veruje ljudima koje
ne poznaje? Zašto?

ii.

Šta mislite, uopšteno govoreći, koliko čovek treba da bude pažljiv/oprezan
u odnosu sa ljudima koje ne poznaje?

iii.

Da li možete da opišite neke situacije u kojima su vam ljudi koje ne
poznajete dobro pomogli?

iv.

Sada ću vam opisati jednu osobu a vi mi recite šta mislite o njoj. Ta osoba
ulazi otvoreno u odnose bilo koje vrste sa drugim ljudima, sa ljudima koje
ne poznaje intimno, recimo kao prijatelje ili porodicu. Polazi od toga da su
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drugi ljudi generalno (u proseku/ne svi, nego u proseku) spremni da joj
pomognu a ne da je iskoriste, da drugi ljudi generalno (u proseku) teže da
budu fer i da generalno drugi ljudi ne gledaju samo svoju korist.
d. Istražiti poverenje u institucije.
i.

Da li verujete državnim institucijama? Zašto? Da li ste imali neka
negativna-pozitivna iskustva? Opišite ih.

ii.

Da li postoje državne institucije kojima verujete? Koje su to? Zašto?

iii.

Ukoliko kažu da ima korupcije u državnim institucijama, neka opišu
slučajeve korupcije za koje znaju ili za koje su čuli. I da opišu šta smatraju
da je korupcija.

e. Istražiti navike što se tiče praćenja informativnih programa.
i.

Koje informativne programe-sadržaje pratite ? Zašto njih ? Na kojim
platforma (TV, novine, radio, Internet)?

ii.

Da li vezujete odredjene dnevne aktivnosti za praćenje informativnih
sadržaja (pr. čitanje kafe uz novine) ?

iii.

Da li možete da opišete vaš tipičan dan što se tiče praćenja informativnih
sadržaja ?

f. Istražiti poverenje u medije.
i.

Šta za Vas znači verovati medijima (informativnim sadržajima) ?

ii.

Koje karakteristike mediji treba da imaju da biste im verovali? Opišite
svaku karakteristiku.

iii.

Kako mediji zadobijaju vaše poverenje? Opište taj process.

iv.

Zamislite idealan medij. Možete li ga opisati? Šta treba da ima i zašto ?
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v.

Kako bi izgledao Dnevnik da ga vi uredjujete?

vi.

Možete li da opišete idealnog novinara? Koje karakteristike treba da ima?

vii.

Kako biste opisali rad novinara u Srbiji. Zašto?

viii.

Kako biste opisali rad stranih novinara? Zašto?

ix.

Šta mislite o izvorima koje mediji koriste u informativnoim programima?

x.

Šta mislite o selekciji tema koje informativni programi biraju?

xi.

Šta mislite koliko su tačni izveštaji koji se objavljuju u informativnim
programima ?

xii.

Šta mislite o novinarskim komentarima koji se objavljuju u medijima ?

xiii.

Kojima medijima ne verujete? Zašto ?

xiv.

Da li možete da opišete situacije u kojima su vam informativni programi
bili od pomoći (bilo koje vrste) ?

xv.

Uopšteno govoreći, šta misilite o radu informativnih medija u Srbiji ?

xvi.

Kad biste birali izmedju privatnih i državnih medija koje biste izabrali i
zašto ?

xvii.

Da li ima korupcije u medijima? Ako da - šta mislite kako se ona
ispoljava?
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Appendix B: Survey questionnaire
I Please show on this 7-point scale where 1 represents great distrust and 7 represents great
trust, how much you personally trust …
1. … the news provided in newspapers.
Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Great trust
2. … the news you see on television.
Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Great trust
3. … the news that you hear on radio.
Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Great trust
4. … the news from online sources.
Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Great trust

II Keeping in mind the coverage of economic crisis in news media in Serbia, please answer
whether you 1 = strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=slightly disagree; 4=neither agree nor
disagree; 5=slightly agree; 6=agree; 7=strongly agree with the following statements.
1. The topic of economic crisis receives necessary attention.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
2. The topic of economic crisis is assigned an adequate status.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
3. The frequency with which economic crisis is covered is adequate.
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Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
4. The topic is covered on the necessary regular basis.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
5. The essential points are included.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
6. The focus is on important facts.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
7. All important information regarding the topic of economic crisis is provided.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
8. Reporting includes different points of view.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
9. The information in a report would be verifiable if examined.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
10. The reported information is true.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
11. The reports recount the facts truthfully.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
12. The facts that I receive regarding economic crisis are correct.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
13. Criticism is expressed in an adequate manner.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
14. The journalists’ opinions are well-founded.
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Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
15. The commentary regarding economic crisis consists of well-reflected conclusions.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
16. I feel that the journalistic assessments regarding the topic of economic crisis are
useful.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
III Having in mind people that you DO NOT know personally, please answer the following
three questions.
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 1 to 7, where 1 means
you can’t be too careful and 7 means that most people can be trusted.
You can’t be too careful 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Most people can be trusted
2. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance,
or would they try to be fair? Please tell me on a score of 1 to 7, where 1 means most
people would try to take advantage of me and 7 means that most people would try to be
fair.
Most people would

1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Most people would

try to take advantage of me

try to be fair
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3. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly
looking out for themselves? Please tell me on a score of 1 to 7, where 1 means most
people look out for themselves and 7 means that people mostly try to be helpful.
Most people look out for
themselves

Most people try to be
1—2—3—4—5—6—7

helpful

IV Now, I would like to ask you a couple of questions about yourself.
1. How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?
Never -1
Less than once a month – 2
Once a month – 3
Several times a month – 4
Once a week – 5
Several times a week – 6
Every day – 7
2. Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in
social activities?
Much less than most – 1
Less than most- 2
About the same – 3
More than most- 4
Much more than most - 5
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V Now I will read to you several short stories and will ask you to answer the questions after
them:
1. Milosh is a journalist in Serbia. Last year Milosh helped his cousin, a construction
worker, to get a job as a journalist.
How likely do you think Milosh is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic
duties?
Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Very likely
2. Lazar is a journalist in Serbia. When writing a story about the success of young talents in
Serbia, Lazar put the focus of the story on his nephew, although he knew that another
student from the Mathematical High School in Belgrade had better grades and won more
prizes in international competitions.
How likely do you think Lazar is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic
duties?
Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Very likely
3. Jovan is a journalist in Serbia. One day a prominent politician asked him not to publish
an investigative article Jovan was working on about the politician’s involvement in a love
affair. He promised he would return the favor to Jovan. Jovan accepted and did not
publish the article.
How likely do you think Jovan is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic
duties?
Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Very likely
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4. Milan is a journalist in Serbia. One day a prominent politician asked him not to publish
an investigative article Milan was working on about the politician’s involvement in
political scuffles among the ruling coalition. He gave Milan a bottle of Scotch and a
packet of cigarettes. Milan accepted and did not publish the article.
How likely do you think Milan is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic
duties?
Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Very likely
5. Zoran is a journalist in Serbia. A prominent politician asked him not to publish an
investigative article Zoran was working on about the politician’s involvement in a
criminal enterprise. He gave Zoran 150 Euroes. Zoran accepted and did not publish the
article.
How likely do you think Zoran is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic
duties?
Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Very likely
6. Petar is a journalist in Serbia. A prominent politician asked him not to publish the
investigative article Petar was working on about politician’s involvement in covering up
the real figures for unemployment in the country. He gave Petar 1,000 Euroes. Petar
accepted and did not publish the article.
How likely do you think Petar is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic
duties?
Not likely at all 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Very likely
VI Please answer the following questions:
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1. Please indicate how many days per week you discuss news with your
friends/family?
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7
2. Please indicate how many days per week you listen to the radio?
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7
3. Please indicate how many days per week you read newspapers?
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7
4. Please indicate how many days per week you watch television?
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7
5. Please indicate how many days per week you use Internet?
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7
6. Please indicate which medium is your main source of information:
______________________________
7. On a scale from Not at all (1) to Very much (7), please indicate to what extent you
think you can trust the government in Belgrade to do what is right?
Not at all 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Very much
8. On a scale from Not at all (1) to Very much (7), please indicate how much
guidance does religion provide you in your day-to-day life?
Not at all 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Very much
9. On a scale from Never (0) to Every week (7), please indicate how often do you
attend religious services?
Never 0 —1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Every week
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10. On a scale from Not important at all (1) to Very important (7), please indicate
how important of a role does religion play in your life?
Not important at all —1—2—3—4—5—6—7- Very important
11. On a scale from Never (0) to Every week (7), please indicate how often do you
pray?
Never 0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Every week
12. Please tell me on a sale of 1-7 how much you personally trust each of the
institutions I read out. 1 means you do not trust the institution at all, and 7 means
you have complete trust in the institution.
Complete
trust

No trust
at all

…the Parliament
of Serbia

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…the legal
system

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…the police

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…political
parties

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…the European
Parliament

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…The United
Nations

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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13. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?
Please answer using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means extremely dissatisfied and
7 means extremely satisfied.
Extremely dissatisfied 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Extremely satisfied
14. Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?
Extremely unhappy 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Extremely happy
VII Now I will ask you some questions about the democracy in your country. There are no
right or wrong answers, so just please tell me what you think. To what extent you think
each of the following statements apply in Serbia. 1 means you think the statement does not
apply at all and 7 means you think it applies completely.
1. Elections in Serbia are free and fair.
Does not apply at all 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Applies completely
2. Voters in Serbia discuss politics with people they know before deciding how
to vote.
Does not apply at all 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Applies completely
3. Different political parties in Serbia offer clear alternatives to one another.
Does not apply at all 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Applies completely
4. Opposition parties in Serbia are free to criticize the government.
Does not apply at all 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Applies completely
5. The media in Serbia are free to criticize the government.
Does not apply at all 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Applies completely
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VIII Please answer whether you 1 = strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=slightly disagree;
4=neither agree nor disagree; 5=slightly agree; 6=agree; 7=strongly agree with the
following statements.
1. Serbia should prohibit certain racial and religious groups from living in our country.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
2. Racial prejudice may be a good thing for us because it keeps many undesirable foreigners
from coming to Serbia.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
3. If necessary we ought to be willing to lower our standard of living to cooperate with other
countries in getting an equal standard for every person in the world.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
4. My country does not have a moral obligation to share its technological and economic
riches with the less fortunate people of the world.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
5. Rich nations should share their wealth with the less fortunate people of the world.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
6. Citizens of Serbia should be entitled to pursue whatever materialistic standard of living
they desire, regardless of the effects on the planet’s environment and natural resources.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
7. Any person should be allowed to live wherever he or she wants in the world.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
8. It would be better to be a citizen of the world than of any particular country.
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Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
9. All national governments ought to be abolished and replaced by one central world
government.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
10. An international police force ought to be the only group in the world allowed to have
armaments.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
11. Concessions on the part of Serbia to other nations are morally right if the concessions
will promote world peace.
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree
IX How widespread do you think corruption is in the news media in Serbia? Please rate
your answer on a scale from (1) Not widespread at all to (7) Extremely widespread.
Not widespread at all 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Extremely widespread
X Finally, I would like to ask you some more questions about yourself.
1. What is your age? __________
2. What is your biological sex?

a. Male
b. Female
3. Which political party do you identify with/you support?

a. Socialist Party of Serbia
b. Democratic Party
c. Democratic Party of Serbia
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d. Serbian Radical Party
e. Liberal Party
f. Serbian Progressive Party
g. Other. Please indicate _________________
h. None
4. What is your level of education? (highest level)

a. Less than elementary school
b. Elementary school
c. High school
d. Bachelor’s degree
e. Master’s degree
f. Doctoral degree
5. What is your religion?

a. Orthodox
b. Catholic
c. Muslim
d. Jewish
e. Other. Please indicate ____________
f. Atheist
g. Does not want to indicate
6. What is you ethnicity?

_____________
7. What is the average earning of your household per month?
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

None
Less than 8,000 dinars
8,001 – 10,000 dinars
10,001 – 13,000 dinars
13,001 – 16,000 dinars
16,001 – 20,000 dinars

7. 20,001 – 24,000 dinars
8. 24,001 – 30,000 dinars
9. 30,001 – 36,000 dinars
10. 36,001 – 42,000 dinars
11. 42,001 – 48,000 dinars
12. 48,001 – 56,000 dinars

13. 56,001 – 64,000 dinars
14. 64,001 – 74,000 dinars
15. 74,001 – 86,000 dinars
16. 86,001 – 100,000 dinars
17. Above 100,000 dinars
18. Does not want to answer

8. Place of birth: ________________________ (village/town/city)

____________________________ (state)
9. Place of birth of your mother: _________________( village/town/city)

____________________________ (state)
10. Place of birth of your father: _________________( village/town/city)

____________________________ (state)
11. Are you a citizen of Serbia?

a. Yes
b. Now
c. Does not want to indicate
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Survey questionnaire – Serbian translation

I Molim da odgovorite na skali od 1 do 7, gde 1 znači “Uopšte ne verujem” a 7 znači
“U potpunosti verujem” koliko lično verujete …
1. … vestima koje se objavljuju u novinama.
Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 U potpunosti verujem
2. … vestima koje se objavljuju na televiziji.
Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 U potpunosti verujem
3. … vestima koje se objavljuju na radiju.
Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 U potpunosti verujem
4. … vestima koje se objavljuju na Internetu.
Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 U potpunosti verujem
II Imajući u vidu pokrivanje teme ekonomske krize u informativnim medijima u Srbiji
(uopšteno), molim odgovite da li se 1 = uopšte ne slažete; 2= ne slažete; 3=delimično ne
slažete; 4=niti slažete niti ne slažete; 5=delimično slažete; 6=slažete; ili se 7=u potpunosti
slažete, sa sledećim izjavama.
1. Dovoljno pažnje se posvećuje temi ekonomske krize.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
2. Temi ekonomske krize se daje adekvatan status.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
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3. Učestalost pokrivanja teme ekonomske krize je adekvatna.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
4. Kada za tim postoji potreba, tema se obrañuje redovno.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se ne slažem
5. U medijske izveštaje o ekonomskoj krizi uključuju se neophodni elementi.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se ne slažem
6. Pažnja se usresreñuje na važne činjenice.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
7. Daju se sve važne informacije o temi ekonomske krize.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
8. U medijskim izveštajima su predstavljene različite tačke gledišta.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
9. Informacije predstavljene u medijskim izveštajima mogu biti proverene.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
10. Informacije iznete u medijskim izveštajima su tačne.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
11. Činjenice se iznose istinito u izveštajima informativnih medija.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
12. Činjenice koje dobijam iz informativnih medija o ekonomskoj krizi su tačne.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
13. Kritike u informativnim medijima se izražavaju na adekvatan način.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
14. Mišljenja novinara su dobro utemeljena.
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Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
15. Novinarski komentari o ekonomskoj krizi su rezultat dubokog promišljanja.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U upotpunosti se slažem
16. Mislim da su ocene novinara o temi ekonomske krize korisne.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
III Imajući u vidu ljude koje NE POZNAJETE, molim Vas odogovorite na sledeća
pitanja.
1. Uopšteno govoreći, da li smatrate da se većini ljudi može verovati, ili da nikada ne
možete biti previše oprezni? Molim odgovorite na skali od 1 do 7 gde 1 znači da nikada
ne možete biti previše oprezni a 7 da se većini ljudi može verovati.
Nikada ne možete biti previše oprezni 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Većini ljudi se može verovati
2. Da li mislite da bi većina ljudi pokušala da Vas iskoristi, ukoliko bi imala priliku, ili bi
pokušala da bude fer ?
Većina ljudi bi pokušala 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Većina ljudi bi pokušala
da me iskoristi

da bude fer

3. Da li smatrate da, u većini slučajeva, ljudi pokušavaju da pomognu drugima ili da
uglavnom gledaju sebe?
Ljudi uglavnom gledaju
sebe

Ljudi uglavnom pokušavaju
1—2—3—4—5—6—7

da pomognu drugima

IV Sada bih želeo-la da Vam postavim nekoliko pitanja o Vama.
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1. Koliko često se družite s prijateljima, roñacima i-ili kolegama? (ne poslovno)
Nikad -1
Reñe od jednom mesečno– 2
Jednom mesečno – 3
Nekoliko puta mesečno – 4
Jednom nedeljno – 5
Nekoliko puta nedeljno – 6
Svaki dan – 7
2. U poredjenju sa drugim ljudima vaših godina, koliko često učestvujete u društvenim
aktivnostima?
Mnogo manje nego drugi – 1
Manje nego drugi- 2
Uglavnom podjednako – 3
Više nego drugi- 4
Mnogo više nego drugi- 5
V Sada ću Vam pročitati nekoliko kratkih priča i zamoliti Vas da odgovorite na jedno
pitanje posle svake od njih.
1. Miloš je novinar u Srbiji. Prošle godine Miloš je pomogao svom bratu od strica,
grañevinaru po struci, da se zaposli kao novinar.
Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Miloš spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?
Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Veoma je spreman
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2. Lazar je novinar u Srbiji. Radeći na priči o uspesima naših mladih stručnjaka, Lazar
je kao primer najuspešnijeg mladog matematičara naveo svog sestrića, iako je znao da
jedan drugi učenik Matematičke gimazije iz Beograda ima bolje ocene i više
priznanja sa meñunardonih takmičenja.
Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Lazar spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?
Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Veoma je spreman
3. Jovan je novinar u Srbiji. Jednog dana, jedan poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne
objavi istraživački članak o ljubavnoj aferi koju je imao. Političar je obećao da će
vratiti uslugu Jovanu. Jovan je prihvatio i nije objavio članak.
Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Jovan spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?
Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Veoma je spreman
4. Milan je novinar u Srbiji. Jednog dana poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne objavi
članak na kojem je radio, a koji se bavio učešćem tog političara u političkim
prepucavanjima unutar vladajuće koalciije. Zauzvrat, političar je dao Milanu flašu
viskija i boks cigareta. Milan je prihvatio i nije objavio članak.
Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Milan spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?
Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Veoma je spreman
5. Zoran je novinar u Srbiji. Poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne objavi članak o
kriminalnim aktivnostima u koje je bio umešan i dao mu 150 evra. Zoran je prihvatio
i nije objavio članak.
Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Zoran spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?
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Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Veoma je spreman
6. Petar je novinar u Srbiji. Poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne objavi članak o tome da
je političar skrivao informacije o pravom stanju nezaposlenosti u zemlji. Političar je
dao Petru 1000 evra. Petar je prihvatio i nije objavio članak.
Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Petar spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?
Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Veoma je spreman
VI Molim Vas da odgovorite na sledeća pitanja.
1. Koliko dana u nedelji raspravljate o vestima sa članovima porodice ili sa
prijateljima?
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7
2. Koliko dana u nedelji slušate radio?
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7
3. Koliko dana u nedelji čitate novine?
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7
4. Koliko dana u nedelji gledate televiziju?
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7
5. Koliko dana u nedelji koristite Internet?
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7
6. Molim Vas navedite koji medij je Vaš glavni izvor informisanja?
_____________________________________
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7. Na skali od (1) Ne, uopšte do (7) U velikoj meri, molim Vas navedite u kojoj meri
verujete da vlada Srbije postupa ispravno?
Ne, uopšte 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 U velikoj meri
8. Na skali od (1) Ne, uopšte do (7) U velikoj meri, molim Vas navedite koliko se
rukovodite verskim načelima u skakodnevnom životu.
Ne, uopšte 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 U velikoj meri
9. Na skali od (0) Nikad do (7) Svake nedelje, molim navedite koliko često
prisustvujete verskoj službi.
Nikad 0 —1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Svake nedelje
10. Na skali od (1) Uopšte nije važna do (7) Veoma je važna, molim navedite koliko
je važna uloga koju religija igra u Vašem životu.
Uopšte nije važna —1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Veoma je važna
11. Na skali od (0) Nikad do (7) Svake nedelje, molim navedite koliko se često
molite.
Nikad 0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Svake nedelje
12. Molim Vas recite mi na skali od 1 do 7 koliko lično verujete svakoj od navedenih
institucija. 1 znači da uopšte ne verujete a 7 znači da imate potpuno poverenje.
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Uopšte

Potpuno

ne

verujem

verujem

…Skupštini

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…pravosudju

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…policiji

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…političkim

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Srbije

strankama
…Evropskom
parlamentu
…Ujedinjenim
nacijama

13. Uopšteno govoreći, koliko ste u celini zadovoljni svojim životom? Molim da
odgovorite na skali od 1 do 7, gde 1 znači da ste izrazito nezadovoljni a 7 znači da
ste izrazito zadovoljni.
Izrazito nezadovoljan-na 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Izrazito zadovoljan-na
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14. Uopšteno govoreći, koliko biste rekli da ste srećni?
Izrazito neserećan-na 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Izrazito srećan-na
VII Sada bih želeo-la da Vam postavim nekoliko pitanja o demokratiji u Srbiji. Molim
Vas da imate na umu da ne postoje tačni ili netačni oddgovori, već samo tražim od Vas da
mi kažete šta mislite. U kojoj meri se, po Vašem mišljenju, svaka od navedenih izjava
odnosi na Srbiju? 1 znači da se uopšte ne odnosi a 7 da se odnosi u potpunosti.
1. Izbori u Srbiji su slobodni i fer.
Uopšte se ne odnosi 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Odnosi se u potpunosti
2. Grañani Srbije raspravljaju o politici sa drugima pre nego što odluče kako će
glasati.
Uopšte se ne odnosi 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Odnosi se u potpunosti
3. Političke stranke nude jasne alternative jedna drugoj.
Uopšte se ne odnosi 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Odnosi se u potpunosti
4. Opozicione stranke mogu slobodno da kritikuju Vladu.
Uopšte se ne odnosi 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Odnosi se u potpunosti
5. Mediji u Srbiji mogu slobodno da kritikuju Vladu.
Uopšte se ne odnosi 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Odnosi se u potpunosti
VIII Molim odgovite da li se 1 = uopšte ne slažete; 2= ne slažete; 3=delimično ne slažete;
4=niti slažete niti ne slažete; 5=delimično slažete; 6=slažete; ili se 7=u potpunosti slažete, sa
sledećim izjavama.
1. Srbija bi trebalo da zabrani odreñenim rasnim i verskim grupama da žive u našoj zemlji.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem

181

2. Rasne predrasude mogu biti dobra stvar zato što sprečavaju da mnogi nepodobni stranci
dodju u Srbiju.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
3. U slučaju nužde, trebalo bi da budemo spremni da smanjimo životni standard, kako bi, u
saradnji sa drugim zemljama, postigli podjednak standard za sve ljude na svetu.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
4. Moja zemlja nema moralnih obaveza da deli svoja tehnološka i privredna bogatsva sa
siromašnijim ljudima na svetu.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
5. Bogate zemlje bi trebalo da dele svoja bogatsva sa siromašnijima.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
6. Grañanima Srbije bi trebalo dozvoliti postizanje željenog životnog standarda bez obzira
na posledice koje to može imati na životnu sredinu i prirodne resurse planete.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
7. Svakoj osobi bi trebalo da bude dozvoljeno da živi gde god hoće na svetu.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
8.

Bolje bi bilo biti grañanin sveta nego neke odreñene zemlje.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
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9. Vlade pojedinačnih država trebalo bi da budu zamenjene jednom centralnom svetskom
vladom.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
10. Medjunarodne policijske snage bi trebalo da budu jedina oružana grupa na svetu.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
11. Ustupci Srbije drugim državama su moralno opravdani ukoliko je to u interesu mira u
svetu.
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem
IX Koliko mislite da je korupcija rasprostranjena u informativnim medijima u Srbiji?
Molim Vas odgovorite na skali od (1) Nije uopšte rasprostranjena do (7) Izrazito je
rasprostranjena.
Nije uopšte rasprostranjena 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 Izrazito je rasprostranjena
X I za kraj, bih želeo-la da Vam postavim još nekoliko pitanja o Vama.
12. Koliko imate godina? __________
13. Kog ste pola?

a. Muški
b. Ženski
14. Koju političku partiju podržavate?

a. Socijalističku Partiju Srbije (SPS)
b. Demokratsku Stranku (DS)
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c. Demokratsku Stranku Srbije (DSS)
d. Srpsku Radikalnu Stranku (SRS)
e. Liberalno Demokratsku Partiju (LDP)
f. Srpsku Naprednu Stranku (SNS)
g. Neku drugu (molim navedite) _________________
h. Nijednu
15. Koji je Vaš nivo obrazovanja? (najviši dostignuti nivo-diploma)

a. Manje od osnovne škole
b. Osnovna škola
c. Srednja škola
d. Osnovne studije
e. Master studije ili magistratura
f. Doktorat
16. Koja je Vaše versko opredeljenje?

a. Pravoslavno
b. Katoličko
c. Islamsko
d. Judaističko (Jevrejsko)
e. Drugo (molim navedite)____________
f. Nisam verski opredeljen-a
g. Ne želi da navede
17. Koja je Vaša nacionalna pripadnost?

________________________________
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18. Koja su Vam prosečna mesečna primanja po domaćinstvu?

19. Bez prihoda

25. 20001 do 24000 dinara

31. 56001 do 64000 dinara

20. Ispod 8000 dinara

26. 24001 do 30000 dinara

32. 64001 do 74000 dinara

21. 8001 do 10000 dinara

27. 30001 do 36000 dinara

33. 74001 do 86000 dinara

22. 10001 do 13000 dinara

28. 36001 do 42000 dinara

34. 86001 do 100000 dinara

23. 13001 do 16000 dinara

29. 42001 do 48000 dinara

35. Preko 100000 dinara

24. 16001 do 20000 dinara

30. 48001 do 56000 dinara

36. BO (Odbija da odgovori)

19. Mesto roñenja: ________________________ (selo-grad)

____________________________ (država)
20. Mesto roñenja majke: _________________( selo-grad)

____________________________ (država)
21. Mesto roñenja oca: _________________( selo-grad)

____________________________ (država)
22. Da li ste državljanin Srbije?

a. Da
b. Ne
c. Ne želi da navede
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Appendix C: Tables
Table 1: Levels of Trust in News Media, Generalized Trust and News Media Performance
(measured as Trust in Corrupt Journalists and Perceived News Media Corruption) in
Serbia

N

Range

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Trust in News Media

544

6.00

1.00

7.00

3.7346

1.25976

Generalized Trust

544

6.00

1.00

7.00

2.8989

1.38031

Trust in Corrupt Journalists

544

6.00

1.00

7.00

1.6489

.90028

544

6.00

1.00

7.00

5.26

1.406

Perceived News Media
Corruption
Valid N

544
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Table 2: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media
with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance
Variable

B

p

R2

Partial

Part

Correlatio

Correlation

R2

F Change

Change

Sign.
F Change

n
.148

Step 1
Pol. Party

-.025

.662

-.023

-.021

Income

.000

.997

.000

.000

Gender

-.036

.476

-.038.

-.035

.372

.000

.317

.309

.041

.418

.043

.040

Religiosity

.071

.172

.072

.067

Media Use

.061

.306

.054

.050

Education

-.058

.348

-.050

-.046

Age

-.085

.136

-.079

-.073

Affiliation

Trust in
Government
Discussion of
News

Step 2

.192
Pol. Party

.012

.825

.012

.011

Income

.002

.974

.002

.002

Gender

-.026

.595

-.028

-.025

.321

.000

.278

.260

.039

.431

.042

.038

Religiosity

.075

.145

.077

.070

Media Use

.033

.570

.030

.027

Education

-.060

.317

-.053

-.048

Age

-.082

.141

-.078

-.070

.119

.021

.122

.111

.163

.001

.173

.158

Affiliation

Trust in
Government
Discussion of
News

Gen. Trust

.045

9.843

.000

Trust in
Corrupt

Journalists
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.
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Table 3: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News
Media with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance and with
Age as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media
Variable

b

p

R2

Partial

Part

Correlatio

Correlation

R2

F Change

Change

Sign.
F Change

n
.192 .000

Step 3
Pol. Party

.012

.827

.012

.010

Income

.001

.984

.001

.001

Gender

-.026

.597

-.028

-.025

.322

.000

.277

.259

.039

.431

.042

.038

Religiosity

.075

.148

.077

.069

Media Use

.033

.570

.030

.027

Education

-.060

.318

-.053

-.048

Age

-.090

.455

-.040

-.036

.109

.452

.040

.036

.163

.001

.173

.158

Affiliation

Trust in
Government
Discussion of
News

Generalized
Trust

.006

.937

Trust in
Corrupt
Journalists
Age X

.014
.937
.004
.004
Gen.Trust
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.
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Table 4: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News
Media with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance and with
Education as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media
Variable

B

P

R2

Partial

Part

Correlatio

Correlation

R2

F Change

Change

Sign.
F Change

n
.195 .002

Step 3
Pol. Party

.012

.838

.011

.010

Income

.003

.957

.003

.003

Gender

-.030

.548

-.032

-.029

.325

.000

.281

.263

.038

.450

.040

.036

Religiosity

.072

.164

.074

.067

Media Use

.038

.519

.034

.031

Education

.040

.725

.019

.017

-.079

.156

-.075

-.068

.245

.064

.098

.088

.159

.001

.169

.153

Affiliation

Trust in
Government
Discussion of
News

Age
Generalized
Trust

1.068

.302

Trust in
Corrupt
Journalists
Education X

-.181
.302
-.055
-.049
Gen. Trust
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.
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Table 5: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News
Media with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance and with
Political Affiliation as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News
Media
Variable

B

P

Partial

Part

Correlati Correla
on

R2

R2

F

Sign.

change

change

F change

tion
.193 .001

Step 3
Pol. Party

-.042

.722

-.019

-.017

Income

.000

.994

.000

.000

Gender

-.024

.625

-.026

-.023

.324

.000

.280

.262

.041

.410

.044

.039

Religiosity

.076

.138

.079

.071

Media Use

.030

.602

.028

.025

Education

-.059

.332

-.052

-.046

Age

-.083.

.135

-.079

-.072

.098

.131

.080

.072

.162

.001

.172

.157

Affiliation

Trust in
Government
Discussion of
News

Generalized Trust
Trust in Corrupt
Journalists
Pol. Party X Gen.

.279

.598

.061
.598
.028
.025
Trust
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.
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Table 6: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media
with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance
Variable

b

p

R2

Partial

Part

Correlatio

Correlation

R2

F Change

Change

Sign.
F Change

n
.148

Step 1
Pol. Party

-.025

.662

-.023

-.021

Income

.000

.997

.000

.000

Gender

-.036

.476

-.038

-.035

.372

.000

.317

.309

.041

.418

.043

.040

Religiosity

.071

.172

.072

.067

Media Use

.061

.306

.054

.050

Education

-.058

.348

-.050

-.046

Age

-.085

.136

-.079

-.073

Affiliation

Trust in
Government
Discussion of
News

Step 2

.237
Pol. Party

-.023

.678

-.022

-.019

Income

.022

.687

.021

.019

Gender

.001

.976

.002

.001

.297

.000

.265

.240

.040

.828

.044

.038

Religiosity

.064

.196

.069

.060

Media Use

.038

.504

.035

.031

Education

-.068

.246

-.062

-.054

Age

-.082

.127

-.081

-.071

.123

.013

.131

.116

-.274

.000

-.289

-.264

Affiliation

Trust in
Government
Discussion of
News

Gen. Trust

.089

20.806

.000

Perceived
News Media

Corruption
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.
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Table 7: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News
Media with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance and
with Age as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media
Variable

b

p

R2

Partial

Part

Correlatio

Correlation

R2

F Change

Change

Sign.
F Change

n
.237 .000

Step 3
Pol. Party

-.022

.684

-.022

-.019

Income

.025

.652

.024

.021

Gender

.001

.979

.001

.001

.295

.000

.261

.236

.039

.417

.043

.038

Religiosity

.066

.189

.070

.061

Media Use

.038

.503

.036

.031

Education

-.046

.695

-.062

-.054

Age

-.090

.455

-.021

-.018

.169

.229

.064

.056

-.275

.000

-.289

-.264

Affiliation

Trust in
Government
Discussion of
News

Generalized
Trust

.120

.720

Perceived
News Media
Corruption
Age X

-.059
.729
-.018
-.016
Gen.Trust
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.
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Table 8: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News
Media with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance and
with Education as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News
Media
Variable

b

p

R2

Partial

Part

Correlatio

Correlation

R2

F Change

Change

Sign.
F Change

n
.239 .002

Step 3
Pol. Party

-.023

.675

-.022

-.019

Income

.023

.676

.022

.019

Gender

-.002

.979

-.002

-.002

.300

.000

.267

.242

.039

.423

.043

.037

Religiosity

.062

.214

.066

.058

Media Use

.041

.466

.039

.034

Education

.013

.114

.006

.005

-.080

.138

-.079

-.069

.224

.081

.093

.081

-.270

.000

-.285

-.259

Affiliation

Trust in
Government
Discussion of
News

Age
Generalized
Trust

.725

.395

Perceived
News Media
Corruption
Education X

-.145
.395
-.045
-.040
Gen. Trust
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.

193

Table 9: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News
Media with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance and
with Political Affiliation as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in
News Media
Variable

B

p

Partial

Part

Correlati Correla
on

R2

R2

F

Sign.

change

change

F change

tion
.237 .000

Step 3
Pol. Party

-.046

.689

-.019

-.017

Income

.021

.703

.000

.000

Gender

.002

.964

-.026

-.023

.298

.000

.280

.262

.041

.400

.044

.039

Religiosity

.065

.192

.079

.071

Media Use

.037

.518

.028

.025

Education

-.067

.252

-.052

-.046

Age

-.083

.125

-.079

-.072

.114

.069

.080

.072

-.273

.000

.172

.157

Affiliation

Trust in
Government
Discussion of
News

Generalized Trust
Perceived News
Media Corruption
Pol. Party X Gen.

.053

.818

.026
.818
.028
.025
Trust
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.

194

Table 10: Correlation Matrix of Indepedent and Dependent Variables
Trust News

Gen.Trust

Media
Pearson Correlation
Trust News Media

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation

Gen.Trust

Trust in Corrupt
Journalists
Perception of News Media
Corruption

1
544
.214

Trust in

Perception of

Corrupt

News Media

Journalists

Corruption

.214**

.198**

-.332**

.000

.000

.000

544

544

544

1

**

-.090*

.000

.036

**

.183

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

544

544

544

544

**

**

1

-.153**

Pearson Correlation

.198

.183

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

N

544

544

544

544

**

*

**

1

Pearson Correlation

-.332

-.090

.000
-.153

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.036

.000

N

544

544

544

544

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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